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1. Three common species of root aphids farmed by the ant Lasius flavus are characterised by clonal 
reproduction, rare dispersal and (genetic) monocultures at the lowest spatial scale. Such a combination of 
symbiont characteristics is commonly found in farming mutualisms and likely constitutes a general set of 
necessary conditions for the evolutionary stability of these systems. 
This thesis, Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8; e.g. Poulsen & Boomsma 2005 Science; Aanen et al. 2009 Science   
 
2. ‘Cattle farming’ by the ant L. flavus can be considered ‘niche construction’, since the ‘in-house’ 
availability of cattle-provided sugars and proteins allows for an exceptionally high density of this species 
in salt-marsh habitats; this domestication process can thus be considered analogous to the dramatic 
increase in human population densities after our ancestor’s cultural transition to a farming lifestyle. 
This thesis, Chapter 4; Larsen 1995 Ann. Rev. Antropology; Laland & Boogert 2010 Ecol. Economics  
 
3. Despite the importance of partner choice for the stability of many mutualisms, the low aphid diversity 
observed in L. flavus mounds can more parsimoniously be attributed to passive mechanisms of dispersal 
and local asexual reproduction in the root aphids rather than to active choice by the ants. 
This thesis, Chapters 2, 4, 7 and Box A 
 
4. Choosing to stick with cooperative partners does not automatically lead to the evolution of more 
cooperation. 
This thesis, Chapters 6 and 7 
 
5. Models involving conditional strategies can yield counter-intuitive results and novel ‘out-of-the-box’ 
insights, which can give rise to future research avenues of explicit hypothesis testing. 
This thesis, Chapters 6 and 7 
 
6. Low cost-benefit ratios and asymmetry in cooperative investments are key ingredients for successful 
mutualism. 
This thesis, Chapters 7, 8 
 
7. Up to 9.5 million tons of food is wasted in The Netherlands annually; this is largely because little value is 
given to food throughout the complete food chain. Therefore, an important lesson remains to be learned 
from yellow meadow ants: “De [L. flavus] mieren kennen er [het vee] de waarde van, het is hun schat” (In: “De 
wijsheid der mieren” by Prof. F.J.J. Buytendijk, 1922). 
De Nationale DenkTank 2012 
 
8. Parallel study of multiple study systems is needed to identify general patterns in biology. However, 
conducting a classical, descriptive study can be a handicap to (young) scientists developing novel study 
systems in evolutionary ecology, since the highest ranking journals prefer studies involving fancy new 
research technology. Yet, basic descriptive studies of a system’s biology are indispensable for making the 
application of these techniques to novel study systems worthwhile for between-system comparison. 
  
9. PhD curricula could be better adapted to the future careers of the students following them, because they 
appear mostly designed to prepare students for a career in science, while >30% of the students pursue a 
career outside academia directly after completion of their PhD. 
Sonneveld et al. 2010, IVLOS, Larsen & Lubbe 2008, VSNU 
 
10. People who say ‘yes’ are rewarded by the adventures they have; people who say ‘no’ are rewarded by the 
safety they attain.  
“Impro” by K. Johnstone, 1979  
The evolutionary ecology of mutualism
A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 1
This PhD project was carried out at the Theoretical Biology Group, which is
fpart of the Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Studies of the University o
Groningen (The Netherlands), according to the requirements of the Graduate
fSchool of Science (Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, University o
Groningen). Part of this project was also carried out at the Centre for Social
Evolution, Department of Biology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
Aniek Ivens received a PhD-grant from the Faculty of Mathematics and
Natural Sciences following top-master programme Evolutionary Biology. The
research was supported by the Pieter Langerhuizen Stipedium and by Stichting
Nicolaas Mulerius Fonds. The printing of this thesis was partly funded by the
University of Groningen and the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences,
University of Groningen.
Lay-out and figures: Dick Visser
Cover art work: Marlies Hulzebos
Cover design: Aniek Ivens
Pictures: All by Aniek Ivens, except for Figure 1.3C by Thijs Janzen
and the picture on page 192 by Jeroen Kuijpers
Printed by: Ipskamp Drukkers, Enschede
ISBN: 978-90-367-5828-4
ISBN: 978-90-367-5827-7 (electronic version)
A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 2
RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN
The evolutionary ecology of mutualism
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van het doctoraat in de
Wiskunde en Natuurwetenschappen
aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
op gezag van de 
Rector Magnificus, dr. E. Sterken,
in het openbaar te verdedigen op
vrijdag 23 november 2012
om 16.15 uur
door
Aniek Barbara Françoise Ivens
geboren op 22 augustus 1983
te Heerlen
A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 3
fPromotores: Pro . dr. F.J. Weissing
Prof. dr. J.J. Boomsma
Prof. dr. I.R. Pen
Beoordelingscommissie: Prof. dr. N.E. Pierce
Prof. dr. K.R. Foster
Prof. dr. B.J. Zwaan
A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 4
De mier
Ik heb sinds kort een mier,
ik noem het beessie Bartje,
't is zo'n mieren-mini-dier,
hij heeft een héél klein hartje,
maar dikwijls denk ik, sapperloot,
wat leeft er in die kleine?
't Geheim in hem is nét zo groot
of groter dan het mijne.
- Toon Hermans (1983)-
Voor Barbara en François
A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 5
A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 6
Contents
CHAPTER 1 General introduction and thesis outline 9
CHAPTER 2 Reproduction and dispersal in an ant-associated root aphid community 29
CHAPTER 3 Estimating the frequency of sexual reproduction in root aphids based on 53
microsatellite markers
CHAPTER 4 Ants farm subterranean aphids mostly in clonal groups - an example of 67
prudent husbandry for carbohydrates and proteins?
BOX A Partner choice in a farming mutualism: do ants display preference for 87
certain homopteran symbionts?
CHAPTER 5 Characterisation and cross-amplification of polymorphic microsatellite loci 99
in ant-associated root-aphids
BOX B MLGsim 2.0: updated software for detecting clones from microsatellite data 107
using a simulation approach
CHAPTER 6 Conditional dispersal can promote and hamper cooperation in 113
unexpected ways 
CHAPTER 7 Does joint evolution of cooperativeness and conditional dispersal promote 135
the evolution of mutualism?





Author affiliations and contact information 193
A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 7
A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 8
General introduction and thesis outline







A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 9
MUTUALISM
Mutualism, an interaction between different species that is beneficial for all actors, is wide-
spread throughout nature. To a large extent, mutualism has shaped, and is still shaping, life
on this planet. In fact, life as we know it would not have existed without mutualistic rela-
tionships. For example, all eukaryotic life is based on ancient endosymbiotic mutualisms
between its cells and formerly independent microorganisms (e.g. mitochondria, plasmids)
(Margulis 1971). Other mutualisms are known to have major impact on ecosystem stability,
such as specialized interactions between flowering plants and their pollinators, or seed dis-
persal by birds, mammals and other animals. The mutualistic relationship between humans
and their agricultural crops and domesticated animals was key to the dominant role our
species is now playing on our planet (Larsen 1995; Stachowicz 2001; Leigh 2010).
Already from these few examples it becomes clear that mutualism comes in many dif-
ferent types and forms. Known mutualisms range from one-to-one interactions [e.g. cleaner
fish that clean their client fish (Bshary & Grutter 2002; Bshary et al. 2002; Bshary &
Grutter 2006)] to mutualistic networks with many partners interacting with many, such as
several species of pollinators interacting simultaneously with several species of flowering
plants (Bascompte et al. 2006). Some mutualisms are associations for life or even multiple
generations [e.g. endosymbionts such as our gut-bacteria (Bäckhed et al. 2005; Booijink te
al. 2007) or fungus-growing ants that farm their mutualistic fungus in their nest (Mueller
2002; Poulsen & Boomsma 2005)], whereas other interactions are only short-termed [e.g.
fig-wasps that only complete part of their life cycle inside fig fruits (West & Herre 1994;
Jander & Herre 2010)]. In addition, mutualisms can also differ in how dependent partners
are on the interaction for survival and maximization of their reproductive success. In obli-
gate mutualisms partners fully depend on each other and the interaction, whereas in facul-
tative mutualisms the partners’ fitness is enhanced by the interaction, but partners can
also survive and reproduce on their own. Lastly, the nature of goods or services exchanged
differs significantly between mutualisms: some rely on transportation, others on nutrition
or protection (Bronstein 2001).
Despite its importance for all aspects of life and its huge diversity, mutualism has his-
torically received much less attention than other ecologically and evolutionarily important
processes, such as competition, host-parasite interactions, trophic relationships, or within-
species cooperation. Only in the last two decades, ecologists and evolutionary biologists
are starting to realize that the eco-evolutionary causes, consequences and stability of mutu-
alism are still poorly understood (as pointed out by Herre et al. 1999). With this disserta-
ftion, I aim to contribute to a better general understanding of the evolutionary ecology o
mutualism. To this end, I have combined two complementary approaches: a specialized
empirical approach via a detailed case study of a farming mutualism, that of the under-
ground ant Lasius flavus tending various species of root aphids inside its nest (Chapters 2-
5), and a more general theoretical approach, via the development of models about the
evolutionary emergence and stability of between- and within-species cooperation
(Chapters 6, 7). 
This chapter serves as an introduction to both approaches. First, I will introduce the
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the existing body of literature and highlighting the most important advances so far. I will
also introduce the most relevant terms (Table 1.1). This is followed by an introduction to
the particular group of farming mutualisms that my empirical studies address. Lastly, I will
give a brief overview of the aims and contents of the thesis.
THE PUZZLE OF WITHIN-SPECIES COOPERATION
Natural selection acts through competition for reproduction and survival. How then can
individuals evolve to help others with costly behaviour, whereas it would be more benefi-
cial to reap the benefits without paying the costs? Cooperation poses a particular problem
if social dilemmas arise, i.e. when the group as a whole would profit most if all members
would contribute to a common good, but where individual members would profit most by
not contributing, that is by ‘cheating’. But even in situations where all participants have an
individual incentive to cooperate, the evolution of cooperation is not self-evident, for
example when the cost and benefits of the interaction are asymmetrically distributed. The
widespread occurrence of cooperation and its evolution pose a problem that has been one
of the most hotly debated issues in evolutionary biology for several decades now (among
others Hamilton 1964a; 1964b; Trivers 1971; West-Eberhard 1975; Axelrod & Hamilton
y1981; Brown 1983; Queller 1985; Bull & Rice 1991; Fletcher & Doebeli 2009, recentl
reviewed in Sachs et al. 2004; West et al. y2007; Bourke 2011). The controversy evoked b
a recent paper on the evolution of eusociality (Nowak et al. 2010; Abbot et al. 2011;
Boomsma et al. 2011; Ferrière & Michod 2011; Nowak et al. 2011) indicates that even
today this problem remains a hot topic. Over the years, major conceptual advancements
have been made to resolve this evolutionary puzzle. Quite a number of reviews appeared
that tackled classification of the mechanisms that have been recognized to promote the
evolution of cooperation (beneficial interactions between both actors) and, more specifi-
cally, altruism (within-species cooperative behaviour that is costly to the partner and bene-
ficial to the recipient) (Sachs et al. 2004; Nowak 2006; West et al. 2007). In my view these
mechanisms can be crudely divided in two groups: the first consisting of mechanisms that
promote non-random associations fof interacting partners and the second consisting o
mechanisms for the expression of conditional strategies. I will now discuss these two groups
in more detail separately.
Mechanisms promoting non-random associations
As opposed to when interactions take place between random partners, interactions in non-
random associations take place between partners with a similar type of strategy, e.g. coop-
erative individuals interact with other cooperative individuals and non-cooperative ones
with other non-cooperative individuals. Mechanisms that promote such positive assort-
ment of cooperators include kin selection, which is relevant for the evolution of altruism
(Hamilton 1964a; 1964b) and passive assortment mechanisms (Queller 1992; 1994;
Fletcher & Doebeli 2009) such as population viscosity, that cause cooperative individuals
to encounter other co-operators more often than cheaters and vice versa (as seen for
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ment of cooperators reduces the benefits to be gained by cheaters: because cheaters and
cooperators mix to a lesser extent, cheating individuals cannot exploit the cooperative com-
munity.
Conditional strategies
The second group of mechanisms consists of conditional strategies, in which the behaviour
of an individual depends on its social context: what others do and who others are. A clas-
sical example of cooperation through conditional strategies is reciprocity, where individuals
have the opportunity to leave interactions when cheated upon (Trivers 1971). Well-known
examples of the study of cooperation through reciprocity are the numerous studies dealing
with the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) in game theory. The non-iterated version of this
game is the prototype example of a social dilemma involving two players (the ‘prisoners’),
for whom, although cooperation (‘not confessing a common crime’) would the best option
for both players, defecting (‘confessing’) remains the dominant strategy, because it yields
individually the highest benefit if one does not know what the other participant will do. As
a consequence, the game-theoretical solution (‘both players confess’) corresponds to an
outcome where both players are worse off than if they both had cooperated in denial. It
has been shown that the dilemma can – at least partly – be resolved if the players do not
play the game once but repeatedly (potentially infinitely). Some of the solutions corre-
spond to a cooperative outcome. Much discussed strategies leading to cooperation are ‘Tit-
For-Tat’ and related strategies (e.g. Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Selten & Hammerstein 1984;
Nowak & Sigmund 1993), where each player decides whether to cooperate or defect based
on previous experiences with the partner. The chance to decide to continue an interaction
or abandon a defecting partner has been termed partner fidelity in mutualism literature
(see below). Another well-known example of conditional strategies promoting cooperation
is the green beard theory (among others Hamilton 1964b; Dawkins 1976; Jansen & van
yBaalen 2006), in which individuals only cooperate with others that carry a trustworth
‘green beard’ marker that is correlated with cooperativeness. Besides theoretical studies,
genes that operate together with a kin effect as ‘green beard’ – genes have now also been
empirically identified, for example in social amoeba Dictyostelium and red fire ants (Keller
& Ross 1998; Queller et al. 2003). A last major category of conditional strategy–mecha-
nisms is part of the Biological Market Theory (BMT) (Noë & Hammerstein 1994). BMT
applies market mechanisms known from economy to biological contexts and is based on
the idea that individuals do not engage in interactions with everybody, but only do so with
cooperators (partner choice). Partner choice, partner fidelity and their possible interaction
have, however, seldom been studied simultaneously. In my thesis, I will address the rela-
tive importance of partner fidelity and partner choice in joint evolution with intraspecific
cooperation (Chapter 6).
Both groups of mechanisms listed can lead to the same end results: positive assortment
of co-operators. Therefore, these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Over the last few
years, attention of the literature shifted from studying altruism towards cooperation
ybetween non-kin and focussing on conditional strategies. Nevertheless, kin selection theor
still provides one of the most important explanations for the evolution of cooperation in
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THE EVEN GREATER PUZZLE OF BETWEEN-SPECIES COOPERATION
Kin selection theory is based on interacting partners carrying with a high probability iden-
tical genes (through identity by descent (IBD)). However, in interspecific cooperation IBD
cannot apply because interacting individuals of different species each have separate gene
pools. The existence of a wide diversity of mutualisms in which different species seem to
help each other thus poses several unsolved evolutionary problems. In fact, Darwin (1859)
already pointed out in his chapter on difficulties on his theory, that no species will ever
evolve traits or behaviour for the exclusive good of another species:
‘Natural selection will produce nothing in one species for the exclusive good or injury of
another; though it may as well produce parts, organs, and excrements highly useful or
even indispensable (...) to another species, but in all cases at the same time useful to the
owner.’
Both the evolutionary emergence of mutualism and the maintenance of mutualism remain
poorly understood. How does cooperation between individuals of different species come
off the ground to start with? Then, once a mutualistic interaction has been established,
natural selection will continue to act on the separate partners and seldom on the mutual-
ism as a whole. The partners may thus both be selected to reap the benefits from the inter-
faction without paying the costs of investment, causing cheating behaviour and conflicts o
interests between the partners (Herre et al. 1999; Bronstein 2001; Bergstorm et al. 2002;
Sachs & Simms 2006). For this reason, mutualism has previously also been defined as
‘mutual exploitation with net benefits for both’ (Herre et al. 1999). How then can mutualism
emerge? And what prevents subsequent mutualism breakdown when faced with cheaters
and conflict between partners? Several mechanisms have been put forward that can
ypromote mutualism emergence and maintenance. These mechanisms are not mutuall
exclusive and can be simultaneously at work in shaping interspecific interactions. Here, I
will give a brief overview, albeit not exhaustive, of the main theoretical concepts concern-
ing mutualism evolution and stability. 
By-products and the importance of cost-benefit ratios
Many mutualisms may have started off as a by-product mutualism: a selfish act (i.e. per-
formed solely for one’s own good), which results in a good or a service (the ‘by-product’)
that is incidentally beneficial for a partner species (West-Eberhard 1975; Brown 1983;
Connor 1995; Leimar & Connor 2003). Typically, these interactions start as asymmetric
interactions: one partner produces a by-product from which the other partner profits (such
an interaction is also called commensalism). Through co-adaptation of both partners this
exchange of by-products can then further evolve into mutualism (Connor 1995). In fact,
some have argued that maybe all mutualisms that are known today started with by-prod-
ucts in at least one of the partners (Connor 1995). Well-known examples of by-product
mutualism are ant-homopteran interactions in which homopterans (aphids, coccids)
provide their faeces (honeydew) to ants, which provide protective services in return
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the cost-benefit ratio of the interaction is very low: it does not incur (almost) any costs pro-
Aducing the good, but does receive the benefits of the goods or services gained in return. 
low cost-benefit ratio of the interaction might thus be a good incentive for a species to
engage in mutualism. Also, a low cost-benefit ratio makes the interaction less prone to
cheating as there are no large costs to be avoided in the first place. Indeed, in theoretical
models, cost-benefit ratios have been shown to play a major role in the evolution of mutu-
yalism in several studies (Foster & Wenseleers 2006; Lehmann & Keller 2006). In fact, man
r yegard mutualism and parasitism as two ends of a single continuum as is also illustrated b
Herre et al.’s (1999) definition of mutualism as mutual exploitation (Bronstein 1994;









Table 1.1 Glossary of used terms.
Term Definition
Altruism Within-species interaction that is beneficial to the recipient and costly to the
actor
Parasitism Interaction between different species that is beneficial to one partner and
costly to the other
Mutualism Interaction between different species that is beneficial for all (both) partners
Commensalism Interaction between different species that is beneficial to one partner and has
(by-product mutualism) a neutral effect on the other partner
Farming mutualism Mutualism in which one partner promotes the growth of the other partner on
which it relies for food
Symbiosis Interaction in which different species live closely together, often lifelong.
Symbiosis can be parasitic or mutualistic
Host/endosymbiont Asymmetric interaction between (often) a large, long lived species (the host)
mutualism and a small, short lived species (the symbiont), that either lives inside the 
body of the host or in a structure built by the host
Obligate/facultative In obligate mutualisms, both partners are dependent on the interaction for
mutualism survival and/or reproduction. In facultative mutualism, partners are not strictly
dependent on the interaction and on each other.
Horizontal transmission Transmission of symbionts between different hosts (can happen within a
single host generation)
Vertical transmission Transmission of symbionts from a host to its descendants (often during host
reproduction)
Relatedness Genetic correlation between interacting individuals of the same species 
Between-species Correlated occurrence of genes in different species
genetic correlation
Partner fidelity The possibility for an interacting individual to abandon or continue the current
interaction dependent on the partner’s past behaviour
Partner choice A mechanism that allows individuals to differently interact with cooperative
and non-cooperative partners
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ythe continuum depends on its cost-benefit ratio. Over evolutionary time partners ma
move along this continuum and the nature of the interactions can change as the partners
co-evolve. The continuum can be best thought of as a balance that can tip to both sides.
Parasitism can evolve from mutualism if two partners are mutually dependent and thus
‘trapped’ in the interaction and one of the partners evolves to exploit the other (Sachs &
Simms 2006). Alternatively, parasitism can also be a starting point for mutualism if the
parasitized host manages to evolve to profit from the presence of the parasite (Yamamura
1993; Aanen & Hoekstra 2007).
Generalized kin selection
Genetic relatedness (through IBD) is not possible between individuals of different species.
However, genetic correlation across species boundaries (= between-species genetic correla-
tion f) can occur when two species enhance each other’s productivity because individuals o
both species with similar traits tend to co-occur and interact. For example, in case of traits
involved in cooperation, this happens when between-species assortment causes coopera-
ftive individuals of one partner species to tend to interact with cooperative individuals o
the other species (Queller 1985; Frank 1994; Doebeli & Knowlton 1998; Fletcher &
Doebeli 2009). The presence of this between-species genetic correlation can thus promote
interspecific cooperation.
Reciprocity
Reciprocity, as discussed in the previous section on within-species cooperation, has been
put forward by Trivers (1971) (under the misleading name of ‘reciprocal altruism’) as a
mechanism that could favour cooperation between unrelated individuals, also of different
species. In the vast body of work inspired by this idea, the framework of the IPD has also
been applied to the study of mutualism in several theoretical models, even though IPD
assumes a symmetric interaction whereas most mutualisms are asymmetric (among others
rBull & Rice 1991; Doebeli & Knowlton 1998; Hoeksema & Bruna 2000). Nevertheless, fo
this framework of repeated interactions to apply in nature, at least one or both of the
following requirements needs to be fulfilled: (1) the partners have the ability to alter their
behaviour in response to the outcome of previous interactions, i.e. fbreak up interactions i
desired and (2) to choose with whom to interact. These two requirements each correspond
to one of the factors put forward by Bull & Rice (1991): (1) partner fidelity and (2) rpartne
choice. These factors have come to play a large role in theoretical as well as empirical
approaches to mutualism and are still debated to date (Weyl et al. 2010; Kiers et al. 2011;
Weyl et al. 2011). I will discuss these factors in detail in the next paragraphs.
Partner fidelity
Partner fidelity translates to whether a partner will still be available for interaction in the
next round; in other words, partner fidelity offers interacting partners the possibility to
choose whether to continue or abandon an interaction. If partners repeatedly choose to
continue the interaction, a partner fidelity feedback can occur. This long-term series creates
a positive feedback loop between the fitness of the two partners: cooperation will indi-











A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 15
et al. k2010). Several mechanisms can favour the establishment of partner fidelity feedbac
in nature, all of them causing the interacting partners to be connected in space and/or
time. For example, partners can co-disperse (in space) or co-reproduce (in time). If cooper-
ative individuals of partner species tend to be spatially or temporally clustered, both
species will indirectly gain benefits from their own investment into cooperation with the
other species, because these benefits are likely to be returned, hence partner fidelity feed-
back can take effect. 
Partner choice and sanctioning
Partner choice allows actors to discriminate between individuals of the partner species and
specifically direct cooperative actions towards cooperative individuals of the partners (Bull
& Rice 1991). Partner choice thus can take two forms: selection of partners before engag-
ing in interaction [so called ‘screening’, known from bobtail squids which selectively allow
fluorescent bacteria to enter their body, (Archetti et al. 2011)] and sanctioning of non-
cooperative partners [known from client fish which reject nibbling cleaner fish (Bshary &
Grutter 2002) and plants which cut off nutrient supplies to bacteria that do not fix enough
nitrogen for them (Kiers et al. 2003)]. Partner choice and sanctioning have been exten-
sively studied, both theoretically [mainly as part of the BMT (Noë & Hammerstein 1994)]
and empirically [in among others cleaner fish, plant – rhizosphere systems and the bobtail
squid (Bshary et al. 2002; Kiers & Denison 2008; McFall-Ngai 2008)]. 
In this thesis, I modelled the joint evolution of partner fidelity, partner choice and
mutualism (Chapter 7). The evolution of within – and between-species cooperation have
historically been studied separately from each other, although similar if not identical mech-
anisms may be at play. By deriving very similar models for within-species cooperation
(Chapter 6) and between-species cooperation (Chapter 7), I will be able to closely compare
the results and we can gain further insight in the similarities and the differences between
these two processes.
FARMING MUTUALISM
Maybe it is simply not possible to cover the full diversity of mutualisms in a single theoret-
ical framework. It is certainly not possible to cover the huge diversity of mutualisms in a
fsingle thesis. In the empirical part of this thesis, I therefore consider a particular kind o
mutualism, farming mutualism. In this section, I will zoom in on these interactions more
closely. 
In farming mutualisms, the host partner promotes the growth of a symbiont that it
depends on for food. This dependence includes both mutualistic systems in which the host
feeds on goods produced by the symbiont and systems in which the host consumes the
symbiont [the latter is commonly called ‘cultivation mutualism’ (Hata & Kato 2006)].
Many examples can be found in nature and these systems often show interesting parallels
to human practices of cattle breeding and crop growing. For example, several insects are
known to actively grow fungus as a crop in their nest, such as the leaf-cutter ants (Weber
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et al. 2002; Aanen et al. 2009) and ambrosia beetles (Farrell et al. 2001; Biedermann &
T faborsky 2011). Other examples of crop growing include damselfish keeping gardens o
multiple species of algae, which they actively protect from other grazers (Hata & Kato
2006; Hata et al. 2010) and even Dictyostelium amoeba that prudently farm the bacteria
they eat (Brock et al. 2011). The best known examples of ‘cattle breeding’ are many differ-
ent species of ants tending above ground or below ground homopterans for ‘milk’ (honey-
dew) and sometimes ‘meat’ (Way 1963; Stadler & Dixon 2005; Stadler & Dixon 2008;
Ben-Dov & Fischer 2010). These systems differ in how dependent participants are on the
interaction; both hosts and symbionts can be found that are obligately dependent on the
other, but farming mutualisms can also be of facultative nature. 
Farming mutualisms are inherently asymmetric: often the host species is larger, longer
lived and engages in the interaction as a single individual (or colony). The symbiont
species interacts often as a group of multiple individuals, has a short generation time and
is smaller. Moreover, especially in systems where the host consumes the symbiont, the ben-
efits to be gained by the host from the interaction stem directly from the ultimate sacrifice
of the symbiont: giving its life. Generally, where species rely so closely on each other for
survival and reproduction in an asymmetric interaction, the interests of the partners will
never be fully aligned and conflict lures around every corner. Because it is often the host
that is in control over the symbiont, the three main arenas of host/symbiont conflict in
farming mutualisms concern the symbiont life history characteristics (1) symbiont repro-
kductive mode, (2) symbiont transmission and dispersal, and (3) symbiont diversity (Fran
1996; Herre et al. 1999; Mueller 2002). Indeed, host control over mutualistic symbionts is
thought to be essential for evolutionary stability of mutualisms (Frank 1996; Herre et al.
1999; Sachs et al. 2004; Archetti et al. 2011). However, are the hosts really in complete
control and what outcomes of these conflicts are preferred by host and symbiont? Below, I
will introduce these three conflicts, their possible outcomes and host/symbiont perspec-
ytives in general (Table 1.2). After that, I will discuss how they potentially apply to m
study system of ants farming root aphids, after having introduced that system in detail.
Symbiont reproduction
In terms of reproductive mode, it would be in the interest of the host to prevent the sym-
biont from sexually reproducing: energy allocation to sexual reproduction is avoided and
beneficial combinations of genes are preserved, because they are not reshuffled by recom-
bination. For the symbiont it would be beneficial to sexually reproduce to avoid inbreeding
effects and remain resilient in changing environments (Table 1.2). However, when hosts
provide very stable niches by creating a protective environment to symbionts (Law & Lewis
1983; Law 1985; Wulff 1985), sexual reproduction might no longer be the preferred option
for symbionts the environment no longer changes and the benefits of asexual reproduction
(higher reproductive rate, not having to search for a mate) can take precedence. In this
case, host control may thus emerge as a by-product of genotypic predictability. Indeed,
several symbiotic bacteria such as Buchnera are both under host control through asexual,
vertical transmission and enjoy highly predictable growth conditions in specific host tissues
(Moran et al. 2008). Fungus-growing termites are known to suppress sexual reproduction
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press sexual reproduction of their fungus permanently, so that clonal vertical transmission
is the rule (Weber 1972; Mueller et al. 1998; Bot et al. 2001; Aanen et al. 2009, but see
Mikheyev et al. 2006).
Symbiont transmission and dispersal
Symbionts can be either horizontally or vertically transmitted. Under horizontal transmis-
sion, symbionts disperse independently from their host. Typically, at the beginning of a
host generation, hosts associate with symbionts that are unrelated to symbionts with which
their parents were associated. Under vertical transmission, symbionts are transmitted to
descendants of their previous hosts during host reproduction. Vertical transmission is in
the interest of both host and symbiont on the long-term, because it allows co-evolution
between the mutualistic partners and hence productivity of the system can increase.
Horizontal transmission, however, allows the symbiont on the short term to escape less
beneficial interactions and to explore new habitats and avoid competition with close rela-
tives (Hamilton & May 1977). Also, horizontal transmission allows the host to choose
among potential symbionts and select the best partners (Table 1.2). Vertical transmission
occurs in many mutualisms, ranging from endosymbionts such as Buchnera referred to
above to ectosymbionts such as the fungus-growing attine ants in which virgin queens
carry a piece of fungus from their natal nest on their nuptial flight (Weber 1972, but see
Poulsen et al. 2009), two species of fungus-growing termites which carry asexual fungus
spores on their mating flight (Korb & Aanen 2003) or ant-tended coccids that climb the
yback of virgin queens ready for take-off (Hölldobler & Wilson 1990). There are also plent
of examples of horizontal symbiont transmission, such as the fungus of several fungus-
growing termites (Aanen et al. 2002) and above-ground aphids tended by ants (Yao 2010;
Vantaux et al. 2011a).
Symbiont diversity
The conflict on symbiont diversity deals with the question of polyculture versus monocul-
ture, a topic that is also debated with respect to human agriculture. From the symbiont’s
viewpoint, some diversity might be preferred, because this would prevent competition with
close relatives and the chance to outcompete non-relatives (Frank 1996). Mutualistic hosts
may, however, favour predominant or exclusive monocultures if coexistence of multiple
strains or species within the same host allows costly contest competition (Frank 1996) or
free-riding by underperforming symbionts, leading to a direct reduction in overall produc-
tivity (e.g. Bronstein 2001; Kiers & Denison 2008). Moreover, competition among sym-
bionts may also select for virulent competitive traits that will indirectly also harm the host
(Wulff 1985; Frank 1996). In addition, the high symbiont relatedness encountered in
monocultures will allow the host to effectively select productive symbionts through artifi-
cial selection. Also, uniform conditions allowed by monoculture may increase mutualism
productivity in undisturbed environments. This latter argument, however, remains debated,
because a community of multiple symbionts might also offer a broader spectrum of serv-
ices or might be less vulnerable to parasites (e.g. van Borm et al. 2002). Host control over
symbiont diversity generally happens through specific mechanisms of symbiont screening



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 19
performance (Kiers & Denison 2008; Weyl et al. 2010). The relative importance of these
mechanisms is somewhat controversial, but available data suggest that monocultures are
fcommonly found in the farming mutualisms that have been studied, from the gardens o
algae-growing damselfish (Hata & Kato 2002) to those of fungus-growing termites and
ants (Bot et al. 2001; Poulsen & Boomsma 2005; Aanen et al. 2009; Mueller et al. 2010).
In fungus-farming leaf-cutting ants, monocultures appear to be enforced by a combination
of incompatibility between genetically different symbiont strains and active symbiont polic-
ing by the hosts (Poulsen & Boomsma 2005; Ivens et al. 2009; Mueller et al. 2010),
whereas a simple mechanism of positive frequency-dependent propagation within estab-
lished colonies appears sufficient to enforce life-time commitment between a termite host
colony and a single symbiont clone (Aanen et al. 2009). However, more studies are needed
to establish the generality of this principle, particularly for farming mutualisms where
hosts are able to segregate symbionts in space (compartmentalization) or time to avoid
competition (Palmer et al. 2010), so that the benefits of polyculture might surpass the
costs.
What becomes clear from the sections above is that these three arenas of potential con-
flicts and their possible outcomes are not independent and all three are closely intertwined
in a complicated web of costs and benefits of possible outcomes, host control mechanisms































































Figure 1.1 f fFlow diagram o  host actions and symbiont traits involved in arming mutualism con-
flict resolution. The top panel lists host actions, the lower panel lists symbiont life-history charac-
teristics and their arenas of potential conflict with their possible outcomes (symbiont reproduction,
diversity, transmission). Two sets of outcomes are often observed in nature: asexual reproduction,
monoculture and vertical transmission (in grey) and sexual reproduction, polyculture and horizon-
tal transmission. Arrows show relationships and plus and minus signs indicate the nature of the
relationship (positive or negative).
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ythe alternative outcomes of the three conflicts are influenced directly and indirectly b
mechanisms of host control (top panel) and interactions among each other (lower panel).
In practice, two sets of outcomes are often found in nature: (1) asexual reproduction,
monocultures and vertical transmission (given in grey) vs. (2) sexual reproduction, poly-
cultures and horizontal transmission.
L. FLAVUS ANTS FARMING ROOT APHIDS – A CASE STUDY
The study system
wThe focal empirical study system of this thesis is the interaction between the Yello
meadow ant Lasius flavus and the root aphids it tends in underground nests. This sub-
terranean interaction is a typical example of a farming mutualism as the ants actively tend,
house and protect the root aphids on which they depend for sugar (through honeydew
consumption) (Figure 1.2) and nitrogen (through aphid consumption) (Pontin 1958;
y1961b; 1978; Heie 1980; Seifert 2007). Also the aphids are presumed to be obligatel
dependent on this interaction as they presumably cannot survive without the grooming
and the protective environment offered by the ants (personal observation, Pontin 1959;
Paul 1977; Heie 1980; Hölldobler & Wilson 1990; Smart 1991). Most aphid species found
in nests of Lasius flavus show myrmecophilous adaptations (adapted to living with ants)
that preclude a free-living lifestyle (Paul 1977; Heie 1980; Hölldobler & Wilson 1990) and
aphid population growth has previously been reported to increase with ant attendance
(Smart 1991).
Although Lasius flavus and its root aphids are commonly found in Northwest Europe
and the mutualistic character of the interaction has been known for decades [with the
earliest reference describing aphids from ant nests dating from 1738 (Réaumur 1738)],
the system has seldom been studied and most natural history characteristics remain
wunknown. For example, it has remained unclear how new ant colonies acquire aphids, ho
(genetically) diverse aphid life stocks are, how these aphids reproduce, and what the costs
yand benefits for the mutualistic partners are. Consequently, our knowledge of this stud
system at the beginning of the project was very limited and based on a sparse set of litera-











Figure 1.2 fSchematic view o  Lasius flavus
worker ‘milking’ a root aphid for honeydew.
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records by Heie (1980), two British dissertations (Paul 1977; Smart 1991) and two Danish
studies from the early 90’s (Godske 1991; 1992). Below, I will describe the ‘players’ of the
mutualism in more detail, as well as the scope for conflict and cooperation in this mutualism.
The host ants
Lasius flavus is an ant species that occurs throughout the Palearctic region. It is quite
common in Northwest and Central Europe, where it mostly occurs in stable (chalk-) grass-
lands and on salt marshes. Its species name flavus refers to its yellow colour, which is
caused by the lack of pigment resulting from its subterranean life style as compared to its
darker ‘cousin' Lasius niger. Especially in salt marsh habitats and old, extensively grazed,
pastures L. flavus colonies build conspicuous mounds that can be elevated up to 50 cm
above the soil surface and reach diameters of more than 120 cm (Figure 1.3). When not
disturbed, these mounds can remain for more than 100 years, being re-colonized by new
ant colonies over time. L. flavus populations can reach average densities that are among the
fhighest reported for ants (Boomsma & Van Loon 1982). In the Netherlands, only a few o
these high density populations remain, notably at old cow pasture ‘Junner Koeland’, near
Ommen and on the salt marsh of the island of Schiermonnikoog. Most empirical research
presented in this thesis was performed at this latter location (Chapter 2; 4; Box A).
L. flavus –ants appear to live in colonies with a single or at most a few queens (mono 
and polygynous colonies) and colony size can reach numbers of 23000–100000 workers
(Boomsma et al. 1993; Seifert 2007). Colonies are generally monodomous, i.e. separate
nest mounds belong to separate colonies. Mating takes place in mating flights when virgin
queens and males leave their natal nest to meet in the air on a single or very few suitable
days in the summer. Queens mate 1–2 times and found a new colony after shedding their
wings (Boomsma et al. 1993; Janzen 2009; van Boheemen 2010). Queens have also been
reported to peacefully co-found new colonies. Queens can live up to 22.5 years (Boomsma
et al. 1993; Seifert 2007).
The soil nests of L. flavus contain especially constructed aphid chambers (Figure 1.3A),










Figure 1.3 f fImpressions rom the ield. A) aphid chamber with aphid (Geoica utricularia) livestock,
B) salt marsh with Lasius flavus kmounds, C) sampling aphids from an ant mound (photos by: Anie
Ivens (A, B), Thijs Janzen (C)).
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parasites and predators (Pontin 1958; 1959; 1961b; Paul 1977; Pontin 1978). The honey-
dew secreted by the aphids is likely to be the almost exclusive source of carbohydrates for
the fully subterranean L. flavus ants, as other subterranean carbon sources are very limited
in the typical salt marsh and chalk-grassland habitats of these ants. Stable isotope analyses
have confirmed that in the presence of aphids there is a demonstrable intermediate trophic
level between the vegetation and the ants, consistent with the aphids being an intermedi-
ate food web node (A.B.F. Ivens & M. Schrama, unpublished data). L. flavus ants have also
been recorded to eat a major proportion of their root aphids, suggesting that they also
utilize their ‘dairy cattle’ to increase protein acquisition (Pontin 1958; 1961b; 1978; Smart
1991; Ivens et al. 2012a; Chapter 4). This implies that, similar to other subterranean ants,
L. flavus depends on root aphid husbandry for producing colonies large enough to repro-
duce (Way 1963; Hölldobler & Wilson 1990).
The symbiont aphids
Thirteen different species of root aphids have been frequently described from Lasius flavus
nests (Pontin 1978; Heie 1980; Godske 1991; Chapter 8) although some records mention
even 23 species (Paul 1977; Seifert 2007). These thirteen species vary substantially in
their abundance, distribution and (known) natural history details (Pontin 1978; Heie
1980; Godske 1991; 1992). This made us decide to focus empirical studies on the four
most common and abundant species at our study site Schiermonnikoog: Geoica utricularia,
Tetraneura ulmi, Forda marginata and its sibling species Forda formicaria.
These four root aphid species appear to be obligately dependent on living with ants
(i.e. to be obligate myrmecophiles), as they have all lost predator defence mechanisms
common in other aphids (Way 1963; Paul 1977; Heie 1980; Hölldobler & Wilson 1990):
All four species have poorly developed cornicles (organs for protective wax production)
and none of them is able to jump (Way 1963; Paul 1977; Heie 1980) as free living species
typically do to escape predation. Most importantly, they all have a set of long anal hairs
that can hold droplets of honeydew, a ‘trophobiotic organ’ that is only found in myrme-
cophilous aphids (Way 1963; Paul 1977; Heie 1980; Hölldobler & Wilson 1990). These
aphids are most often associated with L. flavus, but can also be found in nests of other ant
genera, such as Myrmica (Heie 1980). Apart from having distinct myrmecophilous traits
that reveal obligate dependence on ant care, some of these aphids are also dependent on
the ants for survival during overwintering (Way 1963; Paul 1977; Heie 1980). The sparse
literature suggests that there may be considerable variation in this overwintering adapta-
tion, as some aphids are known to have maintained holocyclic sexual reproduction (see
box on aphid reproduction) and would therefore have to leave the ant nests during
autumn, whereas others are facultatively or obligately anholocyclic (Paul 1977; Pontin
1978; Heie 1980; Godske 1991), i.e. ydo not move host plant and are permanentl
parthenogenetic. This possible polymorphism provided a main incentive for choosing these
four focal species in our studies, as differences in reproductive cycle would provide inter-
esting test beds for theory on potential host-symbiont conflict over symbiont reproductive
ymode. It also remains unclear how the root aphids and the ants embark on their colon
specific associations. In a pilot study (Box A of this thesis), I therefore investigated the
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POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE
LASIUS FLAVUS - ROOT APHID SYSTEM
Aphid reproduction
The fact that the root aphids tended by Lasius flavus may have the ability to reproduce
fboth sexually and asexually (see box on aphid reproduction) implies a potential conflict o
reproductive interest between the ants and the aphids over the best aphid reproductive
mode. Holocyclic sexual reproduction that requires the aphids to leave the ant nest yields
the advantages associated with sexual reproduction for the aphid symbiont, but is almost
certainly not in the interest of the ants as it would make them lose their livestock partners.
On the other hand, a stable environment might render risky sexual reproduction unneces-
sary for the aphids, whereas the ants might prefer at least some sexual reproduction among
their aphids, for example to increase aphid resilience against parasites. Data on this con-
flict and its resolution are very sparse. Ant suppression of aphid sex has not been reported,
although several mechanisms of suppressing aphid dispersal by other host ants (delaying
falate (winged individuals) production, active wing clipping) may indicate the potential o
host ant control over aphid sexual reproduction by prohibiting aphids to disperse to the
primary host plant for sexual reproduction (Way 1963; Hölldobler & Wilson 1990). In
addition, many above-ground myrmecophilous aphids are known to have maintained their
sexual cycle (Heie 1980; Yao 2010; Vantaux et al. 2011a), but reproduction of myrme-
cophilous root aphids had not been studied in detail before I embarked on my thesis
project. 
The sparse available literature suggests that all four focal aphid species have been
observed to live anholocyclically on the roots of secondary host grasses (Festuca rubra,
Agrostis spp. and Elytrigia maritima) in ant mounds (Muir 1959; Pontin 1978; Heie 1980;
Godske 1991; Godske 1992). The Forda species and G. utricularia appear to be anholo-
cyclic in Northern and Central Europe (including the sampling area of our study), but
holocyclic in Southern Europe, where their primary host Pistacia spp. (Anacardiaceae)
occurs (Heie 1980). In contrast to the other three species, T. ulmi has been observed to be
holocyclic at several sites in Northwest Europe and Scandinavia (Heie 1980). This species
was therefore expected to also be holocyclic in The Netherlands, with an obligate annual
host shift to elm trees (Ulmus spp.; Ulmaceae) as primary host for sexual reproduction in
autumn (Heie 1980). However, Pontin (1978) and Godske (1991) suggested that T. ulmi
can also abandon its sexual phase and occur anholocyclically on grass roots in Northwest
Europe. This indicated that there might be substantial intra- and interspecific variation in
reproductive mode and life-cycle, suggesting different outcomes within a single system for
ythis potential host-symbiont conflict. This formed the main incentive for a detailed stud
of root aphid reproductive mode with the use of genetic markers (Ivens et al. 2011; 2012b;
Chapters 2; 3; 5).
Aphid dispersal
A second potential conflict between L. flavus and its root aphids concerns aphid dispersal,
as there is both conflict of interest on transmission mode (horizontal vs. vertical transmis-
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of vertical transmission (vectoring) by ant queens during mating flights has been restricted
to some highly specialized interactions that involve coccids (Way 1963; Hölldobler &
Wilson 1990), so that aphids or coccids are assumed to be horizontally transmitted in
other ant-homopteran interactions. However, ants have repeatedly been shown to restrict
aphid dispersal. Indirect evidence for restricted dispersal was obtained by Yao (2010) after
finding higher FIS values for (holocyclic) ant-attended Tuberculatus aphids than for unat-












Aphids have two alternative and partly overlapping reproductive cycles (see figure):
(1) in the case of holocyclic reproduction, aphids reproduce asexually during most of
the year, with a single sexual generation in a distinct season, e.g. just before over-
wintering. This form of cyclic asexuality can involve obligate dispersal to a primary
host plant, on which mating occurs, and the recurrent colonization of a secondary
host plant for asexual reproduction during the rest of the year. (2) In the case of
anholocyclic reproduction, aphids reproduce exclusively asexually. Anholocyclic
aphids often live on a secondary host plant year around, because the primary host of
their close sexual relative is no longer used. Closely related aphid species may have
very different reproductive cycles (reviewed in Simon et al. 2002), and even popula-
tions of the same species have been found to differ in their mode of reproduction




Schematic diagram of aphid life cycles. The left panel shows a holocyclic cycle, in which
aphids reproduce clonally through the year and sexually in autumn, after which the eggs
overwinter. The right panel shows an anholocyclic cycle in which aphids reproduce clonally
throughout the year. Note that winged dispersers can occur in both cycles. Figure modified
from Heie 1980.
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aphid dispersal and lower alate production in various ant-aphid interactions (Way 1963;
Kindlmann et al. 2007; Oliver et al. 2007; Yao 2010; Tegelaar et al. 2011). The underlying
mechanisms described for Lasius ants vary from dispersal inhibition through semiochemi-
cals that slow down aphids (Oliver et al. 2007) to population regulation preventing aphid
numbers reaching the critical threshold for alate production (Way 1963), and wing-clip-
ping behaviour. Alate (winged) individuals have been described for the four most common
(and focal) aphid species in L. flavus nests in at least some populations (Paul 1977; Heie
1980). These could either be asexually produced dispersers or, where these winged indi-
viduals were produced in connection with a host shift, be indicators of sexual reproduction
not having been lost completely. Alate frequency and population viscosity of these four
species were further investigated in my study presented in Chapter 2, to gain more insight
into the outcome of the potential conflict on aphid transmission and dispersal.
Aphid (genetic) diversity
The third and last potential conflict between the ants and their root aphids concerns aphid
livestock diversity. For the ants, a homogenous aphid livestock will prevent the potential
costs of virulent aphid-aphid competition and thus increase productivity of the system. On
the other hand a diverse aphid livestock might be more resilient against specialized
pathogens. Aphids may also gain from living in a polyculture, because competition with
close relatives is reduced when there is at least some niche segregation (e.g. using different
grass species). Clonal mixing has been well-studied in social gall-forming aphids (among
others Abbot 2009). In this context, increased relatedness among members of an aphid
colony is predicted to promote cooperation between the gall members. These studies
yshowed that relatedness among gall members tended to be high, but clonal diversit
increased over the course of the season, as dispersing aphids entered existing colonies.
Similar results were obtained by Vantaux et al. (2011a) for tree-dwelling, ant-tended,
aphids. This study also showed that ant-tending did not affect aphid colony diversity, con-
firming earlier findings by Yao & Akimoto (2009). No previous studies have addressed the
details of within-nest root aphid genetic- and species diversity. The molecular markers
developed in my studies (Ivens et al. 2011; Chapter 5) enabled me to address these issues
in detail in the study presented in Ivens et al. (2012a; Chapter 4).
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
In this thesis, I will first present my empirical work after which I will continue with the
ymore general theoretical chapters to conclude with an epilogue that focusses specificall
on farming mutualisms. In Chapter 2, I investigated outcomes of the first two potential
host-symbiont conflicts on symbiont reproductive mode and dispersal in the L. flavus
system. Using microsatellite markers, I show that the four most common root aphid species
in L. flavus nests reproduce predominantly clonally and that dispersal is rare in all species.
In Chapter 3, I reflect on the statistical methods available for determining reproductive
mode from microsatellite data, as applied in Chapter 2. This simulation study using the
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confirm with traditional statistical methods based on microsatellite data only. Chapter 4
then focusses on the outcomes with respect to symbiont diversity. In this chapter, I investi-
gated aphid (genetic) diversity within L. flavus mounds, showing that different aphid
species and clonal lineages occur mostly spatially separated in Lasius flavus nests. In addi-
tion, the results indicate that the study system may be an example case of prudent hus-
bandry for both carbohydrates and proteins. Whether ants are able to actively discriminate
between different aphids, a prerequisite for complete host control over symbionts, remains
unclear. Box A reports on a pilot study in which I conducted partner choice experiments to
investigate ant discriminatory ability between different aphids. Chapter 5 reports on the
development and cross-amplification of the microsatellite markers used in Chapters 2, 3, 4
and Box 1 and similar markers developed for three additional root aphid species com-
monly found in nests of Lasius flavus. To conclude the empirical part of the dissertation,
Box B reports on the software to detect clonal lineages in a microsatellite dataset, which I
updated to use in Chapter 2. With Chapter 6 the theoretical part of this thesis starts. This
modelling study aimed to investigate the joint evolution partner fidelity, partner choice
and within-species cooperation. I show that conditional dispersal (equivalent to partner
fidelity) can indeed promote the evolution of cooperation, but that conditional settlement
(partner choice) only plays a marginal role in this model. Also, the evolved conditional
strategies differ strikingly from what is generally expected in this context. In Chapter 7 I
present a follow-up study to Chapter 6 to investigate whether the same results apply to
between-species cooperation. The study shows that in this case both conditional dispersal
and conditional settlement promote the evolution of cooperation. Also, I show that these
processes can lead to asymmetric cooperative interactions that are highly dynamic. I will
conclude with an epilogue presented in Chapter 8, which will focus on the new insights
yinto farming mutualism gained from this thesis, as well as an evaluation of the stud
system and discussion of aspects of the L. flavus system that have not been treated in this
dissertation. I will also offer some thoughts on promising future research avenues in the
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Reproduction and dispersal in an
ant-associated root aphid community
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Clonal organisms with occasional sex are important for our general
understanding of the costs and benefits that maintain sexual repro-
duction. Cyclically parthenogenetic aphids are highly variable in
their frequency of sexual reproduction. However, studies have
mostly focused on free-living aphids above ground, whereas dis-
persal constraints and dependence on ant-tending may differen-
tially affect the costs and benefits of sex in subterranean aphids.
Here, we studied reproductive mode and dispersal in a community
of root aphids that are obligately associated with the ant Lasius
flavus. We assessed the genetic population structure of four species
(Geoica utricularia, Tetraneura ulmi, Forda marginata and F. formi-
caria) in a Dutch population and found that all species reproduce
predominantly if not exclusively asexually, so that populations
consist of multiple clonal lineages. We show that population vis-
cosity is high and winged aphids rare, consistent with infrequent
horizontal transmission between ant host colonies. The absence of
the primary host shrub (Pistacia) may explain the absence of sex in
three of the studied species, but elm trees (Ulmus) that are primary
hosts of the fourth species (T. ulmi), occurred within a few km of
the study population. We discuss the extent to which obligate ant-
tending and absence of primary hosts may have affected selection
for permanent parthenogenesis and we highlight the need for
further study of these aphids in Southern Europe where primary
hosts may occur close to Lasius flavus populations, so that all four
root aphid species would have realistic opportunities for complet-
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INTRODUCTION
Asexual reproduction can allow rapid population growth and therefore enable quick colo-
nization of new habitats. Nevertheless, exclusive asexual reproduction is generally consid-
ered an evolutionary ‘dead end’ because prolonged lack of recombination will lead to
accumulation of deleterious mutations and slower evolvability in response to parasites and
environmental change, ultimately driving asexual species to extinction. Occasional sex in
an otherwise asexual species, however, can allow for sufficient recombination to outweigh
these costs, without compromising the benefits of asexual reproduction (a.o. Green &
Noakes 1995, reviewed in D'Souza & Michiels 2010). Studying species with such mixed
reproductive modes can thus enhance our understanding of the evolution and mainte-
nance of sex, one of the major current topics in evolutionary biology.
Aphids are particularly informative in this context, because they are often cyclical
parthenogens with a (holocyclic) reproductive cycle consisting of a sequence of asexual
generations followed by a single sexual generation (Simon et al. 2002). However, some
aphids have lost the sexual generation and reproduce exclusively asexually (anholocyclic).
These variable reproductive modes, both between species and between populations of the
same species, make aphids excellent model systems for studying the selective forces that
affect cyclical parthenogenesis (Simon et al. 1996; 1999; Delmotte et al. 2002; Gilabert te
al. 2009; Kanbe & Akimoto 2009; Vantaux et al. 2011a).
Aphids are also well-known for their mutualistic relationships with ants (Way 1963;
Stadler & Dixon 2008), which can have profound effects on dispersal and reproduction,
and thus on the population structure of mutualistic partners (Herre et al. 1999; Leigh
2010). However, most of the previous aphid studies have focused on non-myrmecophiles
in above-ground populations, whereas subterranean and obligately ant-associated aphids
have been neglected (Yao & Akimoto 2009; Yao 2010).  Here, we focus on four sympatric
species of root aphids (Geoica utricularia, Tetraneura ulmi, Forda marginata, F. formicaria)
that are known to be obligately associated with ants (Heie 1980; Seifert 2007).
yThe specific objectives of our study were: (1) to infer the extent of population viscosit
of multiple root aphid species across a field transect spanning seven km (Figure 2.1), (2)
to determine the dominant mode of reproduction in these aphids, and (3) to estimate the
potential for horizontal dispersal via winged forms. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Root aphid natural history
Aphids have two alternative and partly overlapping reproductive cycles: (1) Holocyclic
reproduction where aphids are propagated asexually during most of the year, but have a
fsingle sexual generation in a distinct season often just before overwintering. This form o
cyclic asexuality can involve obligate dispersal to a primary host plant, on which mating
occurs, and the recurrent colonization of a secondary host plant for asexual reproduction
during the rest of the year (Heie 1980; Simon et al. 2002). (2) Anholocyclic reproduction
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secondary host plant year-round, because the primary host of their close sexual relative is
no longer used. Closely related aphid species may have very different reproductive cycles
(Simon et al. 2002), and even populations of the same species have been found to differ in
their mode of reproduction (Heie 1980; Simon et al. 1996; Delmotte et al. 2002; Gilabert
et al. 2009; Kanbe & Akimoto 2009). 
yThe sparse available literature suggests that all four focal aphid species of this stud
(Geoica utricularia, Tetraneura ulmi, Forda marginata and F. formicaria) have been
observed to live anholocyclically on the roots of secondary host grasses (Festuca rubra,
Agrostis spp. and Elytrigia maritima) inside ant mounds (Muir 1959; Pontin 1978; Heie
1980; Godske 1991; 1992). The Forda species and G. utricularia appear to be anholocyclic
fin Northern and Central Europe (including our study site on the Dutch island o
Schiermonnikoog), but holocyclic in Southern Europe, where their primary host Pistacia
spp. (Anacardiaceae) occurs (Heie 1980). In contrast to the other three species, T. ulmi has












5 sampled ant mounds
1 km
Figure 2.1 fSampling site o  root aphids associated with Lasius flavus mounds. Aphids were col-
lected on the island of Schiermonnikoog (The Netherlands), where ant mounds were sampled in
groups of five along a 7 km transect across the salt marsh of the island (maps courtesy of D.
Visser).
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(Heie 1980). This species was therefore expected to be holocyclic in our sampling area,
with an obligate annual host shift to elm trees (Ulmus spp.; Ulmaceae) as primary host for
sexual reproduction in autumn (Heie 1980). However, Pontin (1978), Godske (1991) and
Blackman & Eastop (1994) suggested that T. ulmi can also abandon its sexual phase and
occurr anholocyclically on grass roots in Northwestern Europe. Alate (winged) individuals
have been described for all four species in at least some populations (Paul 1977; Heie
1980). These could either be indicators of sexual reproduction and host shift not having
been lost completely, or asexually produced dispersers, although the existence of the latter
remains unconfirmed in Pemphigidae (Moran 1992). We therefore started this study with
the hypothesis that there might be intra- and interspecific variation in reproductive mode
and life cycle among the root aphids in our focal Dutch population.
All four aphid species are found in soil nests of the ant Lasius flavus. These nests
contain specifically constructed aphid chambers, where the ants actively protect their live-
stock from parasites and predators (Pontin 1959; 1978), and where they both tend and eat
them (Pontin 1958; 1961b; 1978). All four root aphid species appear to be obligate
ymyrmecophiles, having lost predator defense mechanisms common in other aphids (Wa
1963; Paul 1977; Heie 1980; Hölldobler & Wilson 1990), i.e. all have poorly developed
cornicles (organs for protective wax production) and lack saltatorial legs to jump or
actively drop from branches in response to threats (Way 1963; Paul 1977; Heie 1980).
Most importantly, they all have a set of long anal hairs that can hold droplets of honeydew,
a ‘trophobiotic organ’ that is only found in myrmecophilous aphids (Way 1963; Heie 1980;
Hölldobler & Wilson 1990) (Figure 2.2). Apart from these distinct traits that reveal obli-
gate dependence on ant care, some of these aphids are also dependent on the ants for sur-
vival during overwintering (Way 1963; Heie 1980). However, the sparse literature suggests
that there may be considerable variation in this overwintering adaptation, as some aphids
are known to have maintained holocyclic sexual reproduction (see above) and would
therefore have to leave the ant nests during autumn, whereas others are facultatively or
obligately anholocyclic (Pontin 1978; Heie 1980; Godske 1991). How ant colonies acquire
their mutualistic aphids remains poorly understood, as virgin queens have not been
observed to vector aphids during colony founding (A.B.F. Ivens, personal observation;
yChapter 8). Most likely, ant mounds that have recently gone extinct are recolonized b
founding queens or neighbouring smaller colonies so that local aphid lineages may acquire
new ‘owners’ (Ivens et al. 2012a; Chapter 4). In addition, aphids may disperse independ-
ently by wind, walking or floating on tidal water (Foster & Treherne 1978; Foster 1978).
Sampling
All aphid samples were collected in July 2008 from L. flavus fant mounds on the island o
Schiermonnikoog, the Netherlands (53°28' N, 6°09' E). Sampling followed a 7 km transect
across the salt-marsh of the island (Figure 2.1), with the westernmost kilometer of the
transect located on grazed pasture and the remainder on un-grazed salt-marsh. The tran-
sect was subdivided into eight locations with 1 km intervals. Nest mound density was high
fthroughout the transect (ca. 600–3500 mounds per ha). At each location, soil samples o
five ant mounds of similar size (Ø ca. 80 cm) were taken and hand-sorted for the occur-
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recorded with a GPS device (eTrexVista™, Garmin, 0.5–5 m precision). A subsample of all
collected aphids was used for species identification using a protocol for microscopic prepa-
fration modified after (Heie 1980). Reference specimens are located at the University o
Groningen (access available upon request).
We chose to use small soil cores so that sampling was non-destructive and we could
resample mounds in later years. This sampling scheme was nonetheless sufficient to obtain
at least one aphid belonging to each of the focal species from 30 of the 40 mounds, and
only one of the 40 mounds yielded no aphids at all in any of our soil core samples. All
mounds were confirmed to be inhabited by L. flavus, with ca. 60% of the 21 soil cores
taken per mound containing ants.
Molecular analysis
DNA was extracted from entire aphids using 200 μl 20%-Chelex® 100 resin (Fluka) (Walsh
et al. 1991). We used polymorphic microsatellite markers to genotype specimens of Forda
spp. (loci Fm1, Fm3, Fm4, Fm6, Gu6, Gu11, Gu13), G. utricularia (loci Gu2, Gu3, Gu5,
Gu6, Gu8, Gu9, Gu11, Gu13), and T. ulmi (loci Tu1, Tu2, Tu3, Tu4, Tu10, Tu11). Marker-
specific details and amplification protocols are given in Ivens et al. (2011; Chapter 5). If a
marker failed to amplify in an individual, the amplification process was repeated at least
twice. PCR-products were analyzed on an ABI-PRISM 3130XL (Applied Biosystems)
sequencer and chromatograms were analyzed in Genemapper (Applied Biosystems).
Data analysis
After omitting 30 samples in which more than half of the markers repeatedly failed to
amplify, the total number of individuals included in the datasets was 469: 201 for G. utric-
ularia, 92 for T. ulmi, 158 for F. marginata and 18 for F. formicaria.
MLGsim 2.0 (http://www.rug.nl/fmns-research/theobio/downloads), an updated
version of MLGsim (Stenberg et al. 2003b; Box B), was used to group individuals into
diploid multilocus genotypes (MLGs), i.e. unique combinations of alleles across all tested
marker loci. Where missing data occurred (190 of the 469 individuals had some missing
genetic marker data - on average 13% of the alleles was missing), individuals were joined
into the MLG of which the genotype for the remaining successfully scored loci was identi-
cal. In the two cases where an individual matched two different but very similar MLGs at
all successfully amplified loci, it was grouped with the more common MLG of the two. For
our further analyses, gaps in an individual’s MLG were filled in with the alleles of the MLG
to which the individual had been assigned. While this increased sample size for our analy-
ses, it also implied that we may have slightly underestimated overall genetic variability.
MLGs were either represented by several to many individuals (recurrent MLGs) or
(rarely) as a single individual in our samples (single MLGs). Asexual reproduction will thus
affect population genetic analyses through overrepresentation of clonally produced indi-
viduals (Sunnucks et al. 1997). To take any possible effects of pseudoreplication into
account, all analyses were performed both on the full dataset, including all individuals
(ramet data; i.e. all individuals belonging to a single MLG), and on a subset of the data
consisting of only one individual per MLG (genet data) (sensu Harper 1977). The two
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Estimates of genetic variability
Asexual reproduction tends to decrease segregation of alleles within loci and recombina-
tion between loci. Over time, this leads to observed heterozygosities (HO) differing from
those expected under sexual outbreeding (HE), and to deviations from Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium (HWE). Specifically, asexual reproduction can lead to heterozygote excess [i.e.
a negative fixation index FIS (Weir & Cockerham 1984; Balloux et al. 2003; Stoeckel et al.
2006)] through mutation accumulation in clonal lineages, also known as the ‘Meselson
effect’ in ancient asexual lineages (Birky 1996; Welch & Meselson 2000; Halkett et al.
2005). Nevertheless, mechanisms such as mitotic recombination or occasional sex can also
ylead to heterozygote deficiency in clones, particularly when asexual lineages are not ver
old and stochastic effects determine whether clones happen to be homozygous or het-
erozygous at neutral markers (Birky 1996). Finally, the lack of recombination under
asexual reproduction should lead to significant linkage disequilibrium (LD). GENEPOP 4.0
(Rousset 2008) was used to estimate HO, HE, FIS, linkage disequilibrium (LD), and devia-
tions from HWE, assuming a panmictic population with random mating.
As a measure for genetic diversity we used the G/N ratio Pd, where N is the sample size
for a given aphid species and G is the number of distinct MLGs in a focal population
(Ellstrand & Roose 1987; Dorken & Eckert 2001; Arnaud-Haond et al. 2007). We also esti-
mated Psex values for every observed MLG, with Psex fbeing defined as the probability o
obtaining at least as many as the observed number of individuals belonging to a given
MLG under the null hypothesis of sexual reproduction and population-wide random
mating (Tibayrenc et al. 1990; Parks & Werth 1993; Young et al. 2002; Arnaud-Haond te
al. 2007). The calculation of Psex takes into account the observed frequencies of the alleles
constituting the given MLG. A MLG with a low Psex value therefore indicates that the mul-
tiple individuals observed for that MLG likely originated from clonal reproduction rather
than sexual reproduction. Although Psex calculation was initially developed to confirm
strict asexuality, it can also be applied to cyclical parthenogens. This is because Psex estima-
tions are done for each unique MLG separately and since this is based on population-wide
allele frequencies, any present genetic variation naturally enters the analysis, regardless its
origin. Using MLGsim 2.0, we estimated Psex values and derived P-values for these values
using Monte Carlo resampling simulations of our study population under HWE with 1000
iterations (Box B). 
Genetic distance
We calculated genetic distances between MLGs using the shared allele distance DAS (Jin &
Chakraborty 1993) in POPULATIONS 1.2.30 (© 1999, Olivier Langella, CNRS UPR9034).
Pairs of MLGs with relatively small genetic distances might belong to one multilocus
lineage (MLL) (Arnaud-Haond et al. 2007), i.e. a grouping of MLGs that go back to the
same sexual reproduction event and whose genetic differences are due to later mutations,
asexual recombination, or, possibly, scoring errors. We considered two MLGs as being part
of the same MLL when they only differed by one or two alleles over all markers combined.
The frequency distribution of the genetic distances between our samples was bimodal,
with genetic distances of one or two alleles constituting the first peak of this overall fre-
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well. We also used a more formal approach of assessing MLL/MLG distinctions, based on
the frequency distribution of genetic distances, following (Arnaud-Haond et al. 2007). This
method was designed for MLL assignments based on at least ten times more MLGs than
observed in the present study, but the results were very similar to those obtained by our
original approach, leading to identical overall conclusions. After multiplying by the
number of alleles that were compared for distance to transform proportional distances into
absolute allele differences, the distance matrix was used to visualize the relationships
between MLGs using minimum spanning MLG trees constructed in HapStar v 0.6 (Teacher
& Griffiths 2011). The distance matrix was also used to construct Neighbour Joining (NJ)
trees (appendix). 
Spatial autocorrelation analyses
To assess whether genetically similar individuals tended to occur geographically close to
each other, we estimated spatial autocorrelations in all four aphid species. Spatial autocor-
relation analysis tests whether the matrix of pairwise genetic distances significantly corre-
lates with the matrix of pairwise geographic distances between individuals (Euclidian
distance based on GPS-coordinates). We used a Mantel test of matrix correspondence with
104 permutations to test for significant correlation between the matrices (Smouse et al.
1986).
The occurrence of spatial autocorrelation can be graphically illustrated using correlo-
grams, in which the estimated matrix correlation coefficient r is plotted against geographi-
cal distance, subdivided in classes. We used seven classes (0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, 4-5, 5-6 and
7-8 km), representing the distances between the eight sampled locations along the tran-
sect. Following Smouse & Peakall (1999) and Peakall et al. (2003), the estimated r value
was plotted in a spatial correlogram with error bars representing the 95% CIs for r deter-
mined by bootstrapping with 104 replicates. The estimated r values were plotted alongside
the 95% CIs of the r-values that were expected under the null hypothesis of a random dis-
tribution of individuals over locations (104 permutations). When an estimated r was larger
than 0 and its 95% CI bars fell outside the 95% CIs generated by the null hypothesis,
genetic and geographical distance were inferred to be positively correlated, with the first x-
axis intercept representing the distance over which significant spatial structure occurred
(Smouse & Peakall 1999; Peakall et al. 2003). All spatial autocorrelation analyses were
performed in GENALEX 6.2 (Peakall & Smouse 2006) and correlograms were drawn using
R 2.12.0 and the xyplot() function in the lattice package (Sarkar 2008).
RESULTS
Aphid genetic variability and reproduction
All four root aphid species showed significant deviations from Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium
(HWE) both at the ramet and the genet-level (Table 2.1). Most of the significant differences
from HWE were caused by heterozygote deficiency, but some loci showed heterozygote
excess and thus negative FIS values (Table 2.1). In G. utricularia, significant ramet-level LD
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In T. ulmi, ramet-level LD was detected in 11 pairs with only four loci-pairs showing no
LD, whereas no significant LD was found at the genet-level. F. marginata showed ramet-
level LD in all 23 pairs of loci and genet-level LD in 16 of the 23 pairs (Table 2.A1). In F.
formicaria, only one pair of loci could be tested due to low sample sizes, showing no LD at
either the ramet- or the genet-level. Combined with the consistent deviations from HWE,
fthis predominance of LD is a strong indication for asexuality being the dominant mode o
reproduction in three of the four species: G. utricularia, T. ulmi and F. marginata. Despite
the low sample size, we infer that this is also likely to be the case for F. formicaria, because
the biology of the two sibling species F. marginata and F. formicaria yappears to be ver
similar (Heie 1980) and the observed allelic distribution over clonal lineages was similar
as well (see below).
In total, we found nine MLGs among the 201 genotyped G. utricularia individuals.
Three of these were unique ‘single’ MLGs, which could all be unambiguously grouped into
MLLs with one of the six MLGs occurring in multiple copies (Table 2.2, Figure 2.2A, Figure
2.A1A). All MLGs with multiple samples had Psex values significantly below expectation for
random mating (Table 2.2). Genetic diversity Pd for this species was 0.044, with some
MLGs being vastly overrepresented among the samples (Table 2.2). For example, the pre-
dominant G. utricularia MLG was found 120 times, i.e. in 60% of the samples (Table 2.2).
Also these patterns indicate predominant clonal reproduction, and thus that this popula-
tion of G. utricularia is anholocyclic. T. ulmi showed a similar pattern, with 4 MLLs consist-
ing of 6 MLGs in total, all of which occurred more than once (Table 2.2, Figure 2.2B, Figure
2.A1B). The Psex estimates for T. ulmi were also significantly reduced when tested against
HWE expectation. In this species, the predominant MLG accounted for 52% of the samples
and overall genetic diversity Pd was 0.065 (Table 2.2), indicating that T. ulmi is also
anholocyclic and clonally propagated in the sampled population.
The same conclusion could be drawn for the two Forda species. F. marginata samples
were more diverse than those of G. utricularia and T. ulmi, with a total of 18 MLGs, seven
of which were encountered only once. All of these single MLGs and five of the r tecurren
MLGs could be combined with other MLGs into six MLLs (Table 2.2, Figure 2.2C, Figure
2.A1C). All but one of the Psex values were significantly reduced, with the predominant
clone accounting for 68% of the samples, and Pd being 0.114 (Table 2.2). Among the F.
formicaria samples we found six MLGs, all belonging to a single MLL. In this species, P xse
values were also generally low, although mostly not significant, which appears to be due to
low sample size. Most MLGs in this species were also recurrent, with 33% of the individu-
als belonging to the predominant clone, and Pd being 0.333 (Table 2.2). Interestingly, the
F. formicaria MLGs formed a single clade within the F. marginata tree, confirming the close
relationship between the two species and suggesting that further work is needed to unam-
biguously establish species identities in this group (Figure 2.2C, Figure 2.A1C).
Aphid dispersal
Figure 2.3 shows the relative frequencies of all detected MLGs and MLLs over the 7 km
transect for G. utricularia, F. marginata and T. ulmi. Although all species had at least one
MLG that was relatively abundant and distributed over more than two locations on the













































Table 2.1 P f f f fopulation genetic statistics or the our species o  root aphids. Data are given both or
the ramet (including all samples) and the genet level (excluding replicates of the same MLG), and
for each tested locus and the population as a whole. N is the number of genotyped aphids, Na the
number of observed alleles, HE and HO are expected (under Hardy-Weinberg assumptions) and
observed heterozygosities, and FIS is the fixation index. Significant P-values for deviations from
HWE (at the 0.2 % level after Bonferroni correction) are given in bold (see Materials and Methods).
Ramet level Genet level
Locus Na N HE HO FIS HWE N HE HO FIS HWE
Pvalue Pvalue
Geoica utricularia
Gu2 5 201 0.58 0.31 0.465 < 0.001 9 0.63 0.22 0.680 0.001
Gu3 7 201 0.69 1.00 -0.457 < 0.001 9 0.79 1.00 -0.210 0.096
Gu5 6 201 0.57 0.14 0.746 < 0.001 9 0.77 0.33 0.607 0.000
Gu6 8 201 0.59 0.29 0.513 < 0.001 9 0.82 0.33 0.631 < 0.001
Gu8 4 201 0.55 0.06 0.892 < 0.001 9 0.72 0.22 0.719 < 0.001
Gu9 8 201 0.78 0.84 -0.068 < 0.001 9 0.66 0.33 0.539 0.001
Gu11 6 201 0.73 0.70 0.043 < 0.001 9 0.81 0.56 0.365 < 0.001
Gu13 8 201 0.78 0.90 -0.155 < 0.001 9 0.81 0.67 0.238 0.002
Population1 6.5 201 0.66 0.53 0.196 9 0.75 0.46 0.439
Tetraneura ulmi
Tu1 2 92 0.141 0.000 1.000 < 0.001 6 0.444 0.000 -0.053 0.031
Tu2 2 92 0.141 0.000 1.000 < 0.001 6 0.444 0.000 0.118 0.031
Tu3 5 92 0.702 0.924 -0.312 < 0.001 6 0.764 0.667 0.200 0.184
Tu4 5 92 0.621 0.902 -0.449 < 0.001 6 0.750 0.667 0.216 0.001
Tu10 3 92 0.281 0.326 -0.153 0.445 6 0.292 0.333 1.000 1.000
Tu11 4 92 0.384 0.402 -0.043 0.001 6 0.514 0.500 1.000 0.532
Population1 3.5 92 0.378 0.426 -0.120 6 0.535 0.361 0.404
Forda marginata
Fm1 9 155 0.45 0.25 0.442 < 0.001 16 0.79 0.56 0.320 < 0.001
Fm3 6 158 0.46 0.22 0.538 < 0.001 18 0.79 0.50 0.388 < 0.001
Fm4 6 158 0.43 0.15 0.665 < 0.001 18 0.70 0.28 0.622 < 0.001
Fm6 4 158 0.69 0.94 -0.353 < 0.001 18 0.73 0.78 -0.030 < 0.001
Gu6 5 158 0.68 0.71 -0.041 < 0.001 18 0.58 0.28 0.543 < 0.001
Gu11 6 158 0.46 0.21 0.548 < 0.001 18 0.79 0.44 0.460 < 0.001
Gu13 4 155 0.40 0.00 1.000 < 0.001 16 0.58 0.00 1.000 < 0.001
Population1 5.7 157 0.51 0.35 0.311 17 0.71 0.41 0.447
Forda formicaria
Fm32 1 18 0.00 0.00 - 6 0.00 0.00 -
Fm4 3 18 0.50 0.78 -0.551 0.024 6 0.54 0.83 -0.471 0.638
Fm6 2 18 0.50 1.00 -1.000 < 0.001 6 0.50 1.00 -1.000 0.090
Gu62 1 18 0.00 0.00 - 6 0.00 0.00 -
Gu11 3 18 0.44 0.28 0.393 0.072 6 0.57 0.33 0.487 0.226
Gu132 1 18 0.00 0.00 - 6 0.00 0.00 -
Population1 1.8 18 0.24 0.34 -0.409 6 0.27 0.36 -0.262
1 Cumulative population-level tests of deviations from HWE would have been significant in all cases with the possible
exception of the F. formicaria genets, but have not been performed because significant LD implies that locus-specific
probabilities cannot be considered as independent.
2 Loci that are monomorphic in F. formicaria and polymorphic in F. marginata. The alleles observed for Fm3 and Gu6
were diagnostic for F. formicaria.
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tions. Furthermore, the MLGs belonging to the same MLL tended to occur in a clustered
manner (Figure 2.3), suggesting that dispersal levels are generally low. The Mantel test
showed a significant correlation between genetic and geographic distances in G. utricularia
and F. marginata f(Figure 2.4AC). The correlograms were consistent with the outcome o
the Mantel test, with significantly positive coefficients only being found for short (<3 km)
distances in G. utricularia and F. marginata, with 95% confidence bars well above expecta-
tion based on a random distribution of genotypes over the island (Figure 2.4). No signifi-
cant autocorrelation was found in the populations of the other species, T. ulmi. The low




































Table 2.2 f fMultilocus Genotypes (MLG) o  the our root aphid species. Name (clone acronym) and
sample size (n) for each MLG; Psex, the probability that the MLG occurred at least n times under
the assumption of random mating is given for each recurrent MLG. All significant Psex-values
remained significant after Bonferroni correction with the exception of F. formicaria MLL1c. Total
sample size (N), total number of MLGs (G) and genetic diversity Pd (G/N) are given for each
species. Clone acronyms of MLGs consist of the species name abbreviation (Gu, Tu, Fm, Ff), the





































*** P value of Psex < 0.001
** P value of Psex < 0.01




































































































Figure 2.2 T fypical habitus and minimum spanning MLG trees or the three root aphid genera.
Drawings represent apterous viviparous females of G. utricularia (A), T. ulmi (B) and F. marginata
(C). Adaptations to mymecophily, elongated anal hairs to hold honeydew, are highlighted (ventral
view in A and B, dorsal view in C). All drawings are reproduced from Heie (1980). Multilocus
genotype (MLG) trees were constructed based on shared allele distance (DAS), multiplied by the
number of alleles available for comparison, to give the number of unshared alleles. Every circle
represents a single MLG and names correspond to those used in Table 2.2, with colours represent-
king multilocus lineages (MLLs). Connected MLGs differ from each other by a single allele and blac
dots represent potential unsampled haplotypes that differ from neighbours by a single allele. The
Forda tree includes both F. formicaria (Ff- MLGs, all belonging to one MLL given in red) and F.
marginata MLGs.
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in this species. For completeness, the results of this analysis are given in the appendix
(Figures 2.A2 and 2.A3).
We found alate aphids for all species except F. formicaria, but numbers were always
very small (5 for G. utricularia, 1 for T. ulmi, and 4 for F. marginata out of a total of 505
aphids sampled in our entire study). Four of these alates were genotyped, which showed
that three of them belonged to the same MLG as the other aphids sampled from the same
ant nest, whereas the fourth alate had a different genotype (but one known from another
colony nearby). Based on the observed alate frequencies, we estimated that these alate
phenotypes had upper 95% CLs of 6% at most in the three species for which we had































Figure 2.4 fSpatial autocorrelation patterns or Geoica utricularia (A), Tetraneura ulmi (B) and
Forda marginata (C). Plots show genetic correlation coefficients r (solid line), their 95% confidence
bars as determined by bootstrapping, and the 95% confidence intervals around zero as expected
from random distributions of genotypes (dashed lines), plotted across the seven distance classes
(1–7 km). Results for the Mantel tests for each correlation are provided in each panel.
Table 2.3 Per f f f fcentages o  alates or the our root aphid species. Total number o  collected aphids
(n), the percentage of alates and the 95% confidence intervals around them (Rohlf & Sokal 1981).
Species n Observed alates (%) Confidence intervals (%)
Geoica utricularia 225 2.2 0.6 – 4.8
Tetraneura ulmi 93 1.1 0.0 – 5.7
Forda marginata 169 2.4 0.5 – 5.4
Forda formicaria 18 0.00 0.0 – 15.1
A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 42
DISCUSSION
Our population genetic estimates showed a strong signature of clonal reproduction for all
four root aphid species. We therefore infer that G. utricularia, T. ulmi, Forda marginata and
F. formicaria have predominantly if not exclusively asexual reproduction in the sampled
Schiermonnikoog population, which largely confirms earlier findings and records (Muir
1959; Pontin 1978; Heie 1980; Godske 1991; Blackman & Eastop 1994). A single clone
accounted for the majority of individuals in all species. In G. utricularia and F. marginata,
genetic differentiation and geographical distance correlated significantly, further corrobo-
rating that the clonal aphid populations are viscous.
The reproductive modes of ant-tended root aphids
Anholocyclic reproduction and overwintering as asexual females (instead of sexually pro-
duced eggs) in ant nests in Northwest Europe has previously been inferred for G. utricu-
laria and both Forda species (Muir 1959; Pontin 1978; Heie 1980; Godske 1991; Blackman
f& Eastop 1994), and our molecular data confirm this. However, finding the same extent o
asexual reproduction in T. ulmi ywas interesting, as this result matched observations b
(Muir 1959; Pontin 1978; Godske 1991), but contrasted with (Heie 1980) statement that
T. ulmi reproduces sexually on elm trees in NW-Europe. Moderately mature (ca. 30 years
old) elm trees do occur in the single village on the island of Schiermonnikoog, but leaf-
galls of T. ulmi were not found (A.B.F. Ivens & M. Schrama, unpublished data). The recur-
rence of identical T. ulmi clones in the same nest-mounds over consecutive years (Ivens te
al. 2012a; Chapter 4) further corroborates that T. ulmi does not reproduce sexually on the
island at any appreciable frequency. Until the 1980’s there were much older elm trees in
the village, which died from Dutch Elm Disease. These might have provided better oppor-
tunities for sexual reproduction in T. ulmi.
fIt is important to note that currently available statistical tests for inferring modes o
reproduction from microsatellite data are designed to test the null hypothesis of 100%
sexual reproduction and random mating, so that rejecting this null hypothesis does not
imply that sexual reproduction is completely absent. Low frequencies of sex (<5%) could
also account for the high variance in FIS values in combination with the strong LD that we
found in most of the loci-pairs (De Meeus & Balloux 2004). Statistically, we cannot rule
out, therefore, that a small proportion of reproduction, particularly in T. ulmi, was in fact
sexual (Balloux et al. 2003; Chapter 3), consistent with the primary host plant for this
species being available and spatial autocorrelation being low, in contrast to G. utricularia
and F. marginata where the host shrub for sexual reproduction is lacking (Heie 1980;
Blackman & Eastop 1994) and autocorrelation patterns are distinct (Figure 4ab).
Population viscosity and dispersal
The aphid populations under study were viscous with low frequencies of alates and signif-
icant autocorrelation in two species, G. utricularia and F. marginata. These autocorrela-
tions were tenfold stronger that the largely non-significant, previously observed
autocorrelations in two species of holocyclic aphids (Abbot & Chhatre 2007; Michel et al.
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along the studied transect (Figure 2.3), most likely by wind-dispersal of winged individu-
als (alates). As our genetic data indicate that there is negligible recruitment from sexual
reproduction on Schiermonnikoog, this must imply that the few alates that we genotyped
were either sexual migrants destined to fail (i.e. to never result in spring offspring recolo-
nizing ant mounds), or unusual asexual dispersers headed for other ant mounds rather
than for primary host trees. Both scenarios would be consistent with the alate MLGs being
identical with those of wingless aphids in the same or a neighbouring mound, so that our
data do not allow us to discriminate between these possibilities.
Morphological analysis of the embryos borne by the alates could have allowed us to
resolve whether alates were sexual or not, since embryos of sexuparae are arostrate,
whereas embryos of asexual dispersers are rostrate (Blackman & Eastop 1994).
Unfortunately, by the time we realized this, we had used the alates for DNA extraction and
microscopic preparation. However, the timing of their appearance (mid-summer) suggests
that we were dealing with unusual asexual dispersers, as sexupara are expected to occur
only towards the autumn (Heie 1980). Moreover, as the primary host of three species (the
Mediterranean shrub Pistacia f) has not occurred even close to the Island o
Schiermonnikoog since the last glaciation, it seems hard to imagine how the island could
have ever been colonized if alates of these species could only migrate to and from Pistacia
shrubs.
What we can infer is that clonal aphid gene flow between ant mounds would indeed be
very low if dispersal remains restricted to wingless aphids walking on the soil surface (even
when helped somewhat by wind), which has been observed for both Forda and Tetraneura
(Muir 1959) or passive floating during tidal inundations, which has been observed for the
salt marsh root aphid Pemphigus trehernei, a non-ant-attended relative of Forda and Geoica
(Foster & Treherne 1978; Foster 1978). P. trehernei yalso reproduces predominantly clonall
wand produces alates at very low frequencies (Foster 1975), but nevertheless colonizes ne
host plants very effectively (Foster & Treherne 1978). Although dispersal by tidal floating
is poorly understood, it is conceivable that the aphid symbionts of L. flavus employ the
same mechanism during occasional summer inundations, to colonize existing ant mounds
where they might then establish a new MLG that can be vertically propagated after adop-
tion by the ants (Ivens et al. 2012a; Chapter 4).
Why aphids may lose sex altogether and does ant-tending matter?
Although it has long been known that aphids either have holocyclic (with sex) or anholo-
cyclic (completely parthenogenetic) life cycles, we lack an overall understanding of the
selection forces that make aphids lose sex and whether such development is always irre-
versible. This is because populations of only a few species have been studied in sufficient
genetic detail and few of these studies have targeted metapopulations consisting of holo-
cyclic and anholocyclic patches. Polymorphisms of this kind are known to occur (Simon te
al. 2002) and genetic studies of such populations would thus be highly informative. The
strong LD, significant deviations from HWE and the observed heterozygote excess match
the genetic population structures of other anholocyclic aphids (Simon et al. 1996; Simon te
al. 1999; Delmotte et al. 2002; Gilabert et al. 2009; Kanbe & Akimoto 2009). However, all
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the genetic population structure as well. Yao (2010) for example showed that FIS values
for ant-tended Tuberculatus aphids were higher than those for unattended aphids.
However, Vantaux et al. (2011a) did not find any effect of ant attendance on the genetic
population structure of facultatively ant-tended aphids above ground. The root aphids
studied here may have such metapopulations consisting of sexual and asexual patches in
Southern Europe (see below), but their genetic analysis would only reveal whether close
proximity of primary host plants increases the frequency of sex, and not whether ant
tending matters, because there are no free living underground populations of these aphids
(see Figure 2.2 for illustrations of their adaptations to myrmecophily).
Living in obligate mutualistic symbiosis has been argued to promote the irreversible
loss of sexual reproduction when the symbiotic environment becomes highly predictable
and uniform (Law & Lewis 1983). Although originally developed for endosymbionts, this
hypothesis might also apply to ectosymbionts such as the aphids of our present study,
because they are surrounded by a highly protective host colony (i.e. they are endosym-
bionts at the colony-level). The ants thus provide a protective underground environment in
which potentially (1) sexually produced frost-resistant eggs are no longer necessary and
(2) well-known sex-inducing environmental cues such as lower temperature and shorter
daylight are less likely to be effective as cues (Rispe et al. 1998, reviewed in Moran 1992;
Hales et al. 1997; Simon et al. y2002). In addition, ants actively keep aphid densities low b
culling (Ivens et al. 2012a; Chapter 4), decreasing the potential for crowding, a factor also
known to induce dispersal and sexual reproduction in aphids (reviewed in Hales et al.
1997). Dispersal constraints due to lack of primary host plants nearby and year-round
underground nursing may thus have tipped the balance towards permanent parthenogene-
sis, relative to aphids that are facultatively ant-tended on food plants above ground where
holocyclic life-cycles are more often maintained. We would thus be surprised if under-
ground ant tending would ever be compatible with substantial aphid sexuality, even when
primary host plants grow nearby. This logic seems to match the sparsely available compar-
ative data as many above-ground aphids such as Aphis fabae combine a holocyclic life cycle
with facultative ant-association (Heie 1986), whereas some other obligately ant-tended
faphids and coccids have become anholocyclic and even use the dispersing virgin queens o
the host ants for transmission (Hölldobler & Wilson 1990).
It is interesting to note that some studies have found that ‘host-ant management’ can
delay aphid dispersal and reduce alate production (Way 1963; Kindlmann et al. 2007;
Oliver et al. 2007; Yao 2010; Tegelaar et al. 2011). In addition to the culling mentioned
above, underlying mechanisms for such practices as described for Lasius ants vary from
inhibition through semiochemicals that slow aphids down (Oliver et al. 2007) to ants
actively cutting the wings of their ‘dairy farm’ dispersal morphs (Way 1963; Hölldobler &
Wilson 1990). We note, however, that our study population does not allow a convincing
test of the possible role of ‘ant management’ in the restriction of root aphid sex, because
the primary host plant was absent for three species and quite possibly unsuitable for the
fourth species (see above). Such a study would be possible in the southern European range
of Pistacia, at sites where these bushes and mature elm trees co-occur with L. flavus and
their root aphids. The microsatellite markers developed for the present study would
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APPENDIX
The dependence of the ant Lasius flavus on root aphids
The honeydew secreted by the aphids is the main source of carbohydrates for the subter-
ranean L. flavus ants, as other subterranean carbon sources are limited in the salt marsh
and chalk-grassland habitats of these ants. Stable isotope analyses have confirmed that in
the presence of aphids there is a demonstrable intermediate trophic level between the veg-
etation and the ants, consistent with the aphids being an intermediate foodweb node
(A.B.F. Ivens & M. Schrama, unpublished data). L. flavus ants have also been recorded to
yeat a large proportion of their root aphids, suggesting that they also utilize their ‘dair
cattle’ to increase protein acquisition (Pontin 1958; 1961b; 1978; Ivens et al. 2012a;
Chapter 4). This implies that, similar to other subterranean ants, L. flavus depends on root














































Table 2.A1 R f f f fesults o  tests or the presence o  Linkage Disequilibrium or ramet and genet datasets
of Geoica utricularia, Tetraneura ulmi and Forda marginata. G-tests for each available pair of loci
w yere run using the Markov Chain algorithm of Raymond and Rousset (1995). P-values statisticall
significant at a 5%-level are given in bold, indicating pairs of loci with significant Linkage
Disequilibrium. The parameter setting for dememorisation was 10000, the number of batches was
set at 20, and the number of iterations per batch was 5000.  
Ramet data Genet data
Locus 1 Locus 2 P-Value S.E. Locus 1 Locus 2 P-Value S.E.
Geoica utricularia
Gu2 Gu2 0.000 0.000 Gu2 Gu3 0.000 0.000
Gu2 Gu2 0.000 0.000 Gu2 Gu5 0.001 0.001
Gu2 Gu2 0.000 0.000 Gu2 Gu6 0.016 0.003
Gu2 Gu2 0.000 0.000 Gu2 Gu8 0.008 0.002
Gu2 Gu2 0.000 0.000 Gu2 Gu9 0.483 0.011
Gu2 Gu2 0.000 0.000 Gu2 Gu11 0.078 0.005
Gu2 Gu2 0.000 0.000 Gu2 Gu13 0.054 0.005
Gu5 Gu5 0.000 0.000 Gu5 Gu3 0.001 0.000
Gu5 Gu5 0.000 0.000 Gu5 Gu6 0.003 0.001
Gu5 Gu5 0.000 0.000 Gu5 Gu8 0.003 0.001
Gu5 Gu5 0.000 0.000 Gu5 Gu9 0.904 0.006
Gu5 Gu5 0.000 0.000 Gu5 Gu11 0.010 0.003
Gu5 Gu5 0.000 0.000 Gu5 Gu13 0.011 0.003
Gu6 Gu6 0.000 0.000 Gu6 Gu3 0.003 0.002
Gu6 Gu6 0.000 0.000 Gu6 Gu8 0.007 0.002
Gu6 Gu6 0.000 0.000 Gu6 Gu9 1.000 0.000
Gu6 Gu6 0.000 0.000 Gu6 Gu11 0.124 0.010
Gu6 Gu6 0.000 0.000 Gu6 Gu13 0.057 0.007
Gu8 Gu8 0.000 0.000 Gu8 Gu3 0.002 0.001
Gu8 Gu8 0.000 0.000 Gu8 Gu9 0.235 0.010
Gu8 Gu8 0.000 0.000 Gu8 Gu13 0.002 0.001
Gu9 Gu9 0.000 0.000 Gu9 Gu3 0.903 0.007
Gu9 Gu9 0.000 0.000 Gu9 Gu13 0.097 0.009
Gu11 Gu11 0.000 0.000 Gu11 Gu3 0.012 0.003
Gu11 Gu11 0.000 0.000 Gu11 Gu8 0.049 0.004
Gu11 Gu11 0.000 0.000 Gu11 Gu9 0.338 0.013
Gu11 Gu11 0.000 0.000 Gu11 Gu13 0.018 0.003
Gu13 Gu13 0.000 0.000 Gu13 Gu3 0.009 0.002
Pairs with significant LD :  28 Pairs with significant LD :  17




































Table 2.A1 Continued 
Ramet data Genet data
Locus 1 Locus 2 P-Value S.E. Locus 1 Locus 2 P-Value S.E.
Tetraneura ulmi
Tu1 Tu3 0.000 0.000 Tu1 Tu3 0.467 0.004
Tu1 Tu11 0.073 0.003 Tu1 Tu11 1.000 0.000
Tu2 Tu1 0.000 0.000 Tu2 Tu1 0.066 0.002
Tu2 Tu3 0.000 0.000 Tu2 Tu3 0.465 0.006
Tu2 Tu4 0.000 0.000 Tu2 Tu4 0.205 0.003
Tu2 Tu11 0.070 0.002 Tu2 Tu11 1.000 0.000
Tu4 Tu1 0.000 0.000 Tu4 Tu1 0.198 0.003
Tu4 Tu3 0.000 0.000 Tu4 Tu3 1.000 0.000
Tu4 Tu11 0.000 0.000 Tu4 Tu11 1.000 0.000
Tu10 Tu1 0.095 0.002 Tu10 Tu1 1.000 0.000
Tu10 Tu2 0.091 0.002 Tu10 Tu2 1.000 0.000
Tu10 Tu3 0.000 0.000 Tu10 Tu3 0.399 0.006
Tu10 Tu4 0.000 0.000 Tu10 Tu4 1.000 0.000
Tu10 Tu11 0.000 0.000 Tu10 Tu11 0.194 0.005
Tu11 Tu3 0.000 0.000 Tu11 Tu3 0.208 0.011
Pairs with significant LD :  11 Pairs with significant LD :  0
Forda marginata
Fm1 Fm3 0.000 0.000 Fm1 Fm3 0.001 0.001
Fm1 Fm4 0.000 0.000 Fm1 Fm4 0.000 0.000
Fm1 Fm6 0.000 0.000 Fm1 Fm6 0.001 0.001
Fm1 Gu6 0.000 0.000 Fm1 Gu6 0.870 0.006
Fm1 Gu11 0.000 0.000 Fm1 Gu11 0.000 0.000
Fm1 Gu13 0.000 0.000 Fm1 Gu13 0.033 0.006
Fm3 Fm4 0.000 0.000 Fm3 Fm4 0.000 0.000
Fm3 Fm6 0.000 0.000 Fm3 Fm6 0.000 0.000
Fm3 Gu6 0.000 0.000 Fm3 Gu6 0.060 0.005
Fm3 Gu11 0.000 0.000 Fm3 Gu11 0.000 0.000
Fm3 Gu13 0.000 0.000 Fm3 Gu13 0.003 0.001
Fm4 Fm6 0.000 0.000 Fm4 Fm6 0.000 0.000
Fm4 Gu6 0.000 0.000 Fm4 Gu6 0.537 0.009
Fm4 Gu11 0.000 0.000 Fm4 Gu11 0.000 0.000
Fm4 Gu13 0.000 0.000 Fm4 Gu13 0.001 0.001
Fm6 Gu6 0.000 0.000 Fm6 Gu6 0.167 0.006
Fm6 Gu11 0.000 0.000 Fm6 Gu11 0.000 0.000
Fm6 Gu13 0.000 0.000 Fm6 Gu13 0.000 0.000
Gu6 Gu11 0.000 0.000 Gu6 Gu11 0.023 0.003
Gu13 Gu6 0.000 0.000 Gu13 Gu6 0.107 0.004
Gu13 Gu11 0.000 0.000 Gu13 Gu11 0.001 0.000
Pairs with significant LD :  23 Pairs with significant LD :  16
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Figure 2.A1 (left) fNeighbour-Joining trees or the three root aphid genera. Neighbour-Joining
trees were constructed based on shared allele distances (DAS) (Jin & Chakraborty 1993). Genetic
distances were calculated and trees were constructed in POPULATIONS 1.2.30 (Olivier Langella
1999) and displayed graphically in R 2.12.0 (R development core team 2010) using the
plot.phylo() function in the ape package (Paradis et al. 2004). Genetic distance in the trees is given
as the proportion of alleles that are not shared between multilocus genotypes (MLGs). Colours rep-
resent specific multilocus lineages (MLLs) consisting of several multilocus genotypes (MLGs) with
names corresponding to those given in Table 2.2 and node numbers representing bootstrap values
(10000 iterations). The Forda tree includes both F. formicaria (Ff- MLGs, all belonging to one MLL
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Figure 2.A2 fSpatial distribution o  cumula-
tive frequencies of Multilocus Genotypes
(MLGs) of Forda formicaria. Distinct MLGs
are represented by different hatching pat-
terns. n gives the sample size for each tran-
sect location (location 1-8, with adjacent












Figure 2.A3 Spatial autocorrelation pattern
for Forda formicaria. The plot shows genetic
correlation coefficient r (solid line), its 95%
confidence bars as determined by bootstrap-
ping, and the 95% confidence interval
around zero as expected from random distri-
butions of genotypes (dashed lines), plotted
across the seven distance classes (1–7 km).
The result for the Mantel test of the correla-
tion is provided in the left corner of the
panel. Due to small sample sizes (see Figure
2.A2), these tests remain inconclusive. 
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f fEstimating the requency o  sexual
reproduction in root aphids based on
microsatellite markers



















Many organisms are known to have a mixed reproductive strategy
of both sexual and asexual reproduction. Mixed reproduction can
have major implications for the ecology and evolution of a species
and detecting the occurrence of mixed reproduction and its extent
can therefore be crucial for our understanding of the evolutionary
ecology of these organisms. However, to date it remains difficult to
indirectly estimate the frequency of sexual and asexual reproduc-
tion from microsatellite data. This is because traditional methods
remain limited to all-or-nothing detection of sexual reproduction,
rather than allowing for estimation of rates sexual reproduction
smaller than 100%. Here, we present a simulation model of popu-
lation genetic diversity under varying rates of sexual reproduction.
Population genetic diversity is assessed using two estimates: clonal
diversity Pd and effective clonal diversity Pde. Model assumptions
of microsatellite marker diversity and spatial population structure
were especially tailored to root aphids and based on empirical data
of natural population of these cyclic parthenogens. The results
show that in predominantly sexual populations, small amounts of
asexual reproduction will remain hard to detect. On the other
hand, small amounts of sexual reproduction in predominantly
clonal populations leave significant population genetic signatures.
The results further show that the clonal diversity observed for the
root aphids on which we based our simulations, match best with
predominant asexual reproduction and absence of dispersal. For
one root aphid species, Tetraneura ulmi, however, observed geno-
typic variation proved too small to draw definite conclusions from
our simulations and neither did our simulation results match
earlier findings with traditional methods. We therefore argue that
for inferring mixed reproduction from microsatellite data a plural-
istic approach consisting of several different analyses should ideally
be applied.
ABSTRACT
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INTRODUCTION
A small amount of sexual reproduction or recombination can overcome the costs of strictly
asexual reproduction, which is generally considered an evolutionary ‘dead end’ (Green &
Noakes 1995; Hurst & Peck 1996; D'Souza & Michiels 2010). These costs, such as accumu-
lation of deleterious mutations (‘Muller’s ratchet’) and being ‘out-evolved’ by parasites
may ultimately outweigh the benefits of the higher reproductive rate of clonal species (not
having to find a mate) and the preservation of beneficial combinations of alleles in absence
fof recombination (reviewed in Green & Noakes 1995). Detecting a small proportion o
sexual reproduction in an otherwise clonal organism can thus be crucial for our under-
standing of the ecology and evolution of the species under study. Vice versa can small bouts
of asexual reproduction in a predominantly sexual species allow for increased colonization
opportunities, through outbursts of high reproductive rates. Many of the species with
potentially mixed reproductive modes include ecologically and economically important
species such as various insects that are crop pests (e.g. aphids), crop plants (e.g. potato)
and human pathogens (e.g. Candida albicans) (reviewed in De Meeus et al. 2007).
Moreover, the frequency of sexual reproduction can have a strong effect on effective popu-
lation sizes (NE) (Yonezawa et al. 2004), which can have important consequences for the
conservation genetics of a species. However, despite its assumed importance, it was not
until recently that attention shifted towards the study of mixed reproduction in single,
natural populations (among others Balloux et al. 2003; De Meeus et al. 2006; Villate et al.
2010; Allen & Lynch 2012).
A major reason for our lack of knowledge on the occurrence of mixed reproductive
fmodes in natural populations is the lack of accurate methods to estimate the frequency o
sexual reproduction from population genetic data. The most widely used techniques are
tests for deviations from Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium (HWE) and estimating so-called P xse
values for specific genotypes. The Psex value of a genotype gives the probability that the
number of repeated observations of a particular genotype in the population resulted from
independent events of sexual reproduction, rather than asexual reproduction (Tibayrenc te
al. 1990; Parks & Werth 1993; Young et al. 2002; Arnaud-Haond et al. 2007). Both
methods rely on rejecting the null hypothesis of 100% random mating, with the only avail-
able alternative being 100% clonal reproduction and thus leaving lower rates of sexual
reproduction undetected (reviewed in Arnaud-Haond et al. 2007). Moreover, both HWE
and Psex approaches test observed population genetic data under the classic, restricted,
assumptions of a randomly mating, unstructured population. In sum, the currently often
observed ‘negative’ result of failing to detect sexual reproduction with these classic
approaches could also be explained by (1) proportions of sexual reproduction much
smaller than 100% occurring in a population, which remain undetected by current
methods and (2) the ‘ideal’ HWE assumptions not being met; violation of any of these
assumptions will cause significant deviations from HWE. 
Several theoretical studies have investigated the effects of mixed reproductive strate-
gies on the patterning of genetic variation in a population (Green & Noakes 1995; Balloux
et al. 2003; Bengtsson 2003; De Meeus & Balloux 2004; Halkett et al. 2005; D'Souza &
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approaching 100% remain hard to detect from population genetic data alone (Balloux te
al. 2003; De Meeus & Balloux 2004; De Meeus et al. 2006), despite the fact that a combi-
nation of sexual and asexual reproduction is known to have large effects on allelic diver-
gence, effective population sizes and genotypic diversity of populations (Balloux et al.
2003; De Meeus & Balloux 2004; Halkett et al. 2005).
Only few empirical studies of species with mixed reproduction are available (reviewed
in Halkett et al. 2005). An important example is the recent study by Allen & Lynch (2012),
which used microsatellites to estimate genetic population structures of Daphnia pulicaria
in six lakes known to differ in the relative frequency of sexual reproduction. D’Souza and
Michiels (2006) provided similar data on freshwater planarian Schmidtea ploychro. Both
studies show results that are in line with earlier theoretical predictions: populations with
lower frequencies of sex show departures from HWE, have lower genotypic diversity and
exhibit increased occurrence of linkage disequilibrium (LD) (D'Souza & Michiels 2006;
Allen & Lynch 2012). These results can be explained by reduced recombination rates
(Balloux et al. 2003; De Meeus & Balloux 2004; Halkett et al. 2005; Arnaud-Haond et al.
2007). In addition, in their 2010 study Villate et al. y(2010) developed methods to identif
sexual individuals in a predominantly clonal population. These methods combine the
insights gained from the above discussed theoretical studies with classic HWE methods,
polymorphic microsatellite markers, hierarchical sampling and phylogenetic reconstruc-
tions (Villate et al. 2010).
With only few empirical studies addressing population genetic structures under mixed
reproduction, theory and data of mixed reproduction remain poorly linked. The theoretical
models available might not apply directly to natural populations, because the underlying
assumptions of high initial variation (e.g. 20 loci with each 99 alleles in Balloux et al.
2003) and spatial structure may not be biologically realistic for the species under empirical
study. Here, we consider a model that closely resembles the individual-based simulation
model of Balloux et al. (2003) and De Meeus & Balloux (2004), but that has been espe-
cially tailored to the biology of an example organism with mixed reproduction, the root
aphid. Root aphid reproduction is similar to other aphids that are cyclical parthenogens,
which alternate sexual and asexual reproduction (Simon et al. 2002). The root aphid
species studied here are well-known for their mutualistic interaction with ants (Paul 1977;
Pontin 1978; Heie 1980; Godske 1991; Ivens et al. 2012a; 2012b; Chapter 2; 4).
Evolutionary theory predicts that their myrmecophilous lifestyle may select for reduced
frequency of sexual reproduction (Wulff 1985; Chapter 2). The number of loci and associ-
ated alleles assumed in our model are based on microsatellite marker data of natural
populations of three species of root aphids (Ivens et al. 2012a; 2012b; Chapter 2; 4). The
spatial population structure in our simulations was modeled linear after the assumed
between-patch dispersal tendencies of root aphids and in accordance with the transect-
sampling in empirical studies (Ivens et al. 2012a; 2012b; Chapter 2; 4). The use of empiri-
cally collected data allows us to compare simulation outcomes on genotypic variation to
those observed in the natural populations of our study species. This comparison provided a
further check of the outcomes of theoretical models on the population genetics of mixed
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MODEL
fIn our simulations, we considered a monoecious population consisting of a linear array o
10 patches that each contain 1000 diploid individuals, in correspondence with the island
model used by Balloux et al. (2003). The simulation assumes that these individuals reproduce
sexually with fixed probability Ps and asexually with the complementary probability 1–Ps. 
During sexual reproduction, recombination occurs between two randomly drawn
parents, whereas offspring produced by asexual reproduction are identical copies of their
parent. The population was further assumed to be monoecious without selfing (unlike the
model by Balloux et al. (2003)). The number of loci, allelic variation and initial allele
frequencies were identical to those observed in the field for three species of root aphids
y(see below, Table 3.A1). During the reproduction phase, alleles mutate with probabilit
μ = 10-3 into one of the other available alleles for that locus. By choosing this mutation
implementation we followed Balloux et al. (2003), although microsatellite loci are likely to
be subject to stepwise mutation (Nauta & Weissing 1996). The assumed mutation rate is
higher than the rate of 10-5 applied by Balloux et al. y(2003). This is because the naturall
observed variation on which we based our simulations is lower than the theoretical varia-
tion assumed in Balloux et al. (2003) and De Meeus & Balloux (2004); under a low muta-
tion rate of 10-5 drift would therefore erode all variation over simulation time. In addition,
we assume that all loci are neutral and unlinked. After reproduction, parents die and the
offspring disperse between patches with fixed probability Pdisp and across a distance ran-
domly chosen between 0 and a fixed maximal dispersal distance Ddist. After dispersal,
1000 juveniles per patch mature into the next parent generation. We assumed no fitness
differences between sexually and asexually produced individuals and simulated 15000
generations, after which observed diversity estimates (see below) were in equilibrium
(Figures 3.1, 3.A1).
Two indicators for population genetic diversity were estimated: clonal diversity Pd and
effective clonal diversity Pde. The clonal diversity index Pd is given by G/N with G being the
number of unique multilocus genotypes (MLGs) and N the total population size (Ellstrand
& Roose 1987; Dorken & Eckert 2001; Arnaud-Haond et al. 2007). Pd is a widely used esti-
mate of genotypic diversity in clonal species (reviewed in Arnaud-Haond et al. 2007). Pd
ranges between 0 and 1, with a value of 1 indicating high genetic diversity (i.e every indi-
vidual having a unique genotype). Population structures of clonal species are often charac-
terized by one or a few MLGs that are overrepresented. To quantify this effect, we used the
effective number of genotypes Ge (Balloux et al. 2003) given by:





in which gi is the frequency of the ith genotype. To normalize the effective number of geno-
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in our further analysis. Again, Pde ranges between 0 and 1 and values approaching 1 indi-
cate high genetic diversity. 
We ran simulations with the frequency of sexual reproduction Ps increasing from 0 and
1, in steps of size 0.01. To study the effect of population structure, these simulations were
run for a series of dispersal regimes (Pdisp = 0.0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 in combination
with Ddisp = 1 and Ddisp = 2, 5, 10 with Pdisp = 0.01). All simulations were replicated 5
times. 
Simulations were run using a C++ routine (available upon request) and compiled in
g++ 4.3.4 (Free Software Foundation, Inc. 2008). The program included a random number
generator that uses the GNU Scientific Library (James 1994; Lüscher 1994). 
Data
The number of loci and allelic variation and frequency implemented in the model were
based on population genetic data on three species of root aphids: Geoica utricularia, Forda
marginata and Tetraneura ulmi (Ivens et al. 2012a; 2012b; Chapter 2; 4). Reproductive
mode in aphids is known to differ between species and between populations of the species,
with holocyclic species or populations having a sexual phase and anholocyclic species com-
pletely lacking this phase (Simon et al. 2002). However, the occurrence of rare sex might
remain undetected in aphids that are thought to be anholocyclic. All aphids were sampled
on the Dutch island of Schiermonnikoog in July 2008. To determine MLGs in these three
species species-specific 5–8 polymorphic microsatellite markers (Ivens et al. 2011; Chapter
5) were used and sample sizes per species ranged from 92 to 201 individuals. A detailed
description of the sampling, molecular analysis and observed MLGs can be found in
Chapter 2.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We simulated populations with the number of loci and allelic diversity observed in natural
fpopulations of three species of root aphids. Only the estimated microsatellite variation o
Geoica utricularia and Forda marginata turned out to be sufficient for any effect to be
observed over simulation time in our model. We will therefore focus discussion of the
results on these two species. For completeness, Tetraneura ulmi results are given in the
appendix (Figures 3.A1, 3.A2)
The effects of sexual reproduction and dispersal on clonal diversity
Pd and Pde values both fluctuated strongly over simulation time, with the strongest fluctua-
tions observed for Pde values and under Ps = 1 (complete sexual reproduction), as is shown
in Figure 3.1 for one representative simulation run. After an initial decline in clonal diver-
sity over the whole range of Ps values, the diversity estimates kept fluctuating within a
limited range of values. Caution should thus be taken at what time step observed and sim-
ulated diversity estimates are compared. Figure 3.2 shows results for generation 15000,
corresponding to a near-equilibrium for all Ps yvalues except maybe for complete sexualit
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Both measures of genetic diversity used in our study, clonal diversity Pd and effective
clonal diversity Pde increased with increasing frequency of sexual reproduction, with the
exception of the scenario without dispersal (Pdisp = 0.0, Figure 3.2AB). This effect is in
accordance with previous theoretical predictions by Balloux et al. (2003) and De Meeus &
Balloux (2004), although the implemented, empirically estimated, locus and allelic varia-
tion were considerably lower than those simulated in the previous completely theoretical
studies (6-8 loci with 4-9 alleles in our study compared to 20 loci with 99 alleles used in
the previous studies, Table 3.A1). The curves for Pd and Pde level off towards Ps fvalues o
100% sexual reproduction. This shows that it will be more difficult to detect small propor-
tions of asexual reproduction in predominantly sexual populations than it will be to detect
















































































Figure 3.1 Clonal diversity Pd ff(top panels) and the e ective clonal diversity Pde (bottom panels)
over simulation time for varying frequencies of sexual reproduction. Simulations were run for two
species of root aphids Geoica utricularia (A, C), Forda marginata (B, D). Plots give Pd and Pde for
15000 generations, for five frequencies of sexual reproduction Ps (see legends). In all simulations
dispersal probability Pdisp was 0.01 and maximal dispersal distance Ddist was 1.
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& Michiels 2006; De Meeus et al. 2006). Indeed, a small percentage of sexual reproduction
is known to have a major effect on patterning of genetic diversity in a population and can
make a predominantly clonal population look like a sexually reproducing population. This
is in line with conclusions that ‘a little bit of sexual reproduction’ may be superior to both
purely clonal reproduction and purely sexual reproduction, since it combines the benefits
of sexual reproduction (a high degree of genetic diversity) without having to bear the ‘costs
of sex’ (Green & Noakes 1995; Bengtsson 2003; D'Souza & Michiels 2010).
Higher dispersal rates Pdisp have a clear positive effect on clonal diversity (Figure
3.2AB), while dispersal distance Ddist has only a marginal additional effect (Figure 3.2CD).
The positive effect of dispersal on clonal diversity under varying frequencies of sex is in
accordance with previous results by De Meeus & Balloux (2004).
Insights into root aphid dispersal and reproduction
Observed Pd and Pde values in the natural populations of G. utricularia and F. marginata
were consistently lower than those obtained in the simulations, even when assuming com-
plete absence of sex (indicated by the arrows on the y-axes, Figure 3.2), with the exception
of simulated populations that were both strictly asexual and highly structured (Pdisp =
0.0). This shows that the observed clonal diversity for G. utricularia and F. marginata can
be best explained by strong population structure in combination with exclusive asexual
reproduction. The simulations thus enable us to confirm our previous findings of HWE-
based analyses (Ivens et al. 2012b; Chapter 2). Predominant asexual reproduction and rare
dispersal are also in accordance with the biological details known for these aphid species
(Heie 1980; Ivens et al. 2012b; Chapter 2).
The same HWE-based analyses (Ivens et al. 2012b; Chapter 2), however, also rejected
sexual reproduction in the third population of aphid species Tetraneura ulmi (Figure 3.A2),
whereas our simulation results show that based on its observed genotypic variation, sexual
reproduction cannot be completely excluded, because observed and simulated Pd and Pde
values overlapped along the full range of Ps values from 0 to 1. This shows that caution
should be taken when rejecting sexual reproduction based on classical HWE-tests alone,
especially when standard assumptions, such as an unstructured population, are not met.
The difference between the results for this species and the other two species may be due to
lower statistical power because variation at marker loci was less pronounced in T. ulmi (6
loci, 2–5 alleles; rather than 6–7 loci with 8–9 alleles in the other two species, Table 3.A1).
Alternatively, the ambiguous results for T. ulmi may reflect that some sex in this species
does indeed occur, or did so until a few decades ago, as T. ulmi has mature elm trees
(Ulmus) as primary hosts, which did in fact occur on the island until the 1980s, whereas
the Pistacia primary host of G. utricularia and F. marginata is restricted to Mediterranean
areas (Heie 1980; Ivens et al. 2012b; Chapter 2). 
Conclusion and future directions
Our present simulations were restricted to microsatellite variation of three species of root
aphids, with similar natural history characteristics. Further understanding of the impor-
tance of mixed reproductive modes in structured populations, would greatly benefit from
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would be most informative if the frequency of sexual reproduction would be known from
independent estimates based on other such as the presence and abundance of eggs (e.g.
Allen & Lynch 2012). However, even these methods would only yield indirect estimates for
the rate of sexual reproduction. Future laboratory studies on populations with controlled
frates of sexual reproduction would be able to fill this gap and allow further validation o
these models and their underlying assumptions on population genetic variation and popu-
lation structure.
fOur results show that detecting mixed reproductive modes, in particular small bouts o
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Figure 3.2 Clonal diversity Pd ffand e ective clonal diversity Pde funder increasing rate o  sexual
reproduction Ps for various dispersal scenarios. Simulations were run for two species of root aphids
Geoica utricularia (A, C) and Forda marginata (B, D). Simulated Pd values for five dispersal proba-
bilities and fixed dispersal distance (1) are given, and simulated Pde values for three dispersal dis-
tances and fixed dispersal probability (0.01). Error bars represent 95%-confidence intervals over
five replicate simulations. Arrows indicate the observed estimates for Pd and Pde in the sampled
populations of G. utricularia and F. marginata. 
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with certainty in cases where variation at marker loci is limited (e.g. T. ulmi). Ideally, con-
clusions on estimated rates of (a)sexual reproduction in natural populations with mixed
reproductive strategies should therefore be based on multiple different analyses such as
classic LD-, FIS- and Psex-analyses combined with Pd simulations as presented here
(Bengtsson 2003; De Meeus & Balloux 2004; Halkett et al. 2005; De Meeus et al. 2006;
Arnaud-Haond et al. 2007).
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APPENDIX
Observed microsatellite diversity 
In our simulations, the number of microsatellite loci, the number of alleles associated with
these loci and the initial allele frequencies were identical to those observed in natural pop-
ulations of the three root aphid species Geoica utricularia, Forda marginata and Tetraneura
ulmi. Table 3.A1 gives the number of loci, number of associated alleles and allele frequen-
cies used in our simulations of the three species.
Simulation results for root aphid Tetraneura ulmi
The genotypic variation observed in the natural populations of root aphids used in our
ysimulations was considerably lower than the variation implemented in the models b
Balloux et al. (2003) and De Meeus & Balloux (2004). Nevertheless, our simulations
yielded very similar results for G. utricularia and F. marginata. However, the genotypic
variation observed for T. ulmi was insufficient to offer decisive conclusions on the com-
















































Table 3.A1 Allele frequencies used to initialize simulations for three species of root aphids. 
Allele Locus 1 Locus 2 Locus 3 Locus 4 Locus  5 Locus 6 Locus 7 Locus 8
Geoica utricularia
Allele 1 0.042 0.057 0.005 0.060 0.100 0.109 0.100 0.042
Allele 2 0.117 0.612 0.010 0.010 0.612 0.114 0.030 0.042
Allele 3 0.114 0.030 0.085 0.308 0.259 0.055 0.114 0.007
Allele 4 0.612 0.229 0.114 0.042 0.030 0.114 0.114 0.037
Allele 5 0.114 0.030 0.114 0.308 0.299 0.306 0.306
Allele 6 0.612 0.271 0.005 0.301 0.450
Allele 7 0.030 0.299 0.030 0.110
Allele 8 0.030 0.005 0.005
Forda marginata
Allele 1 0.735 0.110 0.735 0.371 0.006 0.277 0.052
Allele 2 0.029 0.006 0.026 0.158 0.258 0.358 0.106
Allele 3 0.035 0.052 0.013 0.106 0.006 0.358 0.055
Allele 4 0.013 0.103 0.116 0.365 0.729 0.003 0.052
Allele 5 0.023 0.729 0.061 0.003 0.735





Allele 1 0.837 0.924 0.429 0.924 0.766 0.332
Allele 2 0.130 0.076 0.098 0.076 0.038 0.033
Allele 3 0.033 0.022 0.163 0.076
Allele 4 0.429 0.033 0.391
Allele 5 0.022 0.168
































Figure 3.A1 Clonal diversity Pd ff(A) and the e ective clonal diversity Pde (B) over simulation time
for varying frequencies of sexual reproduction. Simulations were run for root aphid Tetraneura
ulmi. Plots give Pd and Pde for 15000 generations, for five frequencies of sexual reproduction Ps
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Figure 3.A2 Clonal diversity Pd ffand e ective clonal diversity Pde funder increasing rate o  sexual
reproduction Ps for various dispersal scenarios. Simulations were run for root aphid Tetraneura
ulmi. Simulated Pd values for five dispersal probabilities and fixed dispersal distance (1) are given,
and simulated Pde values for three dispersal distances and fixed dispersal probability (0.01). Error
bars represent 95%-confidence intervals over five replicate simulations. Arrows indicate the
observed estimates for Pd and Pde in the sampled population of T. ulmi. 
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Ants farm subterranean aphids mostly
in single clone groups – an example of
prudent husbandry for carbohydrates and
proteins?




















Mutualistic interactions are wide-spread but the mechanisms
underlying their evolutionary stability and ecological dynamics
remain poorly understood. Cultivation mutualisms in which hosts
consume symbionts occur in phylogenetically diverse groups, but
often have symbiont monocultures for each host. This is consistent
with the prediction that symbionts should avoid coexistence with
other strains so that host services continue to benefit relatives, but
it is less clear whether hosts should always favor monocultures and
what mechanisms they might have to manipulate symbiont diver-
sity. Few mutualisms have been studied in sufficient genetic detail
to address these issues, so we decided to characterize symbiont
diversity in the complex mutualism between multiple root aphid
species and Lasius flavus ants. After showing elsewhere that three
of these aphid species have low dispersal and mostly if not exclu-
sively asexual reproduction, we here investigate aphid diversity
within and between ant nest mounds. 
The three focal species (Geoica utricularia, Forda marginata and
Tetraneura ulmi) had considerable clonal diversity at the popula-
tion level. Yet more than half of the ant mounds contained just a
single aphid species, a significantly higher percentage than
expected from a random distribution. Over 60% of these single-
species mounds had a single aphid clone, and clones tended to
persist across subsequent years. Whenever multiple species/clones
co-occurred in the same mound, they were spatially separated with
more than 95% of the aphid chambers containing individuals of a
single clone. 
L. flavus ‘husbandry’ is characterized by low aphid ‘livestock’
diversity per colony, especially at the nest-chamber level, but it
lacks the exclusive monocultures known from other cultivation
mutualisms. The ants appear to eat most of the early instar aphids,
so that adult aphids are unlikely to face limited phloem resources
and scramble competition with other aphids. We suggest that such
culling of carbohydrate-providing symbionts for protein ingestion
may maintain maximal host yield per aphid while also benefitting
the domesticated aphids as long as their clone-mates reproduce
successfully. The cost-benefit logic of this type of polyculture hus-
bandry has striking analogies with human farming practices based
on slaughtering young animals for meat to maximize milk-produc-
tion by a carefully regulated adult livestock population.
ABSTRACT
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BACKGROUND
Mutualistic symbioses are widespread and of crucial importance in many ecosystems
(Stachowicz 2001). Although evolutionary theory to explain the stability of mutualistic
interactions has progressed considerably (see Leigh 2010 for a review), consensus on the
general underlying mechanisms that keep these interactions stable and cooperative has
not been achieved (Herre et al. 1999; Edwards et al. 2006; Weyl et al. 2010; Kiers et al.
2011; 2011). While further theoretical work might alleviate this problem, these difficulties
also illustrate that mutualistic interactions are highly variable in their ecological contexts
(Bshary & Grutter 2006; Kiers & Denison 2008; Palmer et al. 2010) and degrees of com-
mitment (Poulsen & Boomsma 2005; Thompson & Fernandez 2006; Moran et al. 2008),
and that very few of them have been studied in considerable depth (reviewed in Leigh
y2010). Two aspects are thought to have important implications for the interaction stabilit
of host-symbiont mutualisms: 1. The level of sexual reproduction and the degree of inde-
pendent dispersal of the symbionts, and 2. Genetic diversity among symbionts of a single
host (Herre et al. 1999). In a previous study we investigated the first aspect in the hitherto
poorly studied mutualism of Lasius flavus ants farming root-aphids (Ivens et al. 2012b;
Chapter 2). The present study focuses on the second aspect.
In cultivation (farming) mutualisms, the host partner promotes the growth of a sym-
biont that it consumes, either individually or as somatic modules (Hata & Kato 2006).
While scenarios of ‘enslavement domestication’ have been suggested for the early evolu-
tion of such mutualisms (West et al. 2007; Login et al. 2011), it remains difficult to under-
stand how symbionts would be actively selected to make the transition from free-living to
being domesticated. The latter state would imply becoming reproductively isolated from
free-living relatives which would require consistent direct benefits to be sustainable.
yDomestication often also implies losing options for horizontal transmission, having man
offspring consumed by the host, and potentially being mixed with other symbiont lineages,
consequences that could all discourage life as a symbiont. Domestication mutualisms
would thus seem most likely to evolve if symbiont services ultimately benefit the reproduc-
tion of close symbiont relatives and if the productivity of domesticated reproduction con-
sistently exceeds the fitness that can be obtained from a free-living life-style. When
symbionts are already clonal before domestication, one would therefore expect symbioses
to elaborate this form of propagation when making symbionts commit irreversibly to a
dependent life-style, which requires new host-serving adaptations that impede survival
and reproduction without the host. The ‘trophobiotic organs’ evolved in the aphids of our
present study (Heie 1980; Hölldobler & Wilson 1990) are examples of such adaptations.
While symbiont interests in being cultivated would be expected to benefit from monop-
olizing host attention to a group of close relatives, hosts should not necessarily favor the
same tendencies towards rearing monocultures, as a more variable community of sym-
bionts might offer a broader spectrum of services or be less vulnerable to parasites (e.g.
van Borm et al. 2002). As outlined by in earlier studies (Wulff 1985; Frank 1996), hosts
would be selected to enforce monocultures only if scramble competition between multiple
symbiont strains would decrease the overall productivity of the symbiotic interaction, i.e. fi
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host. Similar selection pressure towards monoculture farming would apply if coexistence
of multiple strains within the same host would allow free-riding by underperforming
strains, leading to a direct reduction in overall productivity (e.g. Bronstein 2001; Kiers &
Denison 2008).
Incentives for competition or cheating would destabilize mutualistic interactions
between symbionts and hosts, unless specific mechanisms of symbiont screening upon
admission (Archetti et al. 2011) or symbiont rewarding/sanctioning in proportion to per-
formance (Kiers & Denison 2008; Weyl et al. f2010) can evolve. The relative importance o
these mechanisms is controversial, but available data suggest that monocultures are com-













transect locations n = 8
ant mounds n = 5
soil samples n = 21
aphid chambers n = 1-5
Schiermonnikoog
B
Figure 4.1 f fThe sampling scheme or root aphids in nest mounds o  the ant Lasius flavus.
A. A representative large aphid chamber with many, mostly adult, Geoica utricularia, B. Aphids
were sampled from ant mounds on the island of Schiermonnikoog (The Netherlands) along a tran-
sect on the salt-marsh (framed area on map, corresponding to the area shown in Figure 4.2).
Sampling was done in a nested design with four levels. At every transect location (level 1, location
1-8), we sampled 5 ant mounds (level 2), by taking 21 soil samples (level 3), located in, on the
edge of, or just outside an ant mound. The collected aphids within each sample were kept separate
per aphid chamber (level 4) (Photo: A.B.F. Ivens, maps courtesy of D. Visser).
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algae-growing damselfish (Hata & Kato 2002) to those of fungus-growing termites and
ants (Bot et al. 2001; Poulsen & Boomsma 2005; Aanen et al. 2009; Mueller et al. 2010).
In fungus-farming leaf-cutting ants, monocultures appear to be enforced by a combination
of incompatibility between genetically different symbiont strains and active symbiont polic-
ing by the hosts (Poulsen & Boomsma 2005; Ivens et al. 2009; Mueller et al. 2010),
whereas a simple mechanism of positive frequency-dependent propagation within estab-
lished colonies appears sufficient to enforce life-time commitment between a termite host
colony and a single symbiont clone (Aanen et al. 2009). However, more studies are needed
to establish the generality of this principle, particularly for cultivation mutualisms where
hosts are able to segregate symbionts in space or time to avoid competition (Palmer et al.
2010), so that the benefits of polyculture might surpass the costs.
In the present study we focus on a farming symbiosis that has been known for decades
but has rarely been studied: the root aphid husbandry for sugar (honeydew, ‘milk’) and
nitrogen (‘meat’) of the Yellow meadow ant Lasius flavus, which is likely to be essential for
ant colony growth and reproduction, and involves an entire array of root aphid species
(Pontin 1958; Muir 1959; Pontin 1961b; 1978; Heie 1980; Godske 1991; Seifert 2007).
These root aphid species have a number of distinct traits that improve performance as ant
symbionts but are never found in free-living aphids, such as the ‘trophobiotic organ’ to
hold honeydew for the ants (Hölldobler & Wilson 1990). The most common species have
further lost most if not all sexual reproduction in Northwest Europe, but have maintained
low frequencies of winged morphs that may disperse between colonies (Ivens et al. 2012b;
Chapter 2). In the present study we use a newly developed set of DNA microsatellite
markers (Ivens et al. y2011; Chapter 5) to assess aphid species number and clonal diversit
at the level of single ant nest mounds. 
AThe objectives of our study were to use hierarchical sampling (Figure 4.1) and DN
fmicrosatellite analysis to: 1. Estimate species- and clone diversity for three focal species o
root aphids (Geoica utricularia, Tetraneura ulmi, Forda marginata) within L. flavus nests,
soil samples within nests, and single aphid chambers (Figure 4.1A) within these soil
samples, 2. Evaluate whether the observed distributions are consistent with the expecta-
ytion that symbiont diversity within nests is low, 3. Analyze the extent to which diversit
patterns change across sampling levels and years, and 4. Infer which potential mechanisms
can lead to the observed diversity patterns.
RESULTS
Aphid diversity and abundance
As shown in Figure 4.2, considerable aphid diversity existed along the sampled 7 km
ytransect, but the distribution of this diversity across ant mounds deviated significantl
from random. At all sampling levels (ant mound, soil sample and chamber) monocultures
containing only a single species occurred much more often than expected from a random
distribution (Figure 4.2, Table 4.1), with 52% of the sampled mounds and 99% of the
aphid chambers containing only a single species. Also genetic diversity within species was

















































































Figure 4.2 f fDistribution o  aphid clonal lineages per ant mound. Data are shown or three root
aphid species Geoica utricularia (A), Tetraneura ulmi (B) and Forda marginata (C) in 2008. Large
dotted circles refer to sampling locations (1-8 from left to right), whereas small filled circles refer
to sampled ant mounds, with the number of aphids found in the mound indicated by numbers
within circles. Colours indicate the proportion of aphids belonging to particular clonal multilocus
genotypes (MLGs), whereas multilocus lineages (MLLs) that combine closely related MLGs are
identifiable by their similar colour shades. Mounds with bold black margins were resampled in
2009 and 2010.
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fcontained a single multilocus lineage (MLL) than expected based on the distribution o
MLLs over transect locations (Figure 4.2, Table 4.1). The same was true for the distribution
of multilocus genotypes (MLGs) over mounds, with G. utricularia MLGs occurring signifi-
fcantly more often in monocultures than expected. In the other two species the frequency o
MLG-monocultures across mounds was not significantly different from random expectation
(Figure 4.2, Table 4.1).
At flower sampling levels within mounds (soil samples, chambers) high percentages o
monocultures were also found, both between and within species (Table 4.1). However,
these monoculture percentages did mostly not significantly deviate from randomness,
because low aphid diversity at the species, MLL or MLG level across mounds or soil
samples will automatically lead to low aphid diversity at the next level below. Figure 4.3
illustrates this for the spatial distribution of G. utricularia fMLGs in one of the nests o
Figure 4.2, showing that most MLGs occurred spatially separated already at the soil sample
level, so that aphid chambers could only contain monocultures (Table 4.1, Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of aphid numbers per chamber, with most chambers con-
taining only one aphid, but some chambers having as many as 13 aphids (means per
chamber ± SE G. utricularia 1.61 ± 0.13, T. ulmi 1.84 ± 0.18, F. marginata 2.39 ± 0.28).
fEven aphid chambers with rather many aphids often contained monocultures in terms o




























Table 4.1 R fesults o  the monoculture analyses. For each organization level (between-species and
between MLLs and MLGs within-species) the probability (P) that the observed number of monocul-
tures at a given sampling level (ant mounds, soil samples and aphid chambers) could have resulted
from a random distribution of aphids was estimated using a bootstrap approach with 1000 itera-
tions. P-values below 0.05 (bold figures) indicate deviations from a random distribution. 
LevelAnt mounds Soil samples Chambers
n % P n % P N % P
mono- mono- mono-
cultures cultures cultures
Between species 31 52 0.001 145 94 0.001 239 99 0.001
Within species MLL
Geoica utricularia 20 60 0.028 75 88 0.005 125 95 0.949
Tetraneura ulmi 18 72 0.043 39 90 0.068 50 96 1.000
Forda marginata 11 64 0.015 40 88 0.094 66 95 0.663
Between species MLG
Geoica utricularia 20 60 0.027 75 88 0.002 125 95 0.962
Tetraneura ulmi 18 67 0.082 39 87 0.056 50 94 1.000
Forda marginata 11 36 0.099 40 73 0.707 66 88 1.000
Level Ant mounds
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Annual turnover of aphid clonal lineages
T fen of the ant mounds sampled in 2008 were resampled in 2009 and 2010. In seven o
these we found one or more of the focal species in the subsequent years (Figure 4.5). Most
MLGs that we found in later years had already been found in the same mounds in 2008.
There were only two exceptions to this apparent continuity over time: in the first mound
resampled for T. ulmi (Figure 4.5B) we found an additional MLG in 2009 that had not
been observed in that mound in the previous year, and in the second mound resampled for
F. marginata (Figure 4.5C), we found a MLG that had not been identified before, but which
ybelonged to one of the MLLs that had been observed in 2008 in other nest mounds nearb
(coloured in green shade, Figure 4.2). These apparent exceptions might either reflect
















Figure 4.3 fSpatial distribution o  Geoica utricularia fMLGs in a single, representative nest mound o
Lasius flavus. The top pie chart gives the observed MLG distribution in the entire mound, the mid-
level pie charts give the MLG distribution over soil samples, and the lower pie charts give the MLG
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number of aphids per chamber
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150
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Figure 4.4 fDistribution o  aphids over aphid chambers in Lasius flavus mounds in 2008. Aphid
numbers per chamber with genetic monocultures, i.e. aphids of the same MLL (light grey bars) and
polycultures, i.e. chambers with aphids of multiple MLLs (dark grey bars) (n = 239). Chambers
with only a single aphid are monocultures by default.
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overall composition of the nest mound in which the F. marginata MLG was newly observed
ydid not change significantly between 2008 and 2009 (Fisher Exact Test, P = 0.111), likel
ybecause the newly observed MLG belonged to a MLL that had a population-wide frequenc
of 0.044 in 2008. With such a low frequency, it is quite likely that this MLG was missed in
an earlier year. In contrast, the overall composition of aphid MLGs in the nest where we
found a new MLG for T. ulmi rdid significantly change between 2008 and 2009 (Fishe
Exact Test, P = 0.024). It thus appears less likely that the new MLG was due to under-sam-
rpling in 2008, since this MLG occurred at a high frequency overall (0.52). Overall, we infe
that clonal lineage composition of aphid livestock in L. flavus ant mounds changes rela-
ytively little from year to year. We would have liked to test this with a formal heterogeneit
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Figure 4.5 T femporal variation o  aphid clones in Lasius flavus mounds over three years (2008,
2009, 2010). Geoica utricularia (A), Tetraneura ulmi (B), and Forda marginata (C). Colours indicate
MLGs and correspond to colours used in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Grey circles refer to ant mounds
where a focal species was not sampled in a particular year. Data are presented for those mounds in
which the same species was found in at least two of the three consecutive years.
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DISCUSSION
Aphid distribution and abundance
In half of the ant mounds sampled in 2008 only one of the three focal root aphid species,
G. utricularia, T. ulmi or F. marginata was found, despite the other aphid species being
present within a radius of 50 m. This level of aphid specificity among ant nests matches
earlier findings by Muir (1959) in a British field survey of the same ant species and its
yunderground aphids. If there were multiple aphid species per mound, we found that the
tended to be clustered in separate soil samples and hardly ever occurred in the same aphid
chamber. This not only applied for the three most abundant species that we focused on,
fbut also for other rarer species of root aphids. We are confident, therefore, that inclusion o
these other aphids would not have changed our overall conclusions. Unfortunately, aphid
sample sizes remained low for most mounds and for two of the three focal species, which
seems unavoidable as earlier non-destructive large-scale surveys obtained similar numbers
of adult root aphids for these species (Table 4.A1). Comparing frequencies and absolute
densities across studies is not easy as authors have used different sampling methods in the
past (Pontin 1978; Godske 1992). While these have given very different estimates of root
aphid density, we show in the appendix that this is almost certainly due to these sampling
differences, and that our estimates of adult aphid densities are in line with previous
studies. In spite of these sample size limitations, we are confident, therefore, that our
results would be repeatable with larger sample sizes at: (1) the mound level, because
aphids were generally found scattered throughout the entire mound, so that systematic
bias in our non-destructive sampling appears unlikely, and (2) at the chamber level,
because Figure 4.4 shows that within-chamber aphid diversity does not increase with
increasing numbers of aphids per chamber (ca. equivalent to chamber size). Moreover, in
our statistical analysis we control for any effect of the low sample sizes, by simulating the
exact same sample sizes as achieved in the field.
The considerable interaction-specificity, often between single ant colonies and single
yaphid lineages was also encountered at the genetic level within species. Mounds often onl
harbored one clonal lineage of a single aphid species and if mounds had multiple aphid
clones they were almost always compartmentalized in different chambers. A similar degree
of host specificity has also been shown for above-ground aphids tended by ants as opposed
to non-tended aphids (Yao 2010). However, complete spatial separation of aphid clones is
less frequently observed above ground (Yao 2010; Vantaux et al. 2011a), probably because
these aphids can more easily move around. Our limited sampling across years further indi-
cated a high degree of constancy of distributions of aphid clones over time. It would have
been interesting to compare our results with similar studies on other myrmecophilous and
non-myrmecophilous root aphids, but to our knowledge such studies have not yet been
done. 
Within- and between ant mound aphid distribution patterns
The between- and within-mound distribution patterns were very similar for the three aphid
species under study (Figure 4.2), suggesting that similar dispersal and recruitment mecha-
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sizes seemed proportional to the number of aphids housed in them (appendix). It thus
appears unlikely that these aphids competed for limiting phloem resources, even in the few
cases where different aphid species or MLLs shared a chamber. Rather, the husbanding
ants seem to optimize the feeding conditions for each aphid adult, because aphid densities
y(on average 1.00 per liter soil, appendix) remained well below densities that would occup
all available root phloem resources. These relatively low numbers of adult aphids can be
explained by the ants eating the vast majority of aphid nymphs and only keeping a small
number of adults for honeydew production as inferred previously by Pontin (1978).
The low aphid diversity per mound, the apparent invariance of clonal distributions per
mound among years, and the high degree of population viscosity (Ivens et al. 2012b;
Chapter 2) are consistent with horizontal transmission of aphids between mounds being
infrequent. After successful dispersal and adoption, aphid propagation within mounds would
then mostly be in the form of clonal copies of fundatrices (aphid ‘foundresses’) replacing
their ancestors. We would thus expect that the genetic diversity of aphid livestock within a
given ant mound would slowly increase over the years. The densest L. flavus populations in
Northwest Europe are normally found in extensively grazed old pastures that have been
stable for centuries and where nest-mounds are large because many generations of L. flavus
colonies have contributed to building them. Compared to such populations, the coastal
transect that we studied is more variable in age and stability, which appeared to be reflected
in the younger parts of the salt-marsh harboring less aphid diversity, at least for G. utricu-
laria (appendix). Patterns like this would be reminiscent of older trees having richer com-
munities of underground mycorrhiza and leaf-endophytes (Arnold & Herre 2003; Palfner te
al. 2005), but also of above-ground aphid colonies becoming more genetically diverse over
the season due to the immigration of new aphid clones (Vantaux et al. 2011a).
Inferring the evolutionary logic of aphid husbandry in Lasius flavus colonies
Genetic diversity of symbionts has been a central issue in mutualism theory (Wulff 1985;
Frank 1996; Herre et al. 1999) as diversity levels that simultaneously maximize the fitness
of both hosts and symbionts are often expected to be low (Wulff 1985; Frank 1996). This
is indeed what we found throughout our data set (i.e. at the species, MLL and MLG level).
Compartmentalization of symbionts is known to promote mutualism stability in other
systems [e.g. mycorrhizal mutualisms (Bever et al. 2009)], because benefits can be prefer-
entially allocated toward cooperative symbionts. However, many of these conceptual argu-
ments are based on the assumption that symbiont lineages compete and that the collateral
damage of such interactions for host fitness maintains selection to suppress symbiont
diversity (Frank 1996). While the high root aphid densities per L. flavus mound reported in
the literature (appendix) that inspired this study suggested that such competition might
also apply in this system, our results prompt us to reappraise this assumption, because: (1)
Aphid husbandry is special, relative to other resource enhancing mutualisms, in that the
ant hosts can exploit their aphid symbionts both for sugars (‘milking’ adults in their prime
age) and for proteins (eating young instars and old adults) and (2) Our data suggest that
consumption of most of the aphid offspring by the ants reduces total aphid numbers per
mound (appendix) to such extent that the grass-root phloem resource constraints that
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Many details of the interaction between L. flavus ants and their communities of mutu-
alistic root aphids remain unknown and deserve further study. However, our present results
indicate that the biological details and specific resource constraints of an obligate mutual-
ism may be decisive for the selection factors that determine evolutionary stability over
time. Our present data indicate that prevailing paradigms of partner choice and sanctions
(Noë & Hammerstein 1994; Kiers & Denison 2008; Weyl et al. 2010; Archetti et al. 2011)
may not apply in the ant-aphid mutualism that we studied, because fundamental assump-
tions of scramble competition between unrelated symbionts (Frank 1996) are not fulfilled
(appendix).
After initial domestication, the aphid clones would have continued to benefit from the
ysymbiosis, because the premature death of most early instar nymphs (which individuall
are of low value as sugar providers for the ants) reduces competition over resources and
reproduction, and extensive clonality ensures that vertical transmission will maintain
clonal tenure within nests. This interpretation might explain why L. flavus yis reputedl
obligately dependent on root aphids (Pontin 1978; Seifert 2007), but without having spe-
cialized on any of the large number of aphid species that are available, despite the aphids
having evolved specialized traits that enhance productivity as ant symbionts but preclude
independent life (see Ivens et al. 2012b; Chapter 2 for details). Testing the validity of our
interpretation that early instar aphids are worth more as direct sources of protein than as
later sources of carbohydrates will require controlled lab experiments, which might be fea-
sible in spite of the challenges of keeping these ants and aphids in artificial nests (Smart
1991).  
Analogies with human subsistence farming
The results of our study suggest that polyculture aphid husbandry in L. flavus follows
similar efficiency principles as modern cattle husbandry practices in humans, where adult
cows are kept in numbers that secure maximal milk-productivity in a competition-free envi-
ronment and where surplus reproduction is slaughtered for meat-consumption soon after
birth. How this analogy could come about is interesting to evaluate. 
The English name for L. flavus, Yellow meadow ant, indicates lack of pigmentation
because the ants are almost never exposed to direct sunlight. This exclusively underground
life style, shared by many but far from all Lasius ants (Seifert 2007), must have implied
that foraging territories became limited to the direct nest environment, so that access to
prey was reduced but protection and monopolization of domesticated aphids became
easier. Intensification of aphid husbandry thus seems a logical consequence of becoming
ysubterranean and a prudent way of harvesting a small local resource-base that ultimatel
depends on primary production (grass roots) rather than secondary production (free-living
prey capture). Extensive culling of immature aphids for meat not only allowed polyculture
practices (by eliminating competition), but may have actively encouraged it when different
yaphid species would exploit somewhat different plant root niches, when their availabilit
would be unpredictably, or when they would produce honeydew with slightly different
chemical composition (Fischer & Shingleton 2001). 
The analogies between aphid husbandry in L. flavus and human cultural practices are
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much higher densities than hunter-gatherer populations (Larsen 1995). Likewise, the
density of L. flavus ants in mature grasslands is among the highest known for ants (Odum
& Pontin 1961; Boomsma & Van loon 1982; Seifert 2007) and appears to be sustainable
with only a modest ecological footprint. As in humans, the secret of success appears to be
a unique combination of traits, such as the ability to actively engineer nest mound habitat
[a form of niche construction (Laland & Boogert 2010)] rather than living in fixed plant
structures as other obligately aphid-dependent ants do (e.g. van Borm et al. 2002), and the
availability of multiple aphids that could be domesticated without the need to specialize
on any one of them. This suggests that ant farming practices for meat (Offenberg 2001;
Ben-Dov & Fischer 2010) deserve more explicit study, as they may provide remarkable
insights into sustainable farming practice. 
CONCLUSIONS
Farming mutualisms are highly diverse. Some have a long history of coadaptation, speci-
ficity and vertical symbiont transmission, whereas others have evolved interdependences
based on horizontal symbiont acquisition and low specificity. Many ant species obtain fac-
yultative benefits from tending aphids. Some of these interactions have evolved to be highl
specific, but the Lasius flavus husbandry system that we studied is unusual in that both
ants and root aphids appear to be obligately interdependent and adapted to their respec-
tive life styles as farmers and livestock, but without obvious signs of species-by-species
interaction specificity.
Our genetic explorations of a large island population with dense populations of L.
flavus suggest that the combination of permanently underground nesting, aphid clonality,
and very low gene flow between aphid populations of neighbouring mounds has allowed
these ants to evolve an unusual form of polyculture symbiosis. Species and clonal lineages
yof aphids appear to be kept apart, which likely gives colonies the possibility to activel
manage the diversity and abundance of their livestock. We hypothesize that this allows the
ants to secure maximal yield from a subset of mature aphids that are kept for carbohy-
drates under optimal conditions of phloem feeding and ant care. These selected aphids
may then also reproduce at the highest possible rate, so that the ants both secure maximal
protein intake by eating the excess of early instar aphids, and replacement of their honey-
dew-producing livestock when adult aphids age and become less productive.
Many mechanistic details that govern the dynamics of this mutualism await further
research. However, we feel that analogies with human husbandry practices based on
similar cost-benefit considerations lend sufficient credibility to our interpretations to gen-
erate novel interest into natural selection processes that have produced ant farming prac-
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METHODS
Natural history of the model system
The subterranean Yellow meadow ant Lasius flavus constructs conspicuous nest mounds
(↕ ca. 30cm, Ø ca. 80 cm) in grassland habitats to house both its own colonies and the root
aphids on which it depends for honeydew as a source of carbohydrates (Pontin 1958;
1961b; 1978; Heie 1980) and which they eat for protein (Pontin 1958; 1961b; 1978). The
ants actively protect the aphids (Pontin 1959; A.B.F. Ivens, personal observation) and keep
them in specially constructed ‘aphid-chambers’, cavities around grass-roots with one or
several aphids (Figure 4.1A). Thirteen species of root aphids are known to be tended by L.
flavus, often with multiple species in the same nest mound ((Muir 1959; Pontin 1978;
Heie 1980; Godske 1991; A.B.F. Ivens, personal observation). Among these, Tetraneura
ulmi, Geoica utricularia and Forda marginata are often the most dominant species (Muir
1959; Pontin 1978; Heie 1980; Godske 1991; Ivens et al. 2012b; Chapter 2). This was also
the case at our study site, so we focused our study on these three species. These aphids can
also be found in nests of other ants, such as Myrmica sp. and other Lasius species (Heie
1980), albeit in lower numbers than in the typical L. flavus mounds. 
Aphid reproductive cycles can be fully asexual (anholocyclic) or include a single sexual
phase at the end of the season (holocyclic). In another study (Ivens et al. 2012b; Chapter
y2) we showed that the three focal aphid species are predominantly if not completel
asexual in our study population (see also below), consistent with all three species having
been shown to feed year-round on roots of the grasses Festuca rubra, Agrostis spp. and
Elytrigia maritima without requiring a host shift during winter (Muir 1959; Pontin 1978;
Heie 1980; Ivens et al. 2012b; Chapter 2). The possible winter host shift to Ulmus trees
that has previously been described for Tetraneura ulmi (Heie 1980; O.E. Heie, personal
communication) thus appears to be absent in our NW European study population.
However, several other mechanisms can account for more limited horizontal aphid disper-
sal in salt march habitats such as our study site: walking, floating on tidal floods and wind
dispersal of winged individuals (alates) that are produced at very low frequencies in all
three species. Considerable genetic population viscosity confirms that horizontal dispersal
between mounds is generally limited (Ivens et al. 2012b; Chapter 2). However, this
appears to be the only dispersal mode available as neither vertical nor horizontal transmis-
sion by the tending workers has ever been observed for Lasius ants.
Sampling methods
Ant mounds were sampled for aphids on the island of Schiermonnikoog, the Netherlands
(53°28' N, 6°09' E) in July 2008, 2009 and 2010 along a 7 km transect across most of the
salt-marsh on the island (Figure 4.1B). The westernmost first kilometer close to the inhab-
ited part of the island was grazed by cattle, whereas the remaining transect crossed
ungrazed salt-marsh. The transect was subdivided into eight locations (one every km). At
every location we sampled five same-sized ant mounds (Ø ca. 60 cm), taking 21 cylindri-
cal soil samples (10 cm deep and Ø 8 cm, volume 0.64 l), according to a fixed sampling
scheme (Figure 4.1B). The average volume of the part of the mounds that was suitable for
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estimate by adding the volume of the aboveground part of an average mound and the
volume of a ring directly surrounding the mound (10 cm wide, 8 cm deep) which is known
to often contain root aphids as well (Pontin 1978; Godske 1991). 
Every soil sample was hand-sorted for ‘aphid chambers’, cavities containing one or
more root aphid individuals in spatial isolation from any other aphids (Figure 4.1A). This
sampling scheme resulted in a four-level nested design: transect location, ant nest mound,
fsoil sample and aphid chamber (Figure 4.1B). In July 2009 and 2010 we resampled 10 o
the 40 previously sampled nest mounds, for which we had obtained sufficiently detailed
aphid distributions in 2008 to be able to detect changes in later years.
Molecular methods and data analysis
A detailed description of the molecular analysis of the aphids and properties of the genetic
markers is provided by Ivens et al. (2011; Chapter 5). In short, all collected aphids were
genotyped for an array of polymorphic microsatellite markers (Geoica utricularia, eight
markers: Gu2, Gu3, Gu5, Gu6, Gu8, Gu9, Gu11, Gu13; Forda marginata, seven markers:
Fm1, Fm3, Fm4, Fm6, Gu6, Gu11, Gu13; Tetraneura ulmi, six markers: Tu1, Tu2, Tu3, Tu4,
Tu10, Tu11) after DNA extraction from entire aphids using 200 μl 20%-Chelex® 100 resin
(Fluka) (Walsh et al. 1991). Following PCR-amplification, products were analyzed on an
ABI-PRISM 3130XL (Applied Biosystems) sequencer and chromatograms were analyzed in
Genemapper (Applied Biosystems). 
When amplification failed, samples were re-run at least two more times. When amplifi-
cation remained unsatisfactory, the specific microsatellite locus was scored as ‘missing
data’. When data were missing for more than half of the loci the individual was omitted
from further analysis. In total, we included 239 individuals of Geoica utricularia (2008:
201, 2009: 23, 2010: 15, after omitting a total of 28 individuals), 191 of Forda marginata
(2008: 158, 2009: 4, 2010: 29, 11 omitted) and 105 of Tetraneura ulmi (2008: 92, 2009:
7, 2010: 6, 4 omitted).
Diploid clonal multilocus genotypes (MLGs) consist of a unique combination of alleles
across all genotyped loci. The genotypic data allowed us to assign every aphid to a MLG
using the software MLGSIM 2.0 (http://www.rug.nl/fmns-research/theobio/downloads),
an updated version of MLGSIM (Stenberg et al. 2003b; Box B). A multilocus lineage (MLL)
is a group of closely related MLGs that differ by only one or two alleles (Ivens et al. 2012b;
Chapter 2). All MLGs could be grouped into MLLs. The complete analysis is detailed in
Ivens et al. (2012b; Chapter 2).
When a sample only contained aphids from a single species, MLL or MLG, we classified
that sample as a ‘monoculture’ at the species, MLL or MLG level. Samples were taken at
three ‘sampling levels’: ant mound, soil sample or chamber. To test whether the observed
monocultures occurred more frequently than expected under a random distribution, we
wrote a bootstrap routine in R 2.13.0 (R Development Core Team 2011) (routine available
upon request). For a given level of sampling, the routine distributed the species, MLLs, or
MLGs randomly over samples in 1000 iterations with simulation sample sizes correspon-
ding to the observed sample sizes. The routine thus used the observed frequency distribu-
tions of species, MLLs, or MLGs at the sampling level above the focal level (Figure 4.1B) to
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observed number would be obtained by chance (one-tailed test). When P was <0.05, the
null hypothesis that the observed number of monocultures resulted from a random distri-
bution of aphids over samples was rejected. 
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APPENDIX
Aphid abundance estimates
yThe aphid numbers in our samples were low relative to the numbers that have previousl
been estimated for L. flavus territories (5500–17000 aphids per ant nest of medium size,
i.e. 23000 ants) (Pontin 1978; Godske 1992). However, neither in previous surveys nor in
the present study were mounds sampled exhaustively, in order to preserve them for later
resampling. This implied that aphid density estimates could only be based on extrapola-
tions from aphid numbers in soil core samples, which in our study covered on average
20% (range 11.4%–62.8%) of the estimated total volume of ant mounds that was suitable
for aphid-culture. 
We collected 14.5 ± 2.07 (mean ± s.e.) adult aphids of the focal species per nest,
which produced an estimate of the cumulative total adult aphid population per mound for
fthe three focal root aphid species of 67 individuals (range 18–134) (Table 4.A1). Most o
the discrepancies with earlier estimates appear to be due to previous studies using Tullgren
funnel extraction methods, so that all developmental stages were collected over a period
of several days, whereas we used hand-sorting that only allowed collection of adult aphids
and occasionally fourth instar nymphs (Table 4.A1). The differences in numbers obtained
will likely have been further enlarged by the fact that aphids will continue to give birth
during the 4-5 day long Tullgren extraction, with many of them ending up in the collection
vials instead of being eaten by the ants (Pontin 1978; Smart 1991). Moreover, earlier
authors included a larger part of the potential ant territory and sampled ten root aphid
species more than we were able to analyse genetically. Approximate corrections for these
possible sampling biases produced density figures of adult aphids per litre of mound-soil
that were much closer to our present findings (Table 4.A1). 
On average 88% of the root aphids that previous authors collected by Tullgren funnel
extraction belonged to the nymphal stages that our hand sampling method missed. It
therefore seems reasonable to assume that almost all of these never become established in
chambers as carbohydrate providers to the ant society, but were eaten by the ants before
they become adult (Pontin 1978). This would imply that population numbers of adult root
aphids remain well below the density levels that would exploit all available phloem
resources that could possibly be accessed via grass roots. Whether L. flavus indeed balances
its preying behaviour based on carbohydrate intake would need further testing in con-
trolled laboratory experiments (Pontin 1978). A result consistent with this hypothesis
would seem likely, because a shift from milking to preying behaviour has been documented
for L. niger after workers were offered a carbohydrate food supplement (Offenberg 2001).
L. niger belongs to the same genus as L. flavus and often lives in the same grasslands habi-
tats where it avoids competition with L. flavus by foraging above ground (Pontin 1961a;
1963; Boomsma & Van loon 1982).
Further arguments for the likely absence of scramble competition between root aphids
Of the total of 239 opened aphid chambers that were inhabited by the three focal species
in 2008, only 92 (38.5%) contained more than one aphid (range 2–13). Within this sub-
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(4.6%) contained 2 MLLs (Figure 4.4). Aphid chambers are small cavities that are exca-
vated by the ants alongside roots of grasses like Festuca rubra and Elytrigia maritima.
Although chamber volumes were not measured, they often seemed approximately propor-
tional to the number of aphids housed in them, suggesting that the ants expand chambers
when they need to contain more adult aphids and more roots for these aphids to extract
phloem sap from. Combined with the abundant availability of grass roots in L. flavus
mounds and our average yield of ca. 1 adult aphid per litre soil (Table 4.A1), this minimal
coexistence with non-clone mates and the absence of chamber space constraints would
make it very unlikely that individual ant-tended aphids would not have access to ad
libitum phloem resources.
External factors that may affect aphid diversity at a larger scale
yOverall, we would expect that the genetic diversity of aphid livestock would tend to slowl
increase when L. flavus mounds become larger over the years of their existence, but we did
not have a range of mound-size data to test this and neither are we aware of directly rele-
vant data on this by others. However, the transect locations that are known to be the oldest
from historical records about salt marsh development on the island of Schiermonnikoog
(locations 1,2 and possibly 7) (Olff et al. 1997), harbored mounds that yielded a higher
aphid diversity, at least for G. utricularia for which we had most data. Similarly, mounds
occurring at lower elevations will be more frequently subjected to flooding, a disturbance
that might cause mounds to be growing slower and have longer periods without abundant
ant habitation (Boomsma & Isaaks 1982). Also this seems at least partially consistent with
our data, as aphid clonal diversity in mounds on transect locations with lower elevation
levels [e.g. location 5 and 6 (Ivens et al., unpublished data), tended to have lower clone
diversity with the exception of F. marginata]. Aphid numbers of each of the three species
varied considerably across the transect, possibly reflecting subtle differences in local eco-
logical conditions related flooding frequency and salinity owing to slight elevation differ-
ences (Ivens et al., unpublished data). None of these differences appear to have affected
the overall results and conclusions of our study, but they may be of interest for future eco-
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P fartner choice in a arming mutualism:
do ants display preference for certain
homopteran symbionts?













Mutualism, cooperation between members of different species, is
assumed to be prone to conflicts between partners about invest-
ments and returns. One of the mechanisms that can aid alignment
of these interests is partner choice: the selective directing of
resources towards preferred partners or the neglect of unwelcome
partners. Partner choice requires the ability to discriminate among
potential symbionts. Here, we studied the ability of ant workers of
Lasius flavus to preferentially select among its obligate homopteran
symbionts relative to control homopterans that are not tended. In
this pilot experimental set-up we observed sub-colonies of ants that
were offered mealybugs and aphids that originated from their own
colony or from neighbouring ant colonies as well as symbionts
belonging to different species, all in different states (dead/alive),
in different developmental stages (nymph/adult) or belonging to
different clonal genotypes. We show that the acceptance rate of
symbionts did not differ among any of the categories evaluated.
Total interaction time of the ants with the symbionts was, however,
significantly shorter for nymphs and one of the genotypes, and also
for the mealybugs. In fact, the mealybugs offered were largely
ignored by the ant workers, consistent with them never being
actively tended by Lasius flavus in the field. We use these prelimi-
nary results to evaluate whether the low number and clone diver-
sity of aphid species in ant mounds may be caused by passive aphid
dispersal constraints, rather than by active aphid selection ‘at the
gate’.      
ABSTRACT
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INTRODUCTION
Mutualisms are ubiquitous in nature (Leigh 2010), but their evolutionary stability is still
not completely understood. How can mutualisms remain stable interactions over evolu-
tionary time, when cooperating partner species are likely selected to reap maximal benefits
from the interaction for the least possible investments (Herre et al. 1999)? Several mecha-
nisms to prevent or resolve such conflicts and thus enhance mutualism stability have been
put forward in the literature. One of these, partner choice (Bull & Rice 1991) allows (one
fof) the species to choose with whom to cooperate by preferentially directing benefits. I
cooperative individuals tend to choose cooperative partners, the potential for conflict over
cooperative investment will ultimately be reduced. This mechanism has been studied both
theoretically (e.g. Noë & Hammerstein 1995; Archetti et al. 2011) and empirically (e.g.
Bshary et al. 2002; Kiers & Denison 2008; McFall-Ngai 2008). Partner choice requires dis-
ycriminatory power in the choosing species, which prompted us to study the discriminator
power of Lasius flavus ants when confronted with different underground homoptereans. 
Work on partner choice in homopteran-tending ants has so far been restricted to a
couple of studies on facultative interactions between ants and above ground aphids. These
ystudies showed that aphid species honeydew composition induces a preference hierarch
for the aphids species tended, with species producing melezitose-rich honeydew being pre-
ferred (Völkl et al. 1999; Woodring et al. 2004). However, Vantaux et al. (2012) showed
that Lasius niger ants do not appear to discriminate in tending or predation of high and
low quality clones of aphids.
Here we present pilot study results on partner choice in the obligate interaction
between the underground ant L. flavus and the homopterans it tends in its nests. L. flavus
is well-known for rearing several aphid species (Paul 1977; Pontin 1978; Godske 1991).
Also mealybugs are frequently found in the nests of these ants, but their relationship to the
ants has remained unclear, although mealybugs are often described as being also mutualis-
tic partners of ants for honeydew (Hölldobler & Wilson 1990). In an experimental sub-
colony set-up we investigated ant preferences for both underground aphids and mealybugs
belonging to different species, and for aphids from the ants’ own colony or a different
colony, for different developmental stages, different clonal lineages, and different states
(dead or alive) and measured possible preferences in terms of symbiont acceptance rate
and total interaction time.
METHODS
Study system
The subterranean Yellow meadow ant Lasius flavus houses root aphids and mealybugs in
its conspicuous nest mounds(↕ ca. 30 cm, ø ca. 80 cm) (Paul 1977; Pontin 1978; Godske
1991). The ants depend on these symbionts for honeydew as a source of carbohydrates
and they are also known to eat the root aphids for protein (Pontin 1958; Pontin 1961b;
Pontin 1978; Smart 1991). Aphids are kept in specially constructed ‘aphid-chambers’, cavi-
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tors by the ants. Thirteen species of root aphids are known to be commonly tended by L.
flavus, often with multiple species in the same nest mound (Paul 1977; Pontin 1978;
Godske 1991; Chapter 8), but rarely in the same chamber (Ivens et al. 2012a; Chapter 4).
Among these, Tetraneura ulmi, Geoica utricularia and Forda marginata are often the most
dominant species. Besides aphids belonging to these four species, also Forda formicaria
aphids were used as well as aphids belonging to the genera Anoecia and Trama. Also
several species of mealybugs have been found in L. flavus nests (Chapter 8). Not all mealy-
bugs used in this study could be identified; those who were identified belonged to the
species Rhizoecus albidus Goux or Euripersia tomlini (Newstead). E. tomlini (Newstead)
has earlier been described by Kosztarab & Kozar (1988) to be associated with Lasius flavus.
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Figure A.1 Sampling location and experimental set-up. (A) Ant colonies used in this study were
located at the ungrazed salt marsh of the island of Schiermonnikoog in The Netherlands. (B) exper-
imental set-up of behavioral experiments. Each sub-colony consisted of two Lasius flavus worker
ants and one ant pupa. These sub-colonies were offered either one of their own symbionts (aphid
or mealybug) or an alien symbiont, collected from another ant mound (Maps courtesy of D. Visser).
A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 90
Experimental set-up
fExperiments were performed directly after collection of ants and aphids on the island o
Schiermonnikoog, the Netherlands (Figure A.1A) in July 2010 and 2011. For each sampled
ant colony (n = 14), we made a series of experimental sub-colonies following Bot et al.
(2001) and Ivens et al. (2009). Sub-colonies were housed in a small plastic pot (↕ 3.5 cm,
Ø 2 cm) with a lid with 15 pinholes to provide air. Each sub-colony consisted of two ant-
workers, soil from the original ant nest and a pupa to secure natural nursing behavior by
the workers (Figure A.1B). After set-up, the sub-colonies were allowed to acclimatize
during 2 hours in complete darkness. 
Sub-colonies were then offered a symbiont collected from their own colony or from a
neighboring colony (maximum distance between colonies 10 m). For each symbiont a set
of characteristics was recorded for later reference: (1) Symbiont origin (own colony/ alien
colony), (2) symbiont ‘species’ (when possible to determine: normally aphid species, oth-
erwise aphid genus; mealybugs where merely classified as ‘mealybug’), (3) symbiont state
(dead/alive) and symbiont developmental stage (adult/nymph). A total of 134 symbionts
were tested. After the experiments Geoica utricularia and Forda marginata aphids were
genotyped using microsatellite markers (Geoica utricularia, eight markers: Gu2, Gu3, Gu5,
Gu6, Gu8, Gu9, Gu11, Gu13; Forda marginata, seven markers: Fm1, Fm3, Fm4, Fm6, Gu6,
Gu11, Gu13). All details of the protocol for this genotyping analysis can be found in Ivens
et al. (2011; 2012a; 2012b; Chapters 2, 4 and 5).
Behavioral observations
After introduction of the symbiont individual, each sub-colony was observed for 5 minutes.
All observations were video-recorded for later reference and seven behaviors were recorded
and timed: A: antennation of the symbiont by the ant worker, LA: licking of the abdomen
of the symbiont by ant worker, LB: licking of the back of the symbiont by ant worker, M:
‘milking’, the consumption of a droplet of honeydew from the symbiont by the ants, P:
picking up of the symbiont (mostly to be carried to the brood item, presumably a safe loca-
tion), D: dropping of the symbiont, and I: symbiont ignored by the ants throughout the
experiment. A and LA are standard behaviours in both the milking and the recognition
processes in ants (Hölldobler & Wilson 1990).
Data analysis
We analyzed two major response variables: (a) symbiont acceptance by the ants and (b)
total interaction time between ants and the symbionts. A symbiont was considered
‘accepted’ when behaviors M, P or L, and A, occurred, the latter two only when in combi-
nation with behavior M. Because consistent exact timing of all behaviors was not feasible
(mostly problematic when aphids were carried out of view), total interaction time was
estimated from all behaviors observed: A: 5 seconds, A in combination with M: 10 seconds,
BL: 10 seconds, I: 0 seconds, LA: 10 seconds, LA in combination with M: 10 seconds and
M: 10 seconds. These estimates of time spent were all based on time observations during
the experiments.
Our primary interest was to investigate how symbiont acceptance and symbiont inter-
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a generalized linear model (GLM) with acceptance rate as response variable and symbiont
forigin, ‘species’, state and developmental stage as explanatory factors. Significance o
factors was tested separately and statistical interactions were not considered. As small
datasets with many more zeroes than ones do not allow for reliable testing using standard
GLM models, we followed Firth’s modified score procedure in logistic regression analysis
using R-package Logistf (Firth 1993). These model tests yield estimates for the penalized
maximum likelihood (or ‘Firth-Logistic’ (FL)) after which factor effects are evaluated for
statistical significance using a χ2-test. Because symbiont genotype data were only available
for the aphid species G. utricularia and F. marginata, the effect of genotype was tested in a
separate GLM for each species, following the same procedure as for the full model.
Total interaction time plus one second was log-transformed to improve normality and
analyzed using analysis of variance with total interaction time as response variable and
symbiont origin, ‘species’, state and developmental stage and their interactions as explana-
tory factors. Post-hoc testing (for ‘species’) was performed using the R-package multcomp
(Hothorn et al. 2008). The effect of genotype was tested separately for G. utricularia and F.
marginata ywith total interaction time as response variable and genotype as explanator
factor. All analyses were performed using R 2.13.0 (R Development Core Team 2011).
RESULTS
Symbiont acceptance rates
Overall acceptance rates turned out to be very low as 83% of the offered symbionts
remained unaccepted (Figure A.2). Analysis of the full model comprising all symbiont char-
acteristics available (symbiont origin, symbiont ‘species’, symbiont state and symbiont
developmental stage) showed that none of these characteristics significantly affected sym-
biont acceptance rate (Table A.1; Figure A.2). Apparently, ants do not discriminate among
symbionts from their own nest and symbionts from other nests, among different symbiont
‘species’, among dead or living symbionts, and among different developmental stages when






Table A.1 f f fAnalysis o  variance or acceptance rate and total interaction time. Shown are the inal
fmodel (bold) after model simplification and the full model without interactions (plain text). D
denotes degrees of freedom of predictor variables, Δ FL the change in penalized maximum likeli-
hood (for acceptance rates) and F (F test, for total interaction time) and P, the statistical signifi-
cance upon removal of the predictor. Significant P-values (P < 0.05) are given in bold.
Acceptance rate Total interaction time
Source Df Δ FL P F P
Symbiont species 6 7.023 0.32 7.20 < 0.001
Symbiont developmental stage 1 0.003 0.96 7.17 0.008
Symbiont state 1 0.840 0.36 2.54 0.11
Symbiont origin 1 1.507 0.22 0.56 0.34
Ac  rate Total i t i n time
e
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Total interaction time between ants and symbionts
Total interaction time was also not significantly affected by symbiont origin and state
(Table A.1), but symbiont ‘species’ and developmental stage did have a significant effect,
with nymphs having a shorter interaction time than adults and mealybugs having a shorter
interaction time than aphid symbionts (Table A.1; Figure A.3). There were no significant
differences among aphid species in interaction time, but mealybugs were interacted with
shorter (and rejected more quickly) than all aphid species/genera tested.
Effect of genotype
We did not observe differences in acceptance rate among G. utricularia and F. marginata
genotypes (GLM, G. utricularia: df = 2, ΔFL = 1.31, P = 0.27, F. marginata: df = 2, ΔFL =
1.02 and P = 0.36; Figure A.4). However, we did find a difference in total interaction time
among G. utricularia genotypes as G2 aphids were handled significantly longer than G3
aphids (effect of ‘genotype’ in G. utricularia: F(2,29) = 4.36 P = 0.02 ; Figure A.4C). In
F. marginata, we did not observe differences in total interaction time among the 3 geno-

























































































































Figure A.2 f ff fAcceptance rate o  o ered symbionts. Number o  accepted symbionts (dark grey) and
not accepted symbionts (light grey) plotted for different symbiont characteristics: Origin of the
symbiont (own ant nest/alien ant nest) (A), symbiont ‘species’ or group (B), symbiont state
(dead/alive) (C) and symbiont developmental stage (adult/nymph) (D). None of the factors had a
significant effect on acceptance. In total 134 symbionts were offered. n.s.: P > 0.05.
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DISCUSSION
L. flavus ants prefer aphids over mealybugs
Ants spent significantly more time interacting with aphids than with mealybugs. Total
interaction time included carrying aphids around, antennating them and trying to “milk”
them, behaviours that were practically never expressed towards the mealybugs. In addi-
tion, not a single mealybug was accepted into the sub-colony and carried next to the brood
item, as often happened to accepted aphids. These mealybugs are frequently found in
L. flavus nest mounds and are presumed to be honeydew providing symbionts for L. flavus
ants, although very little is known about this interaction (Kosztarab & Kozár 1988).
However, our results seem to indicate that L. flavus does not actively tend these mealybugs,
nor prey on them. Instead, the mealybugs may be commensalistic inhabitants of ant nests,
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Figure A.3 ffBox-whisker plots o  total interaction time between symbionts and ants. Logarithm o
total number of seconds (+1) ant workers spent interacting with the offered symbionts, plotted for
different symbiont characteristics: Origin of the symbiont (own ant nest/alien ant nest) (A), sym-
biont species or group (B), symbiont state (dead/alive) (C) and symbiont developmental stage
(adult/nymph) (D). Solid lines show medians, boxes show their 25-75 percentiles and whiskers the
interquartile range. Not all outliers are shown to retain clarity. Only symbiont ‘species’ and devel-
opmental stage had a significant effect on total interaction time, with mealybugs and nymphs being
interacted with significantly shorter than other symbionts. n.s.: P > 0.05, * P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01,
*** P < 0.001. 
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Ant discrimination among aphid species and genotypes
Our results show that ants do not differ in acceptance rate of or total interaction time with
different aphid species/genera. Aphid species are known to differ in honeydew quality and
quantity and previously above ground ants have been shown to differentiate among the
aphid species that they facultatively tend (Völkl et al. 1999; Woodring et al. 2004). In our
yset-up we observed only a couple of times that milking occurred, so experimental ants ma
not have obtained sufficient information on honeydew quality or quantity to actively prefer
ycertain aphids during the experimental time given them. Also the honeydew produced b
different clonal genotypes belonging to a single aphid species is known to differ in compo-
sition (Vantaux et al. 2011b). However, our results did not show differences in acceptance
rate among aphids clonal lineages, except that one G. utricularia clone was interacted with
longer than another clone, indicating that some discriminatory power may exist in the ants


























































































Figure A.4 f fAcceptance rate o  and total interaction time with three clonal lineages o  aphids
Geoica utricularia and Forda marginata. G. utricularia (A, C) and F. marginata (B, D) acceptance
rate (dark grey: accepted, light grey: not accepted) and total interaction time are given for three
clonal lineages of each species (G. utricularia: G1, G2, G3, F. marginata: FM1, FM2, FM3), deter-
mined by microsatellite analysis. Within-species differences in acceptance rate of clones were tested
to be non-significant. Within-species differences in total interaction time with ants between clones
were non-significant in Forda marginata, but in G. utricularia yG2 was interacted with significantl
longer than G3. n.s.: P > 0.05, * P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001.
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between aphid clones of the same facultative aphid species, even though the honeydew
produced differed in quality. To be able to assess whether similar dynamics apply to an
obligate, underground ant-aphid interaction, future experiments on L. flavus fpreference o
aphid species and clones should therefore include longer assessment times for the ants,
recently fed experimental aphids, and the performance of chemical analysis of the honey-
dew produced by the different aphids.
Symbiont state and developmental stage
L. flavus wants rely on aphids for both carbohydrate and nitrogen intake, as aphid honeyde
provides sugar and aphid predation yields proteins (Pontin 1958; Pontin 1961b; Pontin
1978; Smart 1991; Ivens et al. 2012a; Chapter 4). Aphids of different developmental
stages presumably have a different nutritional destination for the ants: the majority of the
rnymphs has been inferred to be eaten by the ants, whereas adult aphids are preserved fo
honeydew production (Pontin 1978; Ivens et al. 2012a; Chapter 4). Likewise, one might
expect that dead aphids can still serve as food. To test whether ants distinguish between
aphids that can serve as different food sources, we offered both nymphs and adults as well
as dead and live aphids. The results show that ants do not prefer living over dead aphids in
terms of acceptance rate or interaction time. However, ants do spend significantly more
time interacting with adult aphids than nymphs (including milking and depositing aphids
next to the brood), suggesting that the ants may have at least some discriminatory power. 
No effect of symbiont origin 
Symbiont recognition by ant hosts has previously been shown in fungus growing ants
which distinguish their own resident symbiont fungus from alien fungus and even police
against the latter, helped by the resident fungus (Bot et al. 2001; Poulsen & Boomsma
2005; Ivens et al. 2009), a form of discrimination that could be a mechanism to ensure
long-term host-symbiont association. The tested L. flavus ants, however, did not differ in
acceptance rate or interaction time with symbionts originating from their own nest or from
neighbouring nests. This suggests that the ants do not distinguish between these two
groups of symbionts and may thus not be able to recognize their own “dairy cattle”. This is
surprising, because the ants may transfer colony-specific cuticular hydrocarbons (CHC)
when antennating their symbionts, which one would expect could label them as part of
the colony (Hölldobler & Wilson 1990). This would be consistent with the observation that
ants display very similar behavior towards their aphids as towards their brood (Way 1963;
personal observation). L. flavus ants display low aggression levels (A.B.F. Ivens, personal
observation), which could possibly be correlated with less pronounced CHC-profiles and
thus lower discriminatory power among the different profiles. Future CHC-analyses of ant
workers and their associated aphids could further elucidate this.
Implications of results and future perspectives
The experiments shown here served as preliminary studies of partner choice in the L. flavus
– root aphid farming mutualism. The pilot character of the experiments caused the sample
sizes to be rather unbalanced and some factors causing variation might not have been con-
trolled for (e.g. temperature, weather conditions, distance between sampled colonies).
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feasible and they yielded a couple of interesting preliminary results. Overall, the ants show
very little discriminatory power between aphids. This suggests that the low aphid species
and genetic diversity observed within single ant mounds may not be caused by active ant
screening upon entry into a colony, but rather be due to aphid dispersal constraints which
implies that local clones are seldomly being “diluted” by immigrants (Ivens et al. 2012a;
Chapter 4).
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Twenty-six polymorphic microsatellite loci were developed for four
species of ant-associated root-aphids: Geoica utricularia, Forda mar-
ginata, Tetraneura ulmi and Anoecia corni. We found up to 9 alleles
per locus, with an average of 4.8. We also report polymorphic
cross-amplification of eleven of these markers between different
pairs of study species. Furthermore, we tested previously published
aphid microsatellites and found one locus developed for Pemphigus
bursarius to be polymorphic in G. utricularia. These microsatellite
markers will be useful to study the population structure of aphids
associated with the ant Lasius flavus and possibly other ants. Such
studies are relevant because: 1. L. flavus mounds and their associ-
ated flora and fauna are often key components in protected tem-
perate grasslands, and 2. L. flavus and its diverse community of
root-aphids provide an interesting model system for studying the
long-term stability of mutualistic interactions.
ABSTRACT
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Mutualistic interactions between species are widespread and play key roles in ecosystem
stability and diversity (Stachowicz 2001; Bastolla et al. 2009). In Northwest Europe, the
Yellow meadow ant Lasius flavus keeps up to fourteen species of mutualistic root-aphids in
its nests (Pontin 1978; Heie 1980; Godske 1991). The ants actively tend the aphids, which
provide them with honeydew (Pontin 1978). The nest mounds are markers of high grass-
land biodiversity and long-term habitat stability (Dean et al. 1997; Blomqvist et al. 2000;
Lenoir 2009). However, despite the decline of European temperate grasslands in recent
decades and the associated losses in plant and invertebrate biodiversity (WallisDeVries te
al. 2002), neither the sociobiology of the ants (but see Boomsma et al. 1993), nor the
ybiology of the root-aphids (Pontin 1978; Godske 1991; 1992) have been extensivel
studied. To facilitate molecular ecological approaches in the study of this mutualism, we
developed DNA microsatellite markers for the four commonest species: Forda marginata,
Tetraneura ulmi, Geoica utricularia and Anoecia corni.
Samples for genomic library construction for Forda marginata, Tetraneura ulmi, and
Anoecia corni were collected in 2007 from an ant-nest on the Dutch island of Schier-
monnikoog (53º29’03.5’’N; 6º13’46.1’’E) whereas Geoica utricularia was collected near
Dejret, Denmark (56º12’54.2’’N; 10º24’48.2’’E). All samples for molecular analysis were
preserved in 96% ethanol.
Genomic DNA was extracted using the QIAGEN DNeasy Blood & Tissue kit and
enriched for poly-CA and poly-CT microsatellite containing fragments using the protocol
by Rütten et al. (2001). We designed PCR primers for the flanking regions of repetitive
motifs using the web-based software Primer 3 (Rozen et al. 2000). 
Primers were tested on Schiermonnikoog samples collected in 2007, 2008 and 2009
and on samples collected near Dejret in 2007 (Anoecia spp.). DNA for microsatellite screen-
ing was extracted using 200 μl 20%-Chelex® 100 resin (Fluka) (Walsh et al. 1991). PCR-
cocktails had a total volume of 10 μl, consisting of 0.8 mM dNTPs, 2 mM MgCl2, 1 × RPC
buffer, 0.25 U AmpliTaq Gold® DNA Polymerase (Applied Biosystems), 1 μl of DNA tem-
plate and a varying concentration of primers (Table 5.1). Several primer pairs were multi-
plexed in PCR (Table 5.1). The amplification conditions were 95ºC for 5 minutes, x number
of cycles of  95ºC for 30 sec., Ta for 30 seconds and 72ºC for 30 seconds (1 minute for
Gu3, Gu8, Gu9, Gu10 and Gu13) and a final extension of 15 minutes at 72ºC. The respec-
tive x and Ta for each primer are listed in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
Amplified fluorescent labeled PCR-products were run on an ABI-PRISM 3130XL
(Applied Biosystems) sequencer and chromatograms were analyzed in Genemapper
(Applied Biosystems). Expected and observed heterozygosities and deviations from Hardy-
Weinberg Equilibrium (HWE) were determined using GENALEX 6.2 (Peakall & Smouse
2006). Occurrence of Linkage Disequilibrium (LD) was assessed using Genepop 4.0
(Rousset 2008).
The fourteen markers developed for Geoica utricularia were tested on 5-227 aphids. All
markers were polymorphic, with 5.3 alleles per locus on average (Table 5.1). The four
polymorphic markers for Forda marginata were tested together with three cross-amplifying
markers (Gu6, Gu11, Gu13) on 125-162 aphids yielding 6.0 alleles on average (Tables 5.1
and 5.2). The six microsatellite markers for Tetraneura ulmi had 3.7 alleles on average in
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Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Since all species reproduce asexually, deviations from HWE and pres-
ence of LD are expected (Ivens et al. 2012b; Chapter 2; 3). All loci indeed showed signifi-
cant deviation from HWE, except for Gu15 in Geoica utricularia, Fm4 and Gu11 in Forda
formicaria, and Tu10 in Tetraneura ulmi. In G. utricularia the majority of the loci pairs
f(65%) had significant LD, with most pairs not in LD involving Gu1 and Gu15. All pairs o
T. ulmi were in LD, except for Tu10-Tu2, Tu10-Tu1, Tu2-Tu11 and Tu1-Tu11. In F. marginata,
all loci pairs were in LD.  
The two primer pairs developed for the genus Anoecia amplified across Anoecia species
but were not extensively tested. We merely report these loci here for future reference.
Cross-amplification was tested for all markers except Gu12 and Fm5 (Table 5.2), yielding
eleven markers that amplified in one or more additional species. Moreover, most markers
used (species specific and cross-amplified) for Forda marginata were also suitable for the
sibling species Forda formicaria. The loci Fm3, Fm4, Fm6 and Gu13 proved to be diagnos-
tic for distinguishing between F. marginata and F. formicaria (Table 5.2). Three markers
from Pemphigus bursarius (Pb02, Miller et al. 2000) and P. spyrothecae (97PS12 and 98PS8,
Johnson et al. 2000) were tested for cross-amplification in our focal species, but only Pb02









Table 5.2 f f ff fCross-ampli ications o  microsatellite markers in di erent species o  ant-associated root-
aphids. N number of tested samples, Na number of alleles, HE expected heterozygosity, HO observed
heterozygosity, Ta annealing temperature.
Locus Cross-amplified Size N Na HE HO Ta Nr. of Primer Genbank 
species range (°C) cycles conc. accession
(bp) x (μM) number
Gu6 Forda marginata 151-176 159 5 0.681 0.672 49 40 0.15 HM582818
Gu11 Forda marginata 135-147 162 6 0.489 0.234 49 40 0.15 HM582823
Gu13 Forda marginata 143-178 159 5 0.430 0.000 45 45 0.15 HM582825
Tu11 Forda marginata - 2 - - - 49 40 0.15 HM582836
Fm3 Forda formicaria 121 18 1 0.000 0.000 50 40 0.15 HM582828
Fm4 Forda formicaria 174-178 18 3 0.495 0.777 50 35 0.15 HM582829
Fm6 Forda formicaria 206-291 18 2 0.500 1.000 50 45 0.15 HM582830
Gu6 Forda formicaria 151-152 17 2 0.110 0.000 49 40 0.15 HM582818
Gu11 Forda formicaria 142-146 18 3 0.439 0.277 49 40 0.15 HM582823
Gu13 Forda formicaria 156 19 1 0.000 0.000 45 45 0.15 HM582825
Fm1 Anoecia corni, A. zirnitsi 110-134 7 3 - - 45 45 0.25 HM582827
Tu2 Anoecia corni, A. zirnitsi 137-148 3 2 - - 45 45 0.25 HM582832
Tu11 Anoecia corni, A. zirnitsi 69-126 7 5 - - 45 45 0.25 HM582836
Ac 8 Anoecia zirnitsi, A. major 130-146 2 2 - - 45 45 0.25 HM582838
Pb02a Geoica utricularia 118-124 8 2 - - 50 40 0.20 AF267192
adeveloped by Miller et al. 2000 for the lettuce root-aphid Pemphigus bursarius
A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 104
Although we enriched specifically for (CA)n and (CT)n r Aepeats, the aphid DN
appeared to be especially AT-rich, including repeats that were suitable for microsatellite
design. This observation is in accordance with earlier findings (Weng et al. 2007).    
In conclusion, the 26 newly developed microsatellite markers presented here cover a
large proportion of the known root-aphid fauna associated with L. flavus and other ant
fspecies (Heie 1980), and will be useful for detailed studies of the ecology and evolution o
this mutualistic association.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to reproduce both sexually and asexually can be found in many organisms
(Halkett et al. 2005). Such organisms with mixed reproductive modes include economi-
cally important species such as pest species (e.g. aphids) and agricultural crops (e.g.
potato). Despite recent theoretical and empirical advances (Balloux et al. 2003; De Meeus
& Balloux 2004; Halkett et al. 2005; D'Souza & Michiels 2010; Villate et al. 2010; Chapter
3) it remains difficult to accurately estimate rates of asexual reproduction in predomi-
ynantly sexual populations from microsatellite data alone. Moreover, sexually and asexuall
produced individuals can be hard to distinguish, especially in plants. However, the mode
of reproduction is known to have important implications for the evolutionary ecology and
population genetics of a species (Balloux et al. 2003; Halkett et al. 2005; Arnaud-Haond te
al. 2007). Detecting clonal individuals in sexual populations thus greatly contributes to a
more complete insight into the evolution and ecology of a number of focal study species
(Stenberg et al. 2003a; 2003b; Villate et al. 2010).  
The most frequently used statistical method for assessing the likelihood that a given
individual is of clonal origin from microsatellite data, is the estimation of the Psex fvalue o
the multilocus genotype (MLG) to which the individual belongs. Psex ygives the probabilit
to observe at least as many identical MLGs in the sampled population, as expected in a
random-mating population in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium (Tibayrenc et al. 1990; Parks &
Werth 1993; Young et al. 2002):
Psex = ∑
N ! (Pgen)i (1 – Pgen)N–i (B.1)i!(N – i)!
with N = sample size and n = number of individuals with the same MLG. Pgen is the prob-
ability of that MLG to occur in a diploid population assuming Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium:
Pgen = Π (ajbj) 2h (B.2)
with L = number of loci, aj and bj = frequencies of alleles a and b at locus j, respectively,
and h = number of heterozygous loci in the sample (Parks & Werth 1993). To take into
account departures from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium using fixation index FIS, a measure
for heterozygote excess or deficit in the population (Weir & Cockerham 1984), a more con-
servative probability Pgen,FIS can be estimated (following Arnaud-Haond et al. 2007):
Pgen,FIS = Πajbj + cjFIS,j 2h (B.3)
with L, aj, bj and h the same as above, FIS,j the estimated FIS for locus j, and cj = aj(1– aj)
if locus j is homozygous (i.e., aj = bj) and cj = –ajbj if j kis heterozygous (Hartl & Clar
1997).
Psex values can vary between 0 and 1, with a very low value for an MLG indicating that
the multiple observations of that particular MLG have a very low probability of being
derived from separate events of sexual reproduction. In other words, the repeated occur-
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lineage. However, Psex cannot be treated as an accurate probability that is consistent and
comparable between populations, because the distribution of Psex values of MLGs in a pop-
ulation will also depend on the allelic variation present in the population (equation (B.1)).
Here, we present simulation software that allows the estimation of the critical Psex value
for statistical significance in a given population and thus allows for the statistical signifi-
cance of observed Psex values to be evaluated.
Overview of MLGsim 2.0
The software MLGsim 2.0 is an updated and extended version of MLGsim by Stenberg te
al. (2003b). MLGsim 2.0 reads microsatellite data of diploid organisms and assigns all
individuals to MLGs for which Psex values are then estimated based on their counts and
allele frequencies determined from the observed dataset. Next, the program simulates the
sampled population a (user-specified) number of times taking the estimated allele frequen-
cies and realized sample sizes into account. These simulations then provide a distribution
of simulated Psex values from which a critical Psex threshold value can be determined
against which the observed Psex values can be statistically tested. 
Since its release, the original software MLGsim has been widely used in molecular eco-
logical and evolutionary studies on a wide variety of organisms including weevils
(Stenberg et al. 2003a), aphids (Vorburger 2006), willows (Stamati et al. 2007), corals
(Severance & Karl 2006) and fungi (Xhaard et al. 2011). However, recent developments in
genomic techniques have allowed reaching much larger sample sizes than previous studies,
which implied that the original MLGsim software can no longer be used as it can maxi-
mally handle 200 sampled individuals and needs manually encoded data input. 
The updated version MLGsim 2.0 includes, beside bug-fixes, the following new features: 
(1) no restriction to dataset sample size
(2) microsatellite data will be read automatically from a standard data file
(4) the software calculates allele frequencies directly from the data file
(5) individuals are sorted and assigned to MLG and MLG-counts are now automatised
(6) the program allows for estimation of both Pgen (equation (B.2)) and Pgen,FIS (equa-
tion (B.3))
(7) the software now calculates the observed and expected heterozygosities HO and 
HE and the fixation index FIS. 
(8) the user can specify whether allele frequencies and population genetic estimates 
should be calculated based on ramet data (all samples included) or genet data 
(each MLG included only once) (sensu Harper 1977)
(9) several commonly used estimates for clonal diversity are calculated for the dataset: 
● Clonal diversity and its modified counterpart R = (G – 1)/(N – 1), with G =
number of MLGs and N = number of individuals (Ellstrand & Roose 1987;
Dorken & Eckert 2001; Arnaud-Haond et al. 2007).
● Effective clonal diversity Pde =
Ge
N with effective number of genotypes Ge
given by Ge =
∑gi
2
1 in which gi is the frequency of the i th genotype (MLG)
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Application of MLGsim2.0
The limitation of the original software MLGsim to datasets comprising at most 200 individ-
uals has previously been listed as a shortcoming in several studies and a review (Halkett te
al. 2005; Vorburger 2006; Stamati et al. 2007). MLGsim 2.0 can in principal handle unlim-
yited sample sizes. Since its release online, MLGsim 2.0 has already been successfull
applied in several studies with large sample sizes or large numbers of loci, including
studies on corals (Gorospe & Karl in review; 2352 samples, 6 loci), ants (Kronauer et al. in
review; 83 samples, 30 loci) and aphids (Ivens et al. 2012b; 18 – 201 samples, 6-8 loci).
fIn 2006, the predecessor of MLGsim 2.0 was used to analyse population genetic data o
faphids (Vorburger 2006), which necessitated using only a subsample of 200 individuals o
the total sample of 365. We re-analyzed the complete dataset using MLGsim 2.0 and three
of its new features [custom number of iterations, the ‘FIS’ option (Psex estimation based on
Pgen,FIS rather than Pgen) and the ‘MLG’ option (allele frequencies based on genet data)].
These new analyses do show a couple of quantitative and qualitative differences between
previous and present results (Table B.1). The first analysis (2nd row, Table B.1), is identical
to the analysis by Vorburger (2006), but now includes the complete dataset of 365 individ-
uals rather than a subset of 200 individuals. By including all sampled individuals, the
range of Psex values increased from 10-11 – 10-15 to 10-8 – 10-15, possibly making it easier
to detect critical Psex values for statistical significance. An increased number of iterations
yielded the same results (3rd row, Table B.1). Using the newly implemented FIS option (4rd
row, Table B.1) also resulted in higher significance levels for a clonal origin of MLGs. Using
the newly implemented genet data option, in which allele frequencies are calculated based
on a subset of the entire dataset comprising of only a single copy of each MLG, fewer sig-
nificant Psex values were observed. By using the genet data (5th and 6th row, Table B.1) for







Table B.1 R f fe-analysis o  aphid data rom Vorburger (2006). The published study used a subsample
of 200 individuals instead of the complete dataset to analyse the data with MLGsim using 1000
iterations. These original results are shown in the first row. We re-analysed the complete dataset
with 1000 iterations using the new features of MLGsim 2.0 FIS (using Pgen,FIS) and MLG (using a
genet subsample of the data to estimate allele frequencies). 
Psex range Significance level
Vorburger 2006 (subset used) 10-11 – 10-15 0.05
MLGsim 2.0 (1000 iterations) 10-8 – 10-15 0.05 – 0.01
MLGsim 2.0 (10000 iterations) 10-8 – 10-15 0.05 – 0.01
MLGsim 2.0 (option FIS) 10-8 – 10-15 0.01
MLGsim 2.0 (option MLG) 10-6 – 10-15 ns – 0.01
MLGsim 2.0 (options MLG, FIS) 10-6 – 10-15 ns – 0.01
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In sum, MLGsim2.0 allows for more efficient clone detection in a population genetic
data set of diploid organisms based on co-dominant microsatellite markers. This updated
version of MLGsim is now suited for datasets of unrestricted size, it uses automated data
input, sorts individuals into MLGs and calculates their statistical significance, and provides
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Conditional dispersal can promote and
hamper cooperation in unexpected ways



















Although cooperation provides benefits to all parties involved, it
does not evolve easily, because cooperators can be exploited by
cheaters. This problem may be overcome if cooperative individuals
predominantly interact with other cooperators. Two mechanisms
leading to such positive assortment are partner choice (seeking
cooperative and rejecting non-cooperative neighbourhoods) and
partner fidelity (staying in cooperative and leaving non-coopera-
tive neighbourhoods). We used individual-based simulations to
investigate whether partner choice and partner fidelity indeed
favour the evolutionary emergence and subsequent stability of
cooperation in a patch-structured population. We organized our
simulations as a public goods game, where investment in coopera-
tiveness could jointly evolve with the tendency to leave a patch to
join another patch. Both dispersal and settlement decisions were
allowed to be conditional on average cooperativeness in source
and target patches. Conditional settlement had a negligible effect
on the evolutionary outcome, but conditional dispersal had a
strong effect. If the cost-benefit ratio of public good investment
was very low (making any investment profitable for the investors
themselves), conditional dispersal destabilized cooperation that
readily evolved when dispersal was kept constant. If the cost-
benefit ratio of investing in public goods was high (making the
public goods game a social dilemma where investors lose while
their group gains) conditional dispersal strongly promoted the evo-
lution of cooperation, but only in simulations where individuals
evolved the tendency to leave cooperative patches. In simulations
where individuals tended to stay in cooperative patches (partner
fidelity), cooperation quickly went extinct. This unexpected finding
is explained by the fact that a high level of cooperation is associ-
ated with a high intensity of local competition in our model,
making it profitable to leave cooperative environments and cash
the benefits of cooperation elsewhere. Our results imply that con-
ditional dispersal can both promote and destabilize cooperation,
and that the evolutionary consequences of conditional strategies
may thus be difficult to predict. 
ABSTRACT
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INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is found throughout nature in a wide variety of organisms ranging from
microorganisms to primates (Sachs et al. 2004; West et al. 2007). Ecologically dominant
yorganisms are often characterized by a high degree of cooperation, as exemplified b
biofilm-producing microorganisms, social insects, or our own species. Yet the origin and
maintenance of cooperation is not fully understood, especially in social dilemma situations
where from an individual perspective cheating is more profitable than cooperation (among
others Janssen & Goldstone 2006; Killingback et al. k2006; Lehmann & Keller 2006; Nowa
2006; West et al. 2007; Fletcher & Doebeli 2009; Bijma & Aanen 2010).
It is generally believed that a tendency for positive assortment between cooperative
individuals is an important prerequisite for the evolution and stability of cooperation
(Lehmann & Keller 2006). Already Hamilton (1964a) proposed that limited dispersal could
promote the evolution of cooperation, because under limited dispersal interacting individ-
uals will often be related and, thus, have similar tendencies to cooperate. However, limited
dispersal favours the evolution of cooperation only under very specific conditions (Queller
1992; Taylor 1992; Queller 1994; West et al. 2002; Kümmerli et al. 2009). This is because
limited dispersal will not only increase the scope for cooperation with kin, but also for
competition with relatives (Taylor 1992; Kümmerli et al. 2009). 
Still, dispersal could have an important effect on the evolution of cooperation if it is
not random but conditional on the cooperativeness in the local environment. Partner
choice and partner fidelity are important aspects of such conditional dispersal. As argued
by Bull and Rice (1991), the evolution of cooperation should be strongly promoted if indi-
viduals preferentially settle in cooperative neighbourhoods (partner choice) and if they
only stay in those neighbourhoods where the level of cooperation is sufficiently high
(partner fidelity). Several modelling studies have confirmed these predictions. In an iter-
ated prisoner’s dilemma game, Sherratt and Roberts (1998) showed that including the
option of terminating the interaction with a certain partner after a bad experience (a form
of partner fidelity) does indeed promote cooperative behaviour. The same principle applies
in a continuous snowdrift game (McNamara et al. 2008), provided that the variation in
cooperativeness is sufficiently large and the same partners can interact with each other
sufficiently often. For an N-person prisoner’s dilemma game played in a patch-structured
population, Ichinose and Arita (2008) showed that a conditional dispersal strategy does
not always lead to a more favorable outcome than unconditional dispersal. However, the
ydispersal strategy yielding the highest fitness was a conditional strategy, and this strateg
induced the evolution of cooperation. This matched earlier results by Pepper & Smuts
(2002), who showed in a non-evolutionary assortment model that the option to leave non-
fcooperators leads to positive assortment between cooperators. The joint evolution o
partner choice and cooperation tendency was investigated by Hruschka and Henrich
(2006), again in the context of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. In this model, already a
low level of choosiness allowed the evolutionary emergence and spread of cooperative
kstrategies. Partner choice and partner fidelity are also at center stage in social networ
theory (Perc & Szolnoki 2010), which does not only consider strategic behaviour but also
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uncooperative individuals or seeking to establish links with cooperative ones. Various
studies (e.g. Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Fu et al. 2008; Zhang et al. 2012) arrive at the conclusion
that ‘rewiring’ the existing interaction network can strongly promote and stabilize coopera-
tion.
The studies cited above are important first steps, but they also have several limitations.
F yirst, most of these studies are based on game situations where the players repeatedl
interact and know each other’s identity. In many biological systems, interactions are with
anonymous or changing partners, and reliable information on the cooperativeness of these
partners is often not available. Second, the strategic structure of the game models studied
is often very simple. Many models restrict attention to binary choices (between coopera-
tion and defect) while in natural systems there are often many ‘degrees’ of cooperation. In
other words, cooperativeness is typically a continuous (rather than a discrete or even
binary) variable. Third, most cooperation models equate the payoff of a cooperation game
(e.g., a prisoner’s dilemma game or a public goods game) with fitness. This can be mis-
leading, since the ecological context (e.g., density regulation) and the patterning of the life
ycycle can strongly affect the evolutionary outcome, both qualitatively and quantitativel
(Mylius & Diekmann 1995; Pen & Weissing 2000). Fourth, and most importantly, partner
choice and partner fidelity are either implemented by fixed, non-evolvable rules or as
evolvable strategies with limited flexibility. In particular, most models assume a priori that
individuals should have the unidirectional tendency to seek cooperative neighbourhoods
yand to avoid non-cooperative environments. As we will demonstrate, an opposite tendenc
can also make perfect sense.
Here, we consider a model for the joint evolution of conditional dispersal and
anonymized cooperation that allows for both partner choice and partner fidelity. We con-
sider a species that lives in patches of fixed size where local inhabitants play a public goods
game. Individuals may condition their dispersal decisions on the mean level of coopera-
tiveness in their patch, which may result in partner fidelity. Likewise, we allow for condi-
tional settlement where dispersing individuals make their decision on whether to settle
dependent on the mean level of cooperativeness of a target patch, which is equivalent to
active partner choice.
By means of individual-based evolutionary simulations, we investigate the joint evolu-
tion of cooperativeness, conditional dispersal, and conditional settlement, focusing on the
question whether such conditional strategies will emerge and subsequently allow the
stable establishment of sizable levels of cooperation. No a priori assumptions are made
with respect to the kind of conditional strategies that could evolve. We also evaluate which
kinds of dispersal and settlement strategies are more favourable for the evolution of coop-
eration and whether different strategies can stably coexist.
THE MODEL
Overview
We consider a patch structured population, in which individuals locally interact in a public
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trait. Contributing to the public good (‘cooperation’) is costly for the actor and beneficial
for all individuals inhabiting a patch. The benefits accrued on a patch owing to individual
contributions of (some) inhabitants are equally distributed over all individuals in the
patch. Hence, all individuals profit from a high degree of cooperation, while only the con-
tributors pay a cost. The individual cost of public good investment implies that coopera-
tion will be selected against in well-mixed populations.
Generations in our model are discrete and non-overlapping, with a complete life cycle
consisting of three phases: a social interaction phase, a dispersal and settlement phase and
a reproduction phase. In the social interaction phase, the public goods game is played.
yEvery individual can make a costly contribution to a common good that is shared equall
famong all patch inhabitants, regardless of their individual contribution. The net effect o
contributing and receiving determines an individual’s ‘condition’, which in turn affects its
future fecundity in the patch where it will reproduce. During the dispersal and settlement
phase, individuals may redistribute over the patches. Each individual has a certain ten-
dency to leave its natal patch and settle in a new patch. A candidate target patch is
yselected at random but may be rejected if it does not meet the individual’s patch qualit
ycriteria of cooperativeness. Several rounds of such inspection of patches and rejection ma
occur before finally settling. Both dispersal and rejection carry a small mortality cost.
Dispersal and settlement strategies can be either fixed or conditional on the local produc-
tivity of the natal patch and its alternatives after settlement. The reproduction phase starts
after all dispersing individuals have settled in a new patch. In each patch, all individuals
(both locals and immigrants) produce offspring in proportion to their condition, as deter-
mined by the costs and benefits experienced in the social interaction phase. After repro-
duction, the parents die and the offspring compete for a fixed number of N positions in
their natal patch. The N successful individuals then enter the interaction phase, while the
remaining individuals die (are removed from the population).
An individual’s cooperativeness (i.e., its contribution to the public goods game) and its
tendencies to disperse and settle are heritable strategies that are transmitted from parents
yto offspring, subject to occasional mutations, which allows these strategies to evolve jointl
over the generations. We are particularly interested in the evolution of cooperation under
four dispersal and settlement scenarios: (1) dispersal and settlement rates are both con-
stant (i.e., not conditional on local cooperativeness) and the same for all individuals (i.e.,
no heritable variation); (2) the dispersal decision is based on an evolvable conditional
strategy; (3) the settlement rule is based on an evolvable conditional strategy; (4) both
dispersal and settlement are heritable conditional strategies. We used these scenarios to
evaluate whether and under what circumstances conditional dispersal and settlement
strategies will favour the evolution of cooperation.
Social interactions
Each patch member i in a given patch contributes to the public good according to its
genetically determined investment level xi. The costs of this contribution are cxi, where the
cost c per unit of investment is fixed parameter. The total investment made in the patch,
xtot = ∑xk , generates a revenue bxtot that is distributed over all patch members, irrespec-
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investment, is again a fixed parameter. Each of the N patch members receives a revenue
1–
Nbxtot = bx
–, where x– = 1–N∑xk is the average ‘cooperativeness’ (= contribution to the public
good) in the patch. The difference between benefits (bx–) and costs (cxi) determine the
fecundity of focal individual i, which is given by:
Wi = W0 + bx– – cxi . (6.1)
Here W0 denotes the baseline fecundity, which is set at a sufficiently high value to prevent
fecundities becoming negative. In our model, only relative fecundities (relative to other
patch members) are important, so that we can normalize fecundities by dividing all terms
in equation (6.1) by b:
wi = w0 + x– –(c/b)xi , (6.2)
where wi = Wi /b and w0 = W0/b. Later on we will systematically vary the cost-benefit
ratio c/b. The normalized baseline fecundity w0 determines the strength of selection: if w0
is large, the costs and benefits in equation (6.2) have only a small effect on wi and all indi-
viduals have a fairly similar fecundity. A high value of w0 thus corresponds to weak selec-
tion. In the main text, we use w0 = 5. In the appendix (Figure 6.A3), we will also consider
the case w0 = 2, corresponding to stronger selection. It is useful to rewrite equation (2) as:






b )xi . (6.3)
This equation reveals that for a low cost-benefit ratio ( c–b < 
1–
N) the focal individual’s invest-
ment xi has also a positive net effect on i’s fecundity (i.e., wi increases with xi). Therefore,
the public goods game is a social dilemma only for c–b >
1–
N when, all other things being equal,
individuals are better off by not cooperating but reaping the benefits accumulated by the
cooperation of others. In all simulations shown here N = 50, implying that the cost-benefit
ratio c–b =
1–
50 = 0.02 is the borderline case beyond which the public goods game turns into a
social dilemma.
Dispersal and settlement
In the dispersal and settlement phase, each individual has the opportunity to leave its
natal patch. Depending on the dispersal scenario considered, the dispersal probability d is
either constant (d = d0 for all individuals; following Taylor (1988), we chose d0 = 0.08)
or an evolvable conditional strategy. In the latter case, the dispersal probability of a given
individual depends on the average cooperativeness x– in the individual’s natal patch:
d(x–) =                1                 . (6.4)
1 + exp(– βd · (x– – αd))
Here, αd and βd are heritable parameters describing how the individual will respond to the
average public goods investment x– encountered in its patch. As illustrated in Figure 6.1,
equation (6.4) represents a logistic function that can either increase (when βd >0; ‘type 1’)
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d(x–) = d(αd) =
1–
2. The parameter βd is proportional to the slope of the logistic function at
the turning point (d’(αd) =
1–
4 βd). If an individual has a positive βd (type 1), it has the ten-
dency to leave productive patches (large values of x–), while individuals with a negative βd
(type 2) tend to leave patches with low productivity. When βd is large in absolute value,
the results is an all-or-nothing dispersal strategy, of either always leaving or always staying,
depending on whether x– is larger or smaller than αd . Dispersal is, however, costly so that
compared to individuals staying in their natal patch, the viability of dispersing individuals
is reduced by a factor 1 – md with md = 0.1 in our simulations.
Dispersing individuals encounter patches at random. Depending on the settlement sce-
nario considered, they either settle on the first patch encountered or they base their settle-
ment decision on an evolvable conditional strategy. In the latter case, the probability to
settle in a candidate target patch depends on the average cooperativeness x– in that patch:
d(x–) =               1                 . (6.5)
1 + exp(– βs · (x– – αs))
As with dispersal, also the settlement strategy (equation (6.5)) is characterized by two
heritable parameters αs and βs. An individual can reject several patches; while it explores
new patches offered until a target patch is eventually accepted. However, rejecting a patch
is costly in that it reduces the survival by a factor 1 – ms. In our simulations, the rejection-
related mortality was ms = 0.01.
Reproduction and inheritance
After all individuals have settled, the members of each patch produce offspring in propor-




















































































Figure 6.1 L fogistic unctions describing a conditional dispersal or settlement strategy. Two exam-
ples of a logistic function f(x–) [1+ e= xp(  – β(x– – α))]-1 describing the tendency for a certain behav-
iour (dispersal or settlement) in relation to the productivity x– of a patch. In our model patch
productivity corresponds to patch cooperativeness. The two (heritable) parameters α and β charac-
terizing the function have a clear interpretation: f(x–) = 1–2 for x
– = α , and f ’(x–) = 1–4 β at x
– = α .
Logistic functions of (a) type 1 (β >0) and (b) type 2 (β <0) could both evolve in our model.
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produced in each patch, N are chosen at random to form the patch members entering the
social interaction phase in the next generation, while parents and all other offspring die.
yIndividuals are haploid and reproduce clonally, so that each individual is geneticall
characterized by its alleles (x,αd ,βd ,αs,βs) at five jointly evolving loci. Allelic values are
real numbers that determine the individual’s cooperativeness (i.e., its contribution to the
public good) and its condition dependent dispersal and settlement strategy. In the disper-
sal scenarios where the dispersal and/or settlement decision is not evolvable and based on
a fixed probability the corresponding genetic parameters [(αd ,βd) and/or (α s,βs)] have
no effect and evolve by genetic drift. When reproducing, parents transmit all five alleles to
their offspring, but each locus mutates with probability μ. In such cases, a small number
drawn from the uniform distribution on the interval (–δ,δ) is added to the allele at the cor-
responding locus. To prevent a mutation bias at zero, allelic values at the cooperativeness
locus were allowed to become negative (a negative value of x finduces a contribution o
zero to the public goods game). However, mutations shifting x below –0.1 were not
allowed, in order to prevent x drifting to very negative values (from where the subsequent
evolution of cooperativeness would be very difficult to achieve). In our simulations, we
used a per-locus mutation rate μ = 0.01 and a maximal mutational step size δ = 0.1.
Simulation settings
We simulated populations consisting of 50,000 individuals that where distributed over
1,000 patches, with each patch harbouring N = 50 individuals. In the simulations reported
in the main text all individuals were initialized at the allelic values x = αd = α s = 0.5 and
βd = βs = 0. To check for the robustness of our conclusions, we also initialized βd and/or
βs at positive (type 1 logistic function) or negative (type 2 logistic function) values, which
produced results given in the appendix (Figure 6.A2).
For all four dispersal and settlement scenarios we considered six different cost-benefit
ratios (c/b = 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.02, 0.06, 0.1), including two cases where the public
goods game corresponds to a social dilemma (c/b >0.02). The figures in the main text
report on the cost-benefit values c/b = 0.06 (social dilemma) and c/b = 0.01 (no social
dilemma); the results of the other cost-benefit ratios are given in the appendix.
For each dispersal and settlement scenario and each parameter combination consid-
ered, we ran 100 replicate simulations. Most simulations were run for 50,000 generations,
but we regularly ran longer simulations (>200,000 generations) to check for the robust-
ness of our results.
The simulation program was coded in C++ (code available upon request from A.I.),
and compiled in g++ (4.3.4; Free Software Foundation, Inc. 2008).
RESULTS
Evolution of cooperation when the costs of cooperation are low
Let us first consider a small cost-benefit ratio (c/b = 0.01), where the benefits of con-
tributing to the public good exceed the costs of the contribution and the public goods game









A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 120
four dispersal and settlement scenarios. When the dispersal probability was fixed (at d =
o.o8) and unconditional on local productivity, cooperativeness steadily increased over the
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Figure 6.2 fEvolution o  cooperation when the public goods game is no social dilemma. Evolution
fp ( ), p ( ) ( g )of coo erativeness blue  mean dis ersal rate red  and mean settlement rate oran e  in case o
a low cost-benefit ratio (c/b = 0.01) under four scenarios: (A) fixed dispersal probability (d =
0.08) and fixed settlement probability (s = 1.0); (B) evolvable conditional dispersal strategy and
fixed settlement probability; (C) fixed dispersal probability and evolvable conditional settlement
ystrategy; (D) evolvable conditional dispersal and settlement strategies. Each plot shows 5 randoml
selected replicate simulation runs (dashed lines) and their means (bold lines). Left y-axis: coopera-
ftiveness, right y-axis: probability of dispersal or settlement. The figures in the top left corner o
each plot give the percentage of 100 simulation runs resulting in the evolution of cooperation.
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happened in all 200 simulation runs for these two scenarios. Surprisingly, however, the
joint evolution of a more flexible conditional dispersal strategy inhibited cooperativeness
and often led to the breakdown of cooperation (Figure 6.2BD). Irrespective of the settle-
ment scenario, all 200 simulation runs showed an all-or-nothing pattern: while some runs
resulted in consistently increasing high levels of cooperativeness (sometimes reaching a
level of x >100 within 50,000 generations), cooperativeness converged to zero in the
majority of runs. In fact, cooperation only got off the ground in 25% of the 100 runs with
fixed settlement and 30% of the runs with evolvable conditional settlement. This small dif-
ference in simulation outcomes is not significant (P y= 0.431, Fisher exact test); apparentl
there is no synergistic effect of conditional dispersal and conditional settlement on the evo-
lution of cooperation under low cost-benefit ratios.
As shown in the appendix, the same outcome was observed for even lower cost-benefit
ratios (Figure 6.A1). In case of fixed, unconditional dispersal, cooperativeness always
evolved, and the level reached within 50,000 generations was negatively related to the
cost-benefit ratio. In case of the joint evolution of conditional dispersal, the simulations
exhibited an all-or-nothing pattern, where the percentage of simulation runs resulting in
cooperation was lowest for the lowest cost-benefit ratios.
Evolution of cooperation in a social dilemma
When the cost-benefit ratio is larger than the public goods game becomes a social
dilemma. For c/b f= 0.06, Figure 6.3 shows five representative simulation runs for each o
the four dispersal and settlement scenarios. When the dispersal probability was fixed and
funconditional on local productivity, cooperation did not get off the ground, irrespective o
the settlement scenario (Figure 6.3AC). In fact, cooperativeness rapidly converged to zero
in all 200 simulation runs with fixed and unconditional dispersal. In contrast, high levels
of cooperativeness could evolve when conditional dispersal could jointly evolve (Figure
6.3BD). As in the case of a low cost-benefit ratio, all 200 simulations were of an all-or-
nothing type: either cooperativeness dropped to zero or it rapidly evolved to ever increas-
ing high levels (typically x >100 within 50,000 generations). In case of c/b f= 0.06, 66% o
the 100 runs with fixed settlement and 63% of the runs with evolvable conditional settle-
ment resulted in the evolution of cooperation. This small difference in simulation out-
comes is not significant (P = 0.767, Fisher’s exact test), so there is again no evidence for a
fsynergistic effect of conditional dispersal and conditional settlement on the evolution o
cooperation. Both percentages are significantly higher than the corresponding figures (25%
and 30%, respectively) that were obtained for c/b = 0.01 in Figure 6.2 (P <0.001, Fisher
exact test).
As shown in the appendix, the same simulation outcome was observed for a higher
cost-benefit ratio (c/b = 0.1; see Figure 6.A1). Cooperativeness always converged to zero
yin case of fixed dispersal, and to an all-or-nothing pattern when cooperativeness jointl
evolved with conditional dispersal. Although the cost-benefit ratio was higher than in the
simulations of Figure 6.3, cooperation evolved in an even higher percentage of runs (92%









A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 122
A closer look at the evolution of conditional dispersal
From the results until now, we can conclude that conditional dispersal is a potent factor
that can both promote and hinder the evolution of cooperation. Moreover, the joint evolu-
tion of cooperativeness and conditional dispersal may lead to either high levels of cooper-
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Figure 6.3 f f fEvolution o  cooperation in case o  a social dilemma.  Evolution o  cooperativeness
( ), p ( ) ( g ) p g gblue  mean dis ersal rate red  and mean settlement rate oran e  when the ublic oods ame
is a social dilemma (c/b = 0.06). For the same dispersal and settlement scenarios as in Figure 6.2,
each plot shows 5 randomly selected replicate simulation runs (dashed lines) and their means
(bold lines). Left y-axis: cooperativeness (ranging from 0 to 1 in (A) and (C) and from 0 to 100 in
f(B) and (D)); right axis: probability of dispersal or settlement. The figures in the top left corner o
each plot give the percentage of 100 simulation runs resulting in the evolution of cooperation.
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yruns, the average dispersal rate and the average settlement rate converged to relativel
high values (d ≈ 0.5; s often attaining the maximal value of 1.0), while the values obtained
in the non-cooperative runs were much lower (d ≈ 0.05, s ≈ 0.5) (Figure 6.3BD). But what
determines whether a simulation run will be ‘cooperative’? To answer this question, we
investigated two specific simulation runs (for the social dilemma case c/b = 0.06) in more
fdetail (Figure 6.4). One of these runs (upper panels of the figure) resulted in high levels o
cooperation, while cooperativeness converged to zero in the other run (lower panels). The
replicated simulations in Figure 6.4 are typical in that cooperativeness first declined from
the initial value x = 0,5 and subsequently sharply increased again as can be clearly seen in
Fig 6.4E. While x continued to increase in the cooperative runs, it abruptly declined and
converged to zero in the non-cooperative runs. Figure 6.4 also provides a more detailed
view of how the conditional dispersal strategy jointly evolved with the tendency to cooper-
ate. In the cooperative run, the parameter αd of the dispersal strategy (equation (6.4))
closely matched the average cooperativeness x– in the population, while the parameter βd
evolved to rather large positive values. As a consequence, the dispersal strategy corre-
sponds to a type-1 logistic function that resembles a ‘bang-bang’ strategy (Figure 6.4D):
individuals using this strategy leave their patch, when the patch productivity is larger than
αd , and they stay on their patch when x– <αd . In non-cooperative runs (Figure 4EFGH),
both types of logistic function (βd >0 and βd <0) coexist in the same population for
extended periods of time. Initially, type-1 strategies are as predominant as in the coopera-
tive runs. Eventually, however, they get outcompeted by a type-2 strategy, where individu-
als tend to leave unproductive patches while they tend to stay in cooperative patches.
These outcomes are opposite to what one might have expected: the standard pattern asso-
ciated with partner fidelity (i.e., leaving unproductive patches and staying in cooperative
environments) leads to the decay of cooperation, while the opposite pattern allows for the
evolution of cooperation even in case of large cost-benefit ratios.
Robustness of the results
The simulations reported above were initialized at βd y= 0, that is, dispersal was initiall
fnot condition dependent. It is conceivable that starting with a positive or negative value o
βd might lead to a different outcome, since it might give the evolution of cooperation a
head start. We therefore initialized some simulations with the values βd = +0.1 and βd =
–0.1, where the associated initial values of αd were chosen such that d(xinit) = d(0.5) =
0.15 for the logistic function in equation (6.4). In line with our earlier results, cooperation
never evolved when the population was initialized with a type-2 dispersal strategy (βd =
–0.1). Cooperation did evolve in about 50% of the simulations when the population was
initialized at βd = +0.1, but it got off the ground less easily than in our standard set-up.
Figure 6.A2 in the appendix shows a typical example. Cooperativeness did not evolve for
an extended period of time (about 30,000 generations). In this period, αd ydeclined steadil
from its initial value αd = 17.85. Once it had reached a sufficiently small value, both βd
yand cooperativeness started to increase. In sum, cooperation indeed evolves frequentl

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To further investigate the robustness of our results, we increased the strength of selec-
tion by reducing baseline fecundity  from its standard value 5 to the lower value 2. Figure
6.A3 in the appendix shows the results for the two cost-benefit ratios c/b = 0.01 (no social
dilemma) and c/b = 0.06 (social dilemma). Qualitatively, our earlier results were recov-
ered, but they were quantitatively different in showing that stronger selection accelerates
(as expected) the enhancement of cooperation when dispersal becomes conditional and
cost-benefit ratios are high, whereas it inhibits cooperation more effectively when cost-
benefit ratios are low.
DISCUSSION
yIt has repeatedly been argued that partner choice and partner fidelity may strongl
promote the evolution of cooperation (Bull & Rice 1991; Sachs et al. 2004; Foster &
W yenseleers 2006). Cooperation models including partner choice and partner fidelit
(Sherratt & Roberts 1998; Hruschka & Henrich 2006; Ichinose & Arita 2008; McNamara te
al. 2008; Zhang et al. 2012) do indeed conclude that cooperation can evolve if individuals
tend to leave uncooperative environments and tend to settle in cooperative neighbour-
hoods. However, all these models implemented a priori a fixed direction of the partner
choice and/or a partner fidelity mechanism: individuals were assumed to have the ten-
dency to move away from non-cooperative environments and towards cooperative envi-
r yonments. To our knowledge, the present model is the first to consider the evolutionar
emergence of such directionality as well as the joint evolution of cooperativeness, partner
choice and partner fidelity.
Our results confirm that conditional dispersal (a mechanism related to partner fidelity)
has an important effect on the evolution of cooperation, but that conditional settlement (a
fmechanism related to partner choice) has only a marginal effect. Interestingly, the effect o
conditional dispersal on cooperativeness is not universally positive. In those cases where
cooperation seems to be the standard option (a low cost-benefit ratio making cooperation
individually advantageous), conditional dispersal often led to the breakdown of coopera-
tion. Conditional dispersal did have a positive effect on cooperativeness in case of a social
dilemma situation, but also this effect manifested itself in an unexpected way. Whenever a
population evolved the expected pattern associated with partner fidelity (i.e., to leave non-
cooperative environments), cooperativeness did not evolve. In contrast, cooperativeness
fevolved in those cases where individuals tended to leave patches with a high degree o
cooperation.
How can these patterns be explained? Presumably, two features of our model are
responsible for this: local population regulation and the timing of dispersal in relation to
other life-history events. The local population was reduced to N findividuals at the start o
each generation. In other words, we did not consider the possibility of local resource
enhancement, that is, a positive effect of local cooperativeness (= productivity) on the
local carrying capacity, also known as ‘population elasticity’ (Queller 1994; Le Galliard te
al. 2003; Janssen & Goldstone 2006). As a consequence, if individuals tend to be
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competition, since more offspring will have to compete for the N positions if local fecun-
dity is high. Our model also assumes that social interactions precede dispersal and settle-
ment. As a consequence, individuals can evade local competition by leaving patches with
high productivity. In view of these considerations, a tendency to leave cooperative patches
makes perfect sense, because an individual can only really profit from the benefits of coop-
yeration if it goes away, thereby avoiding the severe competition otherwise experienced b
its offspring. It has long been known that enhanced local competition may cancel the ben-
efits of local cooperation (Queller 1992; Taylor 1992; West et al. 2002). The evolved dis-
persal strategies in our simulations annihilate this effect by avoiding competition in a
productive environment.
Why does ‘inverse partner fidelity’ (leaving productive environments) favour the evolu-
tion of cooperation in a social dilemma situation? Once a type-1 dispersal strategy has
become established, it is understandable how cooperativeness can evolve. Within a patch,
cheaters (i.e., individuals with an atypically low degree of cooperation) can exploit the
fcooperativeness of other patch members, but they also lower the average productivity o
their patch. As a consequence, cheaters (and other patch members) will tend to stay, while
newcomers to the patch will predominantly come from patches of high productivity. Both
factors enhance the local competition experienced by the offspring of cheaters, and this
feffect is apparently sufficiently strong to overcompensate for the immediate benefits o
cheating. The lesson is that the payoffs (equation (6.1)) in the public goods game are not
necessarily reliable proxies of individual fitness, as they correspond to one fitness compo-
fnent (fecundity), while total fitness also depends on other factors, such as the intensity o
local competition. Once ‘inverse partner fidelity’ is established in the population, it
becomes clear why conditional settlement decisions (‘partner choice’) only had a marginal
effect on the evolution of cooperation. In our model, settlement could evolve to be based
on the past productivity of a patch. If individuals have the tendency to leave productive
patches, past cooperativeness becomes an unreliable predictor of future cooperativeness.
In addition, the evolved value of αd closely matched the mean cooperativeness x– in the
population (Figure 6.4AC). Hence, individuals with a type-1 dispersal strategy tend to
leave patches of above-average cooperativeness and, as a consequence, they will on
average encounter patches of a lower cooperativeness than in their natal patch.
Accordingly, individuals can better avoid the costs of choosiness at settlement and settle on
the first patch they encounter.
Why does conditional dispersal hamper the evolution of cooperation in case of low
cost-benefit ratios that do not constitute a social dilemma? In fact, the same kind of rea-
soning applies as in the social dilemma situation. When c/b <1/N, an individual extracts
more benefits from its investment than the costs of this investment. However, the other
ypatch members will profit even more from this investment (since they do not have to pa
the costs). When staying in a cooperative patch, cooperative individuals therefore have to
face competition with other philopatric individuals whom they in fact helped to become
strong competitors. Thus, also in case of a very low cost-benefit ratio individuals profit
from avoiding competition by leaving cooperative patches. If, on the other hand, a type-2
strategy gets the upper hand in the early stages of evolution, cooperation does not persist






















































A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 127
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis shows that the joint evolution of cooperativeness and conditional dispersal
has features that – at least at first sight – are counter-intuitive. In the model considered,
conditional dispersal could hamper the evolution of cooperation, and when it favoured the
evolution of cooperation, the dispersal strategy had an unexpected shape. We do not
pretend that exactly the same results will apply to all cooperation models. In fact, the evo-
lutionary outcome would presumably have been different if the causal link between local
productivity and the intensity of local competition would have been broken (or weakened)
by local resource enhancement, if dispersal and settlement would have preceded the local
interaction phase; or if individuals could have based their settlement decisions on indica-
tors of future (rather than past) cooperativeness. Nevertheless, a few general conclusions
can be drawn from our study. First, the evolution of conditional strategies is often difficult
to predict a priori. This insight is a cornerstone of classical game theory (Van Damme
1991; Rasmusen 2006), but it is not yet firmly established in evolutionary ecology. Yet,
also in biology a variety of models have arrived at the conclusion that the evolution of con-
ditional strategies may have surprising outcomes ([e.g., the evolution of winner-loser
effects in the absence of any difference in resource-holding potential, Van Doorn et al.
2003; the strategic disadvantage of being the informed party in a conflict of interest, Pen &
Taylor 2005; the erosion of sexual selection by conditional sex allocation decisions, Fawcett
et al. 2011]. Second, conditional strategies often coexist for extended periods of time (as
the type-1 and type-2 dispersal strategies in our model; see Figure 6.4FG). Again, there is
a variety of examples for this, including the coexistence of communication strategies
(Botero et al. 2010) and the coexistence of foraging strategies (Giske et al. in press). Third,
the outcome of evolution may strongly depend on the order of life history events and eco-
logical details (see also Mylius & Diekmann 1995; Pen & Weissing 2000). Since the payoffs
of a cooperation game (like the public goods game in our model) are closely related to
fitness, they are often viewed as proxies for fitness. As we have seen in our model, this
may be a problematic inference, since fitness also depends on factors like local competi-
tion, which in turn reflect population regulation and the timing of life history events such
as dispersal.
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains additional simulation results that illustrate the robustness of the
results discussed in the main text. The main text focused on two cost-benefit ratios (c/b =
0.01 and 0.06). Figure 6.A1 shows that similar results are obtained for a range of cost-
benefit ratios (ranging from 0.001 to 0.1). Figure 6.A2 shows some simulations that were
not initialized with βd = 0 but with a positive value. Figure 6.A3 considers a lower base-
line fecundity than the standard value (w0 = 5) used in the main text. All results presented


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.A1 ff f f fE ect o  the cost-bene it ratio on the evolution o  cooperation under various dispersal
and settlement scenarios. Evolution of cooperativeness (blue), mean dispersal rate (red) and mean
settlement rate (orange) for six cost-benefit ratios and four dispersal scenarios: (A) fixed dispersal
probability (d = 0.08) and fixed settlement probability (s = 1.0); (B) evolvable conditional disper-
sal strategy and fixed settlement probability; (C) fixed dispersal probability and evolvable condi-
tional settlement strategy; (D) evolvable conditional dispersal and settlement strategies. Each plot
shows 5 randomly selected replicate simulation runs (dashed lines) and their means (bold lines).
Left y-axis: cooperativeness (ranging either from 0 to 100 or from 0 to 1, see highlight); right y-
axis: probability of dispersal or settlement The figures in the top left corner of each plot give the
percentage of 100 simulation runs resulting in the evolution of cooperation. For each scenario, the
three left-most panels (c/b = 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01) correspond to a public goods game that is no
social dilemma, while the two right-most panels (c/b = 0.06, 0.1) refer to social dilemma situations
(highlighted with gray background). The fourth panel is the borderline case  c/b = 1/N = 0.02. 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































coop. 90% of runs
Figure 6.A1 Continued



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































coop. 84% of runs
D
generation generation
Figure 6.A3 ff f f fE ect o  the strength o  selection on the evolution o  cooperation.  The simulations
shown correspond to those of Figure 6.2 (c/b = 0.01; no social dilemma) and Figure 6.3 (c/b =
0.06; social dilemma) in the main text, but the strength of selection in the social dilemma was
increased by reducing basal fecundity from w0 = 5 to w0 = 2. As before, the panels depict the evo-
lution of cooperativeness (blue), mean dispersal rate (red) and mean settlement rate (orange) in
four scenarios: (A) fixed dispersal probability (d = 0.08) and fixed settlement probability (s =
1.0); (B) evolvable conditional dispersal strategy and fixed settlement probability; (C) fixed disper-
sal probability and evolvable conditional settlement strategy; (D) evolvable conditional dispersal
and settlement strategies. Each plot shows 5 randomly selected replicate simulation runs (dashed
lines) and their means (bold lines). Left y-axis: cooperativeness (ranging from 0 to 1.0 or from 0 to
100); right y-axis: probability of dispersal or settlement. The figures in the top left corner of each
plot give the percentage of 100 simulation runs resulting in the evolution of cooperation.
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fDoes the joint evolution o  cooperativeness
and conditional dispersal promote
the evolution of mutualism?



















Mutually beneficial interactions between species are common and
of considerable ecological importance, but the evolutionary stabil-
ity of such relationships is not well understood. This is because
costly cooperation can be exploited by cheaters reaping the bene-
fits without offering much, if anything in return. It has been argued
that partner choice (actively selecting cooperative interaction part-
ners) and partner fidelity (continuing profitable relationships and
abandoning unprofitable ones) might promote the evolution of
mutualism. Here we use individual-based simulations to investi-
gate whether and under which circumstances the joint evolution of
cooperativeness, partner choice and partner fidelity does indeed
result in a mutualistic outcome. Our model considers a patch-struc-
tured environment with fixed patch size where individuals of two
species interact locally by producing costly commodities that are
beneficial for the patch members of the other species. Production
rate of the commodity (‘cooperativeness’), conditional dispersal
strategy (‘partner fidelity’), and conditional settlement strategy
(‘partner choice’) are all heritable traits that jointly evolve in both
species. To make the results comparable with an earlier model for
the evolution of intraspecific cooperation, we focused on a sym-
metric scenario where species have identical life histories and
fitness parameters. We show that interspecific cooperation can
evolve, but only under extremely low cost-benefit ratios. When
these conditions are met, both conditional dispersal and condi-
tional settlement promote cooperation and have a synergistic
effect. The evolved pattern of dispersal is opposite to the common
assumption in models of partner fidelity that individuals will stay
in cooperative patches and leave uncooperative patches. We
explain this finding by the strong local competition in patches
where productivity is high. Although the two species considered in
our model were identical, evolved patterns of cooperation were
typically unilateral, with one species contributing a lot and the
other very little. This matches the observation that many natural
mutualisms exhibit a strong asymmetry between partners. 
ABSTRACT
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INTRODUCTION
Mutualistic cooperation between species is widespread and of major importance to
complex life (Leigh 2010). Mutually beneficial interactions range from ancient endosym-
bionts that evolved into organelles such as mitochondria and plasmids, to pollination net-
works that help stabilizing ecosystems (Margulis 1971; Stachowicz 2001; Bastolla et al.
2009). The emergence and evolutionary stability of mutualisms are, however, not well
understood. How can species evolve to invest into costly helping of other species, whereas
the benefits could also be reaped for free by exploiting the other species as a parasite
(Herre et al. 1999; Bronstein 2001; Bergstorm et al. 2002; Leigh 2010)? Conditional
behaviour is assumed to play a major role in the evolution of interspecific cooperation.
The two most important mechanisms of conditional dispersal are partner fidelity, the
option to either continue or abandon current interactions and partner choice, the option to
only engage in interactions with selected partners (Bull & Rice 1991; Foster & Wenseleers
2006). By inducing positive assortment between cooperators of both interacting species,
partner choice and partner fidelity might pave the way for the evolution of cooperation
(Nowak & May 1992; Frank 1994; Pepper & Smuts 2002; Foster & Wenseleers 2006).
Several modeling studies (Sherratt & Roberts 1998; Ichinose & Arita 2008; McNamara
et al. 2008) have shown that conditional dispersal can promote cooperation between indi-
viduals of the same species. However, most of these models considered a restricted set of
cooperation and/or dispersal strategies. In a previous study (Chapter 6), we considered a
more flexible strategic structure. We showed that the joint evolution of cooperativeness
and conditional dispersal can both promote (for high cost-benefit ratios) and impede (for
low cost-benefit ratios) the evolution of cooperation in a public goods game. Cooperation
did only evolve when the (jointly evolving) conditional dispersal strategy was opposite to
the pattern included a priori in earlier models: individuals tend to leave cooperative
patches and to stay in non-cooperative patches. This counter-intuitive result can be
explained by the fact that the beneficial effects of local cooperation are annihilated by the
intense local competition in cooperative and, hence, productive environments. If local
cooperation induces intense local competition, it makes perfect sense to leave cooperative
patches. In our model (Chapter 6), the strong link between local cooperation and local
competition was caused by the fact that patch sizes were constant. The outcome might
have been different in case of local resource enhancement, that is, if local competition
would have a positive effect on local carrying capacities. Yet, our study illustrates that the
role of partner choice and partner fidelity is less straightforward than has been suggested.
Only a limited number of studies has so far focused on the interplay between dispersal
and the evolution of inter-specific cooperation. In a model of pair-wise interactions
between two species inhabiting dual lattices it was shown that mutualism can only evolve
when dispersal distances are limited (Yamamura et al. 2004), a result that was confirmed
for joint evolution of cooperativeness and dispersal distance (Mack 2012) and for evolving
cost-benefit ratios (Doebeli & Knowlton 1998). In these models, dispersal was uncondi-
tional and the results could be explained by positive assortment of cooperators. However,
Doebeli & Knowlton (1998) also showed that the likelihood of mutualistic evolution
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enced a satisfyingly cooperative interaction. Such conditional association with cooperative
partners has also been shown to promote mutualism in an asymmetric model of joint evo-
lution of partner choice in a choosy host and cooperativeness of both hosts and symbionts
(Foster & Kokko 2006). In addition, the fitness calculations of Foster & Wenseleers (2006)
suggest that mutualism evolves most readily when both species can actively select their
partners through partner fidelity and partner choice.
Hitherto, the interplay between dispersal and mutualism has mostly been studied for
unconditional dispersal and when dispersal was conditional, individuals were a priori
assumed move away from non-cooperators and/or towards cooperators. In the model pre-
sented here, we explore the joint evolution of conditional dispersal and cooperativeness in
two interacting species without a priori assumptions about the evolving response strate-
gies. Our model considers species that both produce a commodity that is beneficial for the
other species (following Foster & Wenseleers 2006), a setup that differs from previous pair-
wise cooperation models (Doebeli & Knowlton 1998; Yamamura et al. 2004; Mack 2012)
in that local exchange of goods is represented by an interspecific public goods model. After
the exchange of goods, individuals may choose to disperse from their local patch condi-
tional upon the cooperativeness received. Such a conditional strategy may result in partner
fidelity. Likewise, dispersing individuals can decide whether to settle in a new patch
dependent on the cooperativeness of the partner species in that patch, which is equivalent
to partner choice. Our aim was to investigate what dispersal patterns results from the joint
evolution of conditional dispersal and cooperation and whether these patterns promote
ythe evolution of stable inter-specific cooperation. In our simulations, we focus on a full
symmetric interaction. This allows us to compare the results with those on intraspecific
cooperation (Chapter 6) and to study the question whether asymmetric species interac-
tions will evolve from symmetric starting conditions.
THE MODEL
Overview
In a previous model (Chapter 6), we studied the joint evolution of individual cooperative-
ness and conditional dispersal in a single species. To allow for a comparison of the evolu-
tion of within- and between-species cooperation, we here consider a straightforward
extension of that earlier model assuming a patch structured environment that is inhabited
by species A and B. Generations are discrete and non-overlapping, and both species have a
similar life cycle. In a first stage, the interaction phase, individuals play a local cooperation
game in which patch members of each species benefit from a commodity produced by the
individuals of the other species. Producing this commodity is costly and would hence be
selected against in a well-mixed population. The net effect of these costs and the benefits
received from the members of the other species determines an individual’s condition,
which in turn affects its future fecundity in the patch where it will reproduce. In a second
stage, the dispersal phase, the individuals of both species may redistribute over the
patches. Individuals can make their decisions on whether to leave a patch after evaluating
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vided by the patch members of other species). Likewise, they can let their decision on
whether to settle in a potential target patch depend on the cooperativeness of the other
species there during the interaction phase. Both dispersal and rejection of target patches
have mortality costs. In the third and final stage, reproduction, inheritance and population
regulation takes place. All individuals settling in a patch (locals and immigrants) produce
offspring in proportion to their condition, which reflects the costs and benefits experienced
in the interaction phase. After reproduction, the parents die and the offspring of each
species compete for a fixed number (NA and NB, respectively) of positions in their natal
patch. The successful individuals of both species enter a new interaction phase and the
remaining individuals die, i.e. are removed from both populations.
As in the earlier model, an individual’s cooperativeness and its tendencies to disperse
and settle elsewhere are heritable strategies that are transmitted from parents to offspring,
subject to occasional mutations. Hence, these strategies jointly evolve within each species,
and the two species co-evolve over the generations. We considered four scenarios: (1) the
dispersal and settlement rates are constant in both species and the same for all individuals
(i.e., not heritable); (2) dispersal decisions in both species are based on an evolvable con-
ditional strategy; (3) the settlement rule in both species is based on an evolvable condi-
tional strategy; (4) dispersal and settlement in both species are heritable conditional
strategies. The question addressed is whether and under what circumstances conditional
dispersal and settlement will favour the evolution of interspecific cooperation.
Interaction phase
Each individual i of species A has a genetically determined ‘cooperativeness’ xi, which rep-
resents the contribution of i fto a commodity X that is beneficial for i’s patch members o
species B. The total contribution in a given patch, xtot = ∑xi , is distributed over the indi-
viduals of species B, yielding an individual share x–B =
1–NB xtot per patch member of species
B. Likewise, an individual j of species B has a heritable tendency to contribute an amount
yj Ato a commodity Y beneficial for the other species; each patch member of species 
receives a share y–B =
1–NB ytot of the total contribution ytot = ∑yi . cA and cB represent the
respective fecundity costs for the two species per unit of investment, and bA and bB denote
fthe respective fecundity benefits per unit of commodity received, so that the fecundities o
focal individuals i and j are given by:
Vi = VA + bA y–A – cAxi (7.1)
Wj = WB + bB x–B – cByj
Here VA and WB denote the baseline fecundities of the members of species A and B, respec-
tively. Throughout, we will only consider the case where the two species are fully symmet-
ric with respect to their fitness parameters: cA = cB = c, bA = bB = b, VA = WB, and NA =
NB = N f. In our model, only relative fecundities (in comparison to other patch members o
the same species) are important. We can therefore normalize fecundities by dividing all
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vi = vA + y–A –(c/b)xi    , (7.2)
wj = wB + x–B –(c/b)yj
where v = V/b and w = W/b. In our simulations, we will systematically vary the cost-
benefit ratio c/b while keeping the normalized baseline fecundities fixed at vA = wB = 5.
Dispersal and settlement
In the dispersal phase, each individual has the opportunity to leave its patch of origin.
Depending on the scenario considered, the dispersal probability d is either constant (d =
0.15; the value predicted by Taylor (1988)) or an evolvable conditional strategy where an
individual’s dispersal probability is made dependent on the cooperativeness of the patch
members of the other species. As in Chapter 6, we consider conditional strategies that are
given by a logistic function. Individuals of species A make their probability to leave the
natal patch dependent on y–A , i.e. on their share in the commodity Y produced by the patch
members of species B:
d(y–A) =                  
1                    . (7.3)
1 + exp(– βd · ( y–A – αd))
Here αd and βd are heritable parameters that characterize the individual’s ‘norm of reac-
tion’ (see Figure 6.1). If an individual harbours a positive βd (‘type 1’ strategy), it has the
tendency to leave productive patches (large values of y–A), while individuals with a nega-
tive βd (‘type 2’) tend to leave patches with a low productivity. When βd is large in absolute
value, the dispersal strategy approaches an all-or-nothing strategy, where an individual will
always leave or always stay, depending on whether y–A is larger or smaller than αd.
Similarly, the dispersal tendency of members of species B is determined by evolvable
parameters αd and βd , but now the dispersal decision depends on x–B and thus on the coop-
erativeness of the patch members of species A.
Dispersing individuals encounter patches at random. Depending on the settlement sce-
nario considered they either settle on the first patch encountered or they base their settle-
ment decision on an evolvable conditional evaluation of candidate patches. In the latter
case, the probability to settle in a candidate target patch depends on the cooperativeness
yof the other species in that patch. For an individual of species A, the settlement probabilit
is given by:
s(y–A) =                  
1                     (7.4)
1 + exp(– β s · ( y–A – αs))
where again αs and βs are heritable parameters. Similarly, individuals of species B make
their settlement decisions depending on x–B .
Dispersal and the rejection of patches are costly: the viability of dispersing individuals
is reduced by a factor 1 – md, while each time that a possible target patch is rejected the
viability is further reduced by a factor 1 – ms . Dispersal-related mortality md and rejection-
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Reproduction and inheritance
After all individuals have settled, the members of each patch reproduce according to the
fecundity accrued in their natal patch. Of the offspring produced in each patch, NA and NB
are chosen at random to form the patch members that will enter the next social interaction
phase, whereas all parents and all other offspring die.
Individuals are haploid and reproduce clonally, so that, each individual is characterized
by alleles at five jointly evolving loci. Allelic values are real numbers that determine the
individual’s cooperativeness and its condition dependent dispersal and settlement strategy,
i.e. the parameters [(αd , βd) and/or (αs, βs)]. When reproducing, parents transmit all five
alleles to their offspring. At each locus, mutations occur with probability μ = 0.01. In such
cases a small number drawn from the uniform distribution on the interval (–0.1, +0.1) is
added to the allele at the corresponding locus. See Chapter 6 for further details.
Simulation settings
We simulated populations consisting of 25,000 individuals per species that where distrib-
uted over 1,000 patches, with each patch harbouring NA = NB = 25 individuals per
species. All individuals were initialized at the allelic values x = αd = αs = 0.5 and βd = βs
= 0. We considered four different cost-benefit ratios (c/b = 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1) for
all four dispersal and settlement scenarios and we ran 100 replicate simulations for each
scenario and parameter combination. Most simulations were run for 50,000 generations,
but we regularly ran longer simulations (>200,000 generations) to check the robustness
of our results.
The simulation program was coded in C++ (code available upon request from A.I.),
and compiled in g++ (4.3.4; Free Software Foundation, Inc. 2008). 
RESULTS
Does conditional dispersal promote interspecific cooperation?
Figure 7.1 summarizes the results of our simulations on the evolution of between-species
cooperation. Our two-species model strongly resembles the public goods model for within-
species cooperation considered earlier (Chapter 6). In that earlier model we concluded that
conditional dispersal can hamper (within-species) cooperation for low cost-benefit ratios,
while it strongly promotes cooperation when cost-benefit ratios are high. In contrast, Figure
7.1 reveals that – irrespective of the dispersal scenario – between-species cooperation never
got off the ground for the two highest cost-benefit ratios considered (c/b = 0.01, 0.1). When
the cost-benefit ratio was extremely low (c/b = 0.0001), cooperativeness slowly increased
even when neither dispersal nor settlement decisions were evolving conditional strategies
(Figure 7.1A): in 62% of the 100 replicate simulations at least one of the two species reached
a cooperativeness level of 2 within 50,000 generations. We chose this (arbitrary) threshold
to classify whether or not ‘cooperation’ had evolved in a species. Both conditional dispersal
and conditional settlement had a significant effect on the evolution of cooperation. When
conditional dispersal could evolve (Figure 7.1B) the percentage of simulations leading to
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test), while the percentage increased to 76% when conditional settlement could evolve
(Figure 7.1C; P < 0.016, Fisher exact test). Conditional dispersal and conditional settle-
ment had a synergistic effect in that the percentage of simulations leading to cooperation
when both were conditional increased to 99% (Figure 7.1D; P < 0.015 for the comparison
of 93% and 99%, Fisher exact test). In contrast, the evolution of conditional settlement
had no marked effect on the evolution of within-species cooperativeness (Chapter 6).
For the intermediate cost-benefit ratio c/b = 0.001 (which is still very low) the simula-
tion results were somewhat mixed. In the absence of conditional dispersal and conditional
settlement (Figure 7.1A), the cooperativeness of both species stayed well above zero in all
simulations, but no species reached the threshold criterion of 2. The percentage of cooper-
ation increased to 25% in case of conditional settlement (Figure 7.1C; P < 0.001, binomial
test), to 65% in case of conditional dispersal (Figure 7.1B; P < 0.001, binomial test), and
to 78% in case of conditional dispersal and conditional settlement (Figure 7.1D; P < 0.021,
Fisher exact test). However, in none of the simulations did cooperativeness reach high
levels, and the occasional (small) outbursts in cooperativeness were in all cases followed
by a subsequent drop in cooperativeness to small values.
Since consistent and sizeable cooperation levels only evolved when the cost-benefit
ratio was extremely low (c/b = 0.0001), we will focus on this case for the rest of this
paper. In view of equation (7.2), between-species cooperation is very ‘cheap’ in this case,
because even if an individual contributes 10 units to the commodity that is beneficial to
the other species (a value that was almost never reached in our simulations), the loss in
fecundity (0.001) is minute in comparison to the baseline fecundity (vA = wB = 5). One
might therefore suspect that evolution is largely governed by random factors (genetic drift
and mutation), but this does not seem to be the case. When simulations were run for a
longer period (Figure 7.2 shows two representative examples), the evolution of coopera-
tiveness showed a clear trend that was only marginally affected by stochastic fluctuations.
As we will show below, stochasticity was mainly important for determining which kind of
strategies evolved in the two species in a given simulation run. 
Evolution of asymmetric species interactions
To make our results comparable with the situation of within-species cooperation consid-









































Figure 7.1 (left) ff f f f fE ect o  the cost-bene it ratio on the evolution o  interspeci ic cooperation under
different dispersal and settlement scenarios.  Evolution of cooperativeness (blue), mean dispersal
probability (red) and mean settlement probability (orange) for four cost-benefit ratios and four dis-
persal scenarios: (A) fixed dispersal probability (d = 0.15) and fixed settlement probability (s =
1.0); (B) evolvable conditional dispersal strategy and fixed settlement probability; (C) fixed disper-
sal probability and evolvable conditional settlement strategy; (D) evolvable conditional dispersal
and settlement strategies. Each plot shows 5 randomly selected replicate simulation runs (dashed
lines) and their means (bold lines). Left y-axis: cooperativeness; right y-axis: probability of disper-
fsal and settlement in a new patch. The graphs in the top of each panel refer to the percentage o
100 simulation runs during 50,000 generations where the cooperativeness of one or both species
exceeded the (arbitrary) threshold value of 2, meaning that we obtained: ‘cooperation’, when at
least one species exceeded the threshold; ‘bilateral cooperation’, when both species exceed the
threshold; and ‘unilateral cooperation’, when only one species exceeded the threshold. 
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parameters, population sizes and initial conditions. Yet, as exemplified by Figure 7.2, the
ylevel of cooperation that evolved in the two species widely diverged. This is confirmed b
Figure 7.1, which indicates that bilateral cooperation (where both species reached cooper-
ativeness levels above 2) emerged only in a fraction of the ‘cooperative’ simulation runs. In
case of unconditional settlement (Fig 7.1AB), the majority of cooperative simulation runs
were classified as ‘unilateral’, that is, they corresponded to a simulation where only one of
the two species exceeded the threshold cooperativeness value of 2 within 50,000 genera-
tions. Interestingly, conditional settlement had a positive effect on bilateral cooperation, as
the percentage of bilateral cooperation increased significantly, irrespective of whether dis-
persal happened at a fixed rate (44% versus 16%; P < 0.001, Fisher exact test) or was an
evolving conditional strategy (58% versus 40%; P < 0.005, Fisher exact test).
For dispersal scenario 4 (the evolution of both conditional dispersal and conditional
settlement), Figure 7.3 depicts the cooperativeness evolved in both species for ten ran-
domly chosen simulation runs. While it is apparent that in each simulation a sizeable level
of cooperation evolved in at least one species, the other species typically lagged far behind









































Figure 7.2 ffEvolution o  asymmetric cooperation. Long-term evolution (200,000 generations) o
Acooperation in species A (solid line) and species B (dashed line). In both example runs, species 
happens to evolve a high degree of cooperativeness. Cooperation remains unilateral in (A) where
even after extended periods of time cooperativeness does not get off the ground in species B.
Cooperation remains asymmetric but becomes bilateral in (B), where after a long period without
cooperation, cooperativeness starts to increase steadily in species B. After almost 10,000 genera-
tions (indicated by the circle), the relationship between A and B reversed for a brief period of time.
In both simulations: c/b = 0.0001 and we allow for dispersal scenario 4 with both conditional dis-
persal and conditional settlement.
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(black dots), did the cooperativeness of both species consistently stay above our classifica-
tion threshold of 2. In one other simulation (purple), a long period of asymmetry ended in
a more symmetric outcome in generation 50,000. We conclude therefore that the evolution
of symmetric bilateral cooperation was the exception rather than the rule. A more typical
outcome was unilateral cooperation, where one species reaps the benefits of cooperation
while not paying the (even very low) costs of being cooperative itself.
Do partner choice and partner fidelity promote the evolution of cooperation?
wThe heat plots in Figure 7.4, based on two of the simulations of Figure 7.3, illustrate ho
the distribution of alleles for cooperativeness (left panels in Figure 7.4A and Figure 7.4B)
and the parameters βd (middle panels) and αd (right panels) that characterize the condi-
tional dispersal strategy evolve in the two species (Figure 7.4C and Figure 7.4D). Figure
f7.4A (= black dots in Figure 7.3) shows a simulation run where relatively high values o
cooperativeness evolved in both species. Since the dispersal strategy is conditional on the
cooperativeness of the other species, the top panels show βd and αd of species B next to
the cooperativeness of species A, while the bottom panels illustrate the dispersal parame-
fters of species A next to the cooperativeness of species B. The dispersal parameters o
species A show a consistent pattern: the switch point αd of the dispersal function (equa-
tion 7.3)) evolves in parallel with the cooperativeness y of species B and assumes more or
less the same values. From the start, βd takes on positive values, implying that a type-1 dis-













































































Figure 7.3 Evolutionary trajectories resulting in unilateral and bilateral cooperation. The coopera-
tiveness of both species is shown for ten randomly chosen example runs for the cost benefit ratio - c/b
= 0.0001 and dispersal scenario 4 with a simulation time of 50,000 generations. Based on our classi-
ffication of a species as ‘cooperative’ when its level of cooperativeness exceeded a threshold value o
2, the graph is subdivided into four sections: (1) bottom-left corner (white): no species is coopera-
tive; (2) bottom-right section (brown): unilateral cooperation by species A; (3) top-left section
(brown): unilateral cooperation by species B; (4) top-right section (grey): bilateral cooperation.


















































































































































































































































































































































A.Ivens-diss  16-10-2012  11:14  Pagina 146
Figure 7.4C). This means that the individuals in species A tend to leave patches with a
high degree of cooperativeness of the other species, while they tend to stay when coopera-
tiveness is low. In the longer run, species B follows the same pattern, but two different dis-
persal strategies (a type-1 and a type-2 strategy) coexist in the first 25,000 generations
(Figure 7.4C, blue lines) until the type-1 strategy finally outcompetes the other. Both
species evolved a type-1 settlement strategy (not shown), implying that individuals tend to
accept patches with an above-average degree of cooperativeness of the other species, while
they reject non-cooperative patches.
The simulation in Figure 7.4AC exemplifies a few general points. Whenever a species
evolved a high degree of cooperativeness, the jointly evolved dispersal strategy and the
jointly evolved settlement strategy were both type-1. In case of the settlement strategy, this
is perhaps not surprising, since it corresponds to the expected outcome of partner choice,
i.e. accept cooperative neighbourhoods and reject non-cooperative environments. However,
the evolved dispersal pattern is not in line with the standard expectation concerning
partner fidelity, although the observed pattern appears to be sensible. An individual that
stays in a patch with a high cooperativeness of the other species has a fecundity benefit,
but it also has to compete with conspecifics that receive a high benefit as well. It is there-
fore advantageous to leave and to ‘cash’ the benefits of cooperation in a less competitive
patch, because all patches will ultimately be downregulated to two times 25 individuals in
the next generation.
Figure 7.4B (= blue dots in Figure 7.3) exemplifies the joint evolution of cooperative-
ness and cooperation-dependent dispersal in a simulation run with a strong evolved asym-
metry between the two species. In line with the above considerations, species B, which
evolves a high level of cooperation, makes use of a type-1 dispersal strategy. However, a
second dispersal strategy of type-2 managed to coexist for extensive periods of time (for
generation t = 10000, Figure7.4D, dashed blue line). In species A, cooperativeness did not
really get off the ground, but there was considerable variation in low-level cooperativeness
(for generation t = 10000, Figure 7.4D, red vertical lines). The (relatively) cooperative
individuals of species A harboured a type-1 dispersal strategy, while a low-level of cooper-
ation was associated with a type-2 dispersal strategy. Both species evolved a type-1 settle-
ment strategy (not shown). This example demonstrates that cooperation can be both
strongly asymmetric between species and have considerable variation in cooperativeness
within species and that the response to the other species’ cooperativeness can persist for









































Figure 7.4 (left) fJoint evolution o  cooperativeness and conditional dispersal in replicate simula-
tion runs leading to either the evolution of bilateral (A, C) or unilateral cooperation (B, D).  The
panels are heat plots illustrating for both species the evolution of the frequency distribution of the
alleles for cooperativeness and the parameters βd and αd characterizing the conditional dispersal
strategy. In the upper parts of the figure (A, B), the top panels show the cooperativeness of species
A (left) and the dispersal parameters βd (middle) and αd (right) of species B. The bottom panels
show the cooperativeness of species B (left) and the dispersal parameters of species A (middle and
right). For generation 10,000 panels (C) and (D) show representative dispersal strategies (red,
species A, blue, species B; solid lines: Type-1 strategy, dashed lines, Type-2 strategy) and the
average cooperativeness of the individuals expressing these strategies (vertical lines). 
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DISCUSSION
Cost-benefit effects on the evolution of interspecific cooperation
In our model cooperation between species only evolved when the cost-benefit ratio of the
interaction was extremely low. Under higher cost-benefit ratios, no cooperation emerged,
irrespective of the dispersal scenarios considered (Figure 7.1). This outcome contrasts the
results obtained in Chapter 6, where we showed that conditional dispersal promotes
within-species cooperation particularly strongly under high cost-benefit ratios. This is
because, in both models, the only adaptive response as a cooperative individual under
high cost-benefit ratios is to evolve competitor avoidance. However, under intraspecific
cooperation (Chapter 6), the cooperative individual in fact just helped the competitors
becoming competitive herself. In case of interspecific cooperation the competitors to be
avoided are not the same individuals that she also cooperates with. Cooperation between
yspecies will therefore not come off the ground when both species have a strong tendenc
(as selected for by high c/b ratios) to avoid conspecific competitors and leave beneficial
environments created by the other species.
With the extremely low cost-benefit ratios required for mutualism in our current model,
the mutualistic relationships that evolved may be viewed as examples of by-product mutu-
alism, where partners exchange goods that are cheap (or even free) to produce but yield
Ahigh benefits for the other species (Connor 1995; Leimar & Connor 2003; Leigh 2010). 
well-known example of by-product mutualism is honeydew provided by aphids to ants,
which is based on trading waste product for protection and obtaining the extra bonus of
engaging waste collectors that enhance hygiene in the aphid colony (Stadler & Dixon
2008). Also others have found that (low) c/b ratios enhance the probability (Yamamura te
al. 2004; Foster & Wenseleers 2006), but it would be useful for future studies to let cost-
benefit ratios jointly evolve with cooperativeness and conditional dispersal, as it is conceiv-
able that costs and benefits change over evolutionary time as mutualistic partners
co-evolve. Evolving cost-benefit ratios did indeed promote mutualism in a model of pair-
wise interspecific cooperation (Doebeli & Knowlton 1998).
Partner fidelity, partner choice and the evolution of mutualism
Provided cost-benefit ratios were sufficiently low, interspecific cooperation evolved in all
four simulated dispersal scenarios. However, cooperation in at least one of the species
evolved more frequently when conditional dispersal (equivalent to partner fidelity) was
allowed to evolve as well (Figure 7.1AB). Also the joint evolution of conditional settlement
(equivalent to partner choice) promoted cooperation (Figure 7.1AC) and we observed an
additional synergistic effect of conditional dispersal and settlement that increased the
frequency in which bilateral cooperation evolved (Figure 7.1D; see below). Previously,
partner fidelity and partner choice have theoretically been shown to promote mutualism
(Foster & Kokko 2006; Foster & Wenseleers 2006), but, these models assumed that individ-
uals would have an innate tendency to leave non-cooperators and move towards coopera-
tors. Such positive conditional settlement could indeed evolve in our model, but
conditionally dispersing individuals evolved to leave cooperative patches rather than non-
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within-species cooperation (Chapter 6). Although unexpected at first these within-species
results could be explained by competition avoidance: by leaving ‘good’ patches, individuals
avoided competition over reproduction with individuals they themselves helped to be
strong competitors. Virtually the same explanation applies to the current model for inter-
specific cooperation. A tendency to stay in ‘good’ patches is clearly not advantageous in
your model; individuals would profit from the cooperativeness of the other species b
having a higher fecundity, but their offspring would face fierce competition for the fixed
number of positions available since all conspecific patch members would be highly fecund
as well. In other words, the benefits received in a good patch can only be ‘cashed’ else-
where. This effect may have been buffered for when we would have allowed for local
r yesource enhancement to take effect: if patch sizes would increase with patch productivit
rather than being constant.  
Emergence of variation in cooperativeness and conditional strategies
To allow comparison of our results on between-species cooperation with those obtained for
within-species cooperation in Chapter 6, we focused on a symmetric situation in which
both species were virtually identical and started simulations with the same initial condi-
tions. Still, a remarkable degree of interaction asymmetry evolved, with the majority of the
runs resulting in unilateral rather than bilateral cooperation (Figure 7.3). Doebeli and
Knowlton (1998) showed as well that symmetric starting conditions can yield fluctuating
fend results for the evolution of mutualism. Most likely, similar or even higher degrees o
asymmetry would evolve when the model contains asymmetry a priori. However, given
some of the other counterintuitive results, it would seem wise to explicitly test this expec-
tation. Such future studies would be particularly relevant because many mutualisms are
characterized by asymmetry between partners, for example in body size, generation time,
and number of interacting individuals (reviewed in Leigh 2010).
Throughout our simulations we maintained considerable variation for cooperativeness
both between and within species and the same was true for conditional strategies. Over
extended periods of time, opposite dispersal strategies can apparently coexist (Figure 7.4),
often in combination with differing levels of cooperativeness. The importance of variation
for beneficial effects of conditional strategies has previously been recognized in different
contexts (Ferrière et al. 2002; Foster & Kokko 2006; McNamara et al. 2008; Wolf et al.
2011). Indeed, costly conditional behaviour requires variation; it is only worth paying the
costs of being choosy or responsive if these costs are balanced by fitness benefits emanat-
ing from making good choices.
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Epilogue: what have we learned about
farming mutualism?
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yIn this thesis, I have studied the problem of the evolution of stable (farming) mutualism b
means of combined empirical (Chapters 2-5, Box A, B) and theoretical approaches
(Chapters 6, 7). For a detailed description of my findings I refer to the individual chapters.
Instead, in this last chapter I will reflect on what we have learned about farming mutu-
alisms in general and the suitability of the Lasius flavus-root aphid system as model system
for farming mutualisms in particular. I will also look ahead to future avenues in both
empirical and theoretical studies on farming mutualism by discussing potential future
yempirical angles and by describing the characteristics of a theoretical model specificall
tailored to farming mutualism. 
ARE CONDITIONAL BEHAVIOUR AND LOW COSTS THE KEYS TO
SUCCESS IN COOPERATION?
How cooperation can evolve by means of natural selection is not self-evident. In a world in
which individuals are selected to outcompete others, even a small cost of cooperative
behaviour can be too high and prevent its evolution (see also Chapter 1). Previously it was
shown that selectively continueing cooperative interactions (partner fidelity y) or selectivel
engaging in cooperative interactions (partner choice) can be important mechanisms to
promote the evolution of cooperation (among others Trivers 1971; Bull & Rice 1991).
Evolution of such conditional mechanisms is often hard to predict. Indeed, when model-
ling conditional behaviour one easily obtains counter-intuitive results (e.g. Van Doorn et al.
2003; Pen & Taylor 2005; Fawcett et al. 2011). This was also the case in Chapter 6, in
which conditional dispersal (partner fidelity in our model) was shown to promote within-
species cooperation, but did so in unexpected ways: (1) cooperation evolved when individ-
uals tended to leave cooperative patches for non-cooperative ones, rather than the other
way around, (2) conditional dispersal could also lead to the disappearance of cooperation
and (3) the evolution of cooperation under conditional dispersal evolved more easily when
cost-benefit ratios were high. As explained in Chapter 6, although counter-intuitive at first,
these results can well be understood by taking local resource enhancement into considera-
tion. I therefore conclude that when investigating the importance of conditional behaviour
for the evolution of cooperation one should be careful to not only focus on the cost-bene-
fits of the cooperation pay-off, but also to take into account other effects such as those
generated by population regulation.
Cooperation between species, however, is expected to be even more difficult to evolve
than the within-species cooperation studied in Chapter 6. This is especially so because no
kin-selective advantage can take effect in an interaction between individuals of different
species (see Chapter 1). Indeed, in my model in Chapter 7, between-species cooperation
only evolved under much more restricted conditions than within-species cooperation in the
comparable model of Chapter 6. In particular, interspecific cooperation could only evolve
under very low cost-benefit ratios, in which there are hardly any costs involved in engaging
in an interaction (comparable to by-product mutualism). Given these low costs, the model
in Chapter 7 showed that conditional dispersal (partner fidelity) can also promote the evo-
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tionality in the form of conditional settlement (partner choice). 
Interspecific cooperation thus evolves most easily under very low cost-benefit ratios
and under conditions in which partner fidelity and partner choice can interact. The con-
ceptual models of Chapters 6 and 7, however, did not consider specific cooperative
systems, rendering the underlying assumptions rather general and biologically less realis-
tic. Future extensions of these conceptual models should include a wider range of coopera-
tive games, such as one-to-one interactions and interactions with asymmetry in
cost-benefit ratios and information available to participants, in order to test whether these
general results are robust. Moreover, for a better theoretical understanding of the evolu-
tion of farming mutualism, we will need to go beyond conceptual models and develop
more mechanistic models specifically tailored to farming mutualism. In the section on
‘farming mutualism’, I will also give a detailed prospect of the contours of such a model.
First, I will discuss what we have learned about the specific farming mutualism between
Yellow meadow ants and their root aphids and discuss its prospect as a future model
system for farming mutualism.
EVALUATION OF L. FLAVUS- SYSTEM AS A STUDY SYSTEM FOR
FARMING MUTUALISMS
At the start of my dissertation project, very little was known about the L. flavus – root
aphid system. All information was based on a handful of studies, published between the
50’s and early 90’s (Pontin 1958; 1959; 1961b; Paul 1977; Godske 1991; 1992; Smart
1991). In addition, some information seemed to be based on anecdotal evidence and none
of the studies or observations had been performed in my main study population on the
island of Schiermonnikoog, the Netherlands. Nevertheless, for several reasons the L. flavus
ysystem seemed a promising study system for farming mutualism: (1) field and laborator
studies seemed quite feasible; a large study population was available and laboratory set-
ups had been described in the literatur (Muir 1960; Dixon 1970; Paul 1977; Smart 1991);
(2) the available information suggested considerable life-history variation among the sym-
ybiont root aphid species that would enable comparative studies; and (3) a detailed stud
of conflict resolution mechanisms in farming mutualism seemed feasible, because of the
yavailable variation in symbiont life-history with respect to for example myrmecophil
(dependence on ants) and reproductive mode. In this section, I will evaluate these three
notions in light of what we know now and discuss the future potential of this ant-aphid
interaction as a model system for farming mutualism.
The feasibility of field and laboratory studies
During the first year of this project, I visited a large number of field sites in Northwest
Europe (the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Denmark, see Figure 8.1, Table 8.1).
These site visits were aimed at obtaining insight into aphid species diversity in L. flavus
nests in general and at evaluating the suitability of these sites for my studies. The salt
marsh population on the island of Schiermonnikoog proved to be the most suitable location
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diversity of aphid species. The field survey further showed that the aphid diversity on
Schiermonnikoog was comparable to the diversity on the Danish island of Læsø, but that
inland and salt marsh communities differed in aphid species composition (see Table 8.1).
The large ant population on Schiermonnikoog allowed for systematic sampling of root
aphids from ant mounds. For aphid sampling I mainly followed Pontin (1978) and Godske
(1991; 1992), using a fixed scheme for taking soil samples (Figure 4.1). However, in con-
trast to the previous studies which used Tullgren funnel sorting for separating aphids from
the soil samples, I hand-sorted aphids from the soil. This method allowed me to separate
faphids according to aphid chambers, which for the first time opened the possibility o
analysing aphid (genetic) diversity at the chamber level. As documented in Chapter 4, it
turned out that aphid chambers hardly ever contain multiple species and multiple clones
per species. The downside of hand-sorting is that I possibly missed a number of aphids
which might have been detected by Tullgren sorting, especially early developmental stages
f(of all species) that were too small to detect by eye (for a discussion, see the appendix o
Chapter 4).
Lasius niger, a sister species of L. flavus, and its above-ground facultative aphid sym-
bionts (in particular the pea aphid Aphis fabae) has been studied in controlled greenhouse



















Figure 8.1 fOverview o  sample locations in the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and Belgium.
Map courtesy of D. Visser.
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allows for the study of fundamental characteristics of the mutualistic relationship, such as
partner choice (Vantaux et al. 2012), the effects of aphid clone and ant attendance on hon-
eydew quality (Fischer & Shingleton 2001; Yao & Akimoto 2001; Vantaux et al. 2011b),
ant suppression of aphid dispersal (Oliver et al. 2007), and shifts from aphid milking to
preying on aphids (Offenberg 2001). However, these results are restricted to a facultative,
above-ground interaction and a full understanding of the dynamics of ant farming mutual-
Aism requires comparison with the results obtained in an obligate, underground system. 
laboratory set-up of the L. flavus system would allow such a comparison. Unfortunately,
culturing ants and aphids in the laboratory turned out to be very challenging. Earlier
records by Muir (1960), Dixon (1970), Paul (1977) and Smart (1991) showed that cultur-
ing aphids and ants in a combined set-up can be done, but that aphid numbers often
remain very small. Our pilot efforts showed that L. flavus colonies (with queens, trans-
ferred from the field) can best be kept in separate boxes on a diet of meal worms and
honey solution, with medium humidity and daily fluctuating temperature, to mimic
natural conditions (A. B. F. Ivens and C. F. Veen, personal observation). Aphids were best
kept in tubes with a small number of ant workers on roots of Festuca rubra (Figure 8.2).
When aphids were kept without ant workers, they quickly died because their trophobi-
otic organ got infected with mold when not being cleaned from honeydew by ants. In addi-
















A with ants B without ants
Figure 8.2 f fSet-ups or laboratory culturing o  root aphids with ant workers (A) and without ant
workers (B). In both set ups, grass- Festuca rubra is grown in plastic experimental test tubes and
aphids feed on the grass roots. Note that in set-up (A) with the grass rooted in soil, aphids do not
survive without ant workers airing the soil and cleaning their abdomen. In set-up (B) aphids sur-
vived approximately two weeks. 
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aphid survival. In our pilot studies, neither ants nor aphids reached densities high enough
for larger-scale experiments. Future efforts to culture ants and aphids should include cul-
turing aphid on Holcus lanatus (Paul 1977) and direct connection of root aphids and ant
colonies, which has previously been shown to yield higher aphid numbers for experimental
and taxonomic studies. Alternatively, experiments can be performed with ants and aphids
directly after being collected from the field. This method was applied in the pilot experi-
ments of Box A of this thesis, in which I studied aphid and mealybug acceptance by ant
sub-colonies. Although possible, this collection method does not allow for carefully con-
trolled laboratory circumstances and sample sizes.
Diversity in the L. flavus system
Over the course of my PhD studies, I found 15 different species of root aphids in Lasius
flavus nests and five species of underground mealybugs (Table 8.1). These aphid species
have all been described before from L. flavus nests in Britain and Denmark (Paul 1977;
Pontin 1978; Heie 1980; Godske 1991), but as far as I am aware, this is the first detailed
study of root aphids and mealybugs in L. flavus nests in the Netherlands. For species identi-
fication I used a protocol for microscopic preparation (modified from Heie 1980). This
process is very time consuming and identification remains uncertain, because of the limited
number of records on root aphid taxonomy available (Zwölfer 1958; Paul 1977; Heie 1980).
It is therefore likely that some cryptic species remained undetected; this issue can only be
resolved by further genetic analysis, following up on our initial work presented in Chapter 5.
The sparse records on the species found indicated a large variation in life-history char-
acteristics. For example, Anoecia corni and Tetraneura ulmi were assumed to complete their
sexual cycle in Northwest Europe on their primary host plants Cornus and Ulmus resp.,
whereas Forda spp., Geoica spp. and Anoecia zirnitsi yhave been inferred to reproduce onl
anholocyclically in the area (Paul 1977; Heie 1980). Also the extent to which these root
aphids disperse differs between species according to the few available records: some
species obligately leave ant nests in search for their primary host plants to reproduce, for
others clonal alates (winged individuals) have been described and others are assumed to
never leave the ant nest (Paul 1977; Heie 1980). Lastly, these aphid species are assumed
to differ significantly in their dependence on ants: Forda spp., for example, have been
described to be obligate myrmecophiles whereas Tetraneura ulmi is considered a faculta-
tive myrmecophile by some (Paul 1977; Heie 1980). In Chapters 2 & 3, I first tried to
verify early records on root aphid reproduction and dispersal using microsatellite markers
in a detailed field study of the four most common species Geoica utricularia, Forda mar-
ginata, Forda formicaria and Tetraneura ulmi. I showed that, in contrast to earlier records,
all four species most likely reproduce clonally on Schiermonnikoog, although caution
should be taken when excluding sexual reproduction for T. ulmi based on microsatellite
data only (Chapter 3). The microsatellite data confirm that some aphid dispersal occurs
along the island’s salt marsh, but at very low frequencies. This indicates that sparse natural
history records emanating from field surveys are not necessarily accurate, and that site
specific life-history details of root aphids should ideally be verified prior to further experi-
ments, especially when earlier records concern populations that have not been studied
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In spite of some sampling efforts having remained limited (Table 8.1), the L. flavus
populations across Northwest Europe may harbour an interesting degree of variation in
aphid species diversity, their degree of myrmecophily, and possibly also reproductive modes
and dispersal tendencies. This variation provides many additional opportunities to test
alternative hypotheses on the implications of association with ants. This work would
include population genetic analyses of aphids over their full ecological and geographical
range, in particular including areas where aphid primary host plants occur and an ant-
aphid conflict of interests over aphid reproductive mode is likely to be more pressing
(Southern Europe for the focal species of Chapter 2 and 4). In addition, combined analy-
ses of nuclear and mitochondrial DNA on sampled aphids from a wider geographical
range, would allow construction of a phylogeny of aphid clonal lineages which will give
more insight into the history of this mutualistic interaction and the origin of aphid clones
found in Northwest Europe nowadays.
In particular the genus Anoecia offers a wide spectrum of these possibilities, with
within-genus interspecific differences in reproductive mode, myrmecophily and dispersal
tendencies (Paul 1977; Heie 1980). This means that in comparisons between Anoecia
aphids, genus-differences in life-history can be factored out and yielded results may give
more direct information on the evolutionary ecology of ant-tending than the aphid-aphid
comparisons presented in this thesis. We already developed some microsatellite markers
for this genus (Ivens et al. 2011; Chapter 5) and a preliminary taxonomic survey identified
the possibility for several cryptic species in this species-complex (A.B.F. Ivens, personal
observation), but time was too short to study this genus in detail.
What have we learned?
My empirical studies ended up focussing on the three most common aphid species. Chapter
2 and 3 show that G. utricularia and F. marginata reproduce exclusively clonally and T.
ulmi most likely also. In addition dispersal is rare in all species. Ivens et al. (2012a; Chapter
4) then reveals that the majority of L. flavus nests contain only a single of these three
species and that clonal lineages and species tend to occur spatially separated within ant
mounds. Although the chapters presented in this thesis were largely aphid oriented, we
also conducted several unpublished studies concerning the basic biology of the ants.
rMicrosatellite analysis of ant workers collected from the same mounds as sampled fo
aphids, showed that the L. flavus fpopulation on Schiermonnikoog appears to consist o
both mono- and polygynous colonies and that queens mate 1-2 times (Janzen 2009; van
Boheemen 2010). Moreover, an ecological study that investigated correlations between ant
colony genetic diversity, sex ratios and environmental stress factors such as inundation fre-
quency (as approximated by salinity) and colony density showed, among other results,
that ant sex ratios (males/females) are negatively correlated with salinity and that total
reproductive output is negatively correlated with ant mound density (van Boheemen 2010;
Koch 2012). 
Our studies also gave further insights into incipient stages of the interaction, although
additional work will be needed to fully resolve this. Our population genetic analyses on
associated ants and aphids showed that host and symbiont population structures differ
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well-mixed, i.e. panmictic. In fact, the ant population does not show any population differ-
entiation, neither along the sampled transect (Figure 8.3), nor across Northwestern Europe
(Janzen 2009). L. niger is also known to have a such well-mixed population, which is con-
sistent with both Lasius species mating in large, synchronized mating flights (Boomsma &
Van der Have 1998). This absence of genetic correlation between ants and aphids indicates
that vertical transmission can be excluded as transmission mode for the aphids. In addi-
tion, virgin queens have never been observed to carry aphids on their mating flight,
another indication that vertical transmission does not occur [there are examples of dispers-
ing virgin queens carrying symbiotic coccids; (Hölldobler & Wilson 1990)]. Aphids thus
transmit horizontally between ant colonies and several mechanisms can underlie aphid
this form of transmission: horizontally dispersing aphids can enter existing ant colonies
and/or be picked up by ants; this mechanism is supported by the finding that ants are able
to discriminate between nymphs and adults, but do often not seem to be able to distin-
guish between aphid species or clones (Box A). Alternatively, groups of aphids may remain
in the ant mound, being tended by subsequent colonies of ants. Determining the relative
importance of these two scenarios for horizontal transmission will require more detailed
studies on ant-aphid partner choice and long-term monitoring of existing and incipient ant
colonies.
The big unknowns, however, remain the costs and benefits for both host and symbionts
of being engaged in their interaction. The benefits to the ants are presumed to lie in aphids
providing both carbohydrates and proteins. The aphids are presumed to not survive
without the ants, as is confirmed by my own observations. In addition, Smart (1991)
showed that aphid population size increases with ant attendance. Thus, while it seems
beyond doubt that both host and symbionts benefit from the interaction, the relationships
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Figure 8.3 f ffLack o  correlation between genetic di erentiation and geographic distance between
sample locations of the ant Lasius flavus on Schiermonnikoog. Genetic differentiation is quantified
as FST (Weir & Cockerham 1984). The dashed line shows the linear regression line between genetic
differentiation and distance indicating that no significant correlation (Mantel test: N = 120, P =
0.486) was observed between locations along the 7 km transect (figure reproduced from Janzen
2009). 
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ductive success would need to be quantified before we can draw firmer conclusion on the
forces that affect the dynamics of this mutualism.
Scope for the L. flavus – root aphid system as a future model system for
farming mutualism?
Does the Lasius flavus – root aphid system have the potential to become a new model
system for farming mutualisms? In order to understand universal factors governing the
evolutionary ecology of farming mutualisms, we need systems that are similar enough to
allow meaningful comparison, yet different enough to highlight the importance of system-
specific characteristics. The best known farming mutualisms are those of social insects
farming crops: the fungus-growing ants and termites. Just like these systems, the L. flavus
system is presumed to be an obligate mutualism with in-nest farming of symbionts, unlike
other examples of ‘cattle-breeding’ ants such as L. niger that facultatively tend above-
ground aphids. For a further understanding of (obligate) farming mutualisms, having a
study system at hand such as L. flavus is therefore indispensable. Moreover, the fact that
both Lasius species sometimes tend the same aphid species opens doors to studying mutu-
alism networks. Likewise, promising future studies of this mutualism can extend to includ-
ing aphid host plants (Veen 2011) and aphid endosymbionts.
My studies showed that population genetic field studies are feasible and that the system
yhas a lot of research potential in terms of mapping aphid species diversity and life-histor
variation across mounds and (sub)populations. Controlled laboratory studies, however,
will remain a challenge in this subterranean system, with observations remaining restricted
to artificial environments (as used by Muir 1960; Dixon 1970; Paul 1977; Smart 1991)
with low aphid numbers. In addition, the interpretation of experimental data will be diffi-
cult as long as basic biological information, such as how partners associate, is not well
understood. Developing this system into a model system would thus first require a large
number of descriptive studies, before conclusive experimental data can be obtained. In
fact, these descriptive studies might constitute the biggest hurdle towards adopting this
ysystem as a model system: in the current scientific culture of publish-or-perish, purel
descriptive, often time-consuming, studies have a hard time to be published in the highest
ranking journals. Nevertheless, I think that it is worth taking this hurdle, because few other
farming mutualisms have that much potential for studying the many facets of in-house
cattle breeding in a single system.    
FARMING MUTUALISMS
Farming mutualisms are interactions between different species in which one species (the
host) promotes the growth of a species it relies on for food (the symbiont). Farming inter-
actions are considered to be mutualisms when they are presumed to yield net benefits for
both partners. In general, the exchanged benefits in farming interactions are nutrients pro-
vided by the symbiont (either in the form of goods produced, or by being eaten or both) in
exchange for host protection and tending so their life-time reproductive success is
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host-symbiont conflicts of interests are expected. The three main arenas of potential con-
flict are (1) symbiont reproductive mode, (2) symbiont transmission and dispersal and (3)
symbiont diversity (see also Chapter 1).
Universal patterns in farming mutualisms?
For each of the three potential arenas of conflict, generally two alternative outcomes in
terms of symbiont traits are considered possible: (1) symbiont reproduction can be sexual
or asexual, (2) symbiont transmission can be vertical or horizontal, and (3) symbiont
diversity can be minimal (monoculture – clonal relatedness of 100%) or substantial (poly-
culture – relatedness moderate to low) (Herre et al. 1999; Mueller 2002; Table 1.2). Host
and symbiont may prefer different outcomes and hence a conflict of interest can arise. In
this thesis, I studied which combination of outcomes characterizes the mutualistic interac-
tion between ant L. flavus and the root aphids in its nest. I showed that in this system,
symbiont reproduction is asexual in three of the studied species and also likely asexual in
ythe fourth, transmission is horizontal (and rare), and symbiont diversity is low, especiall
at the lowest organization-level of aphid chambers. This particular combination of out-
comes is not commonly observed in other farming mutualisms (see Figure 1.1). Other
farmed obligate symbionts are often asexually vertically transmitted and kept in genetic
monocultures [e.g. fungus-growing ants; some fungus-growing termites (Weber 1972; Korb
& Aanen 2003; Mueller et al. 2005; Poulsen & Boomsma 2005; Mueller et al. 2010)] or
symbionts reproduce sexually and transmit horizontally, after which diversity remains or is
yactively decreased by hosts [above-ground aphids (facultatively) kept by ants; the majorit
of fungus-growing termites; algae-farming damselfish (Hata & Kato 2004; Aanen et al.
2009; Yao 2010)].
In the other obligate systems of fungus-farming insects, symbiont reproduction, trans-
mission and diversity are controlled by an interplay of several host and symbiont control
mechanisms (a.o. Bot et al. 2001; Poulsen & Boomsma 2005; Aanen et al. 2009; Poulsen te
al. 2009; Schiøtt et al. 2010). In the L. flavus – system, however, the underlying mecha-
nisms governing these symbiont traits remain unclear. Does our observed set of outcomes
result from L. flavus host control over symbiont dispersal, reproduction and diversity? Or
do the strong aphid population structure and compartmentalization of aphid clones within
fant mounds simply result from constraints on aphid dispersal and does the absence o
sexual reproduction in aphids result from the absence of suitable host plants? Whether
active host control mechanisms or symbiont dispersal constraints underlie our findings
remains unclear. We can, however, confirm based on our data in combination with previ-
ous findings in other farming mutualisms (Bot et al. 2001; Hata & Kato 2002; Poulsen
2005; Aanen et al. 2009; Mueller et al. 2010), that many of the farming systems that have
been stable over evolutionary time are characterized by low symbiont diversity at the
lowest organization level. Often this low diversity goes hand in hand with asexual repro-
duction and vertical transmission. My results show that also with horizontal transmission
low diversity can be achieved, be it actively or passively (see also Aanen et al. 2009). Care
should be taken when comparing obligate to facultative systems and systems with host
control to systems without host control, because very different mechanisms may be at work.
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different underlying mechanisms may give hints as to what makes mutualistic systems
robust against cheating so they do not fall victim to mutualism breakdown (Sachs & Simms
2006). Low diversity through compartmentalization might be one of these universal, stabi-
lizing factors (Frank 1996; Herre et al. 1999), but see Verbruggen et al. w(2012) who sho
that spatial structure can also hamper the stability of mutualism in mycorrhiza.
Future avenues for modelling (farming) mutualism
In sum, a more complete understanding of the evolutionary ecology of mutualisms requires
both empirical studies on a wider array of farming mutualisms and theoretical modelling
effort specifically tailored to farming mutualism. In this section I would like to describe
yhow a suitable model for the evolution of farming mutualism would look like, thereb
taking into consideration the empirical and theoretical findings on farming mutualism I
discussed in the two previous sections. 
In my opinion, more encompassing models for the evolution of farming mutualism should
include the following features:
● Asymmetric host-symbiont interaction (in terms of cost-benefit ratio, goods or services
exchanged, generation time, body size, number of individuals): asymmetry on one or
more levels is a key characteristic of farming mutualism
● Nutritional benefit for the host: by definition, the host is dependent on the symbiont for
food, and the condition of the host should thus directly improve with consuming (part
of) the symbiont. 
● Protection and uniform environment provided by the host: in many farming mutualisms,
host protection increases symbiont survival and decreases environmental fluctuations,
by creating a uniform environment.
● Different symbiont reproductive modes possible: sexual vs. asexual: the two alternative
outcomes of the conflict on reproductive mode
● Different symbiont transmission modes possible: vertical vs. horizontal: the two alterna-
tive outcomes for the conflict on transmission mode
● Different levels of symbiont diversity possible: monoculture vs. different degrees of poly-
culture.
● Host control over symbiont reproduction, transmission and diversity (symbiont related-
ness) should be allowed to evolve: host control is often assumed to be the driving force
behind conflict resolution in farming mutualism. However, host control should not be
an a priori assumption but an evolving trait, as it will undergo evolutionary change
when the symbiosis becomes more integrated.
● Co-transmission and simultaneous timing of reproduction should be allowed to undergo
evolutionary change: these two mechanisms can lead to positive assortment of mutual-
fistic partners. Implementing these mechanisms can help evaluating the importance o
positive assortment for the evolution of mutualism.
In addition, my thesis results indicate that a good model for mutualism in general should
ideally include the following two components: (1) conditional behaviour of the interacting
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ydegrees of freedom for interacting partners, which can lead to unforeseen co-evolutionar
dynamics that may remain overlooked when behaviour is presumed to be unconditional in
a model (Chapter 6, 7). Second, allowing evolution of variables that have hitherto been
considered constant can also give new insights into mutualism dynamics. Joint evolution
of mutualism intensity and cost-benefits ratios is particularly important, because it allows
modelled mutualisms to move along the mutualism-parasitism continuum.
fA model with these features would allow for an in-depth analysis of the outcomes o
host-symbiont conflict and the mechanisms governing them in specific biological systems.
For example, is low symbiont diversity indeed a basic requirement for stable farming mutu-
alism to evolve, as comparison of natural farming mutualisms suggests? And what is the
relative importance of mechanisms like host control, partner fidelity and partner choice? Is
each of these necessary for stable farming mutualism, or can mutualism remain stable also
in the absence of one of them? Lastly, such a model would give us insight in the mutual-
ism-parasitism dynamics of farming mutualisms.
CONCLUSION
The establishment of a mutually beneficial relationship requires partners to be able to
repeatedly choose to continue an interaction (partner fidelity). Although most farming
mutualisms may start under this condition, subsequent co-evolution, inherent asymmetry,
fand potential conflicts of interests will ultimately erode the initial degrees of freedom o
the partners in terms of dispersal, reproduction and partner choice. However, giving up on
individual freedom may be compensated for by being part of an increasingly productive,
specialized system in which the individual partners are more successful than they would
yhave been on their own. This is also what likely happened to the root aphids tended b
Yellow meadow ants: the protective environment provided by the ants might have given
the aphids the opportunity to give up almost all sexual reproduction, stay at the same loca-
tion for prolonged periods of time and spread northwards from their original habitat. Vice
versa, the year-round presence of aphids for ‘milk and meat’ gives the ants the opportunity
to reach higher population densities than they could reach in salt marsh habitats without
aphids. It is therefore safe to say that, for these ants and aphids, life seems better together. 
Why are we here? And where do we go? And how come it’s so hard?
It’s not always easy and sometimes life can be deceiving
I’ll tell you one thing, it’s always better when we’re together
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MUTUALISME
Mutualisme, een interactie tussen organismen die tot verschillende soorten behoren en
waarvan beide ‘partners’ profijt hebben, komt veel voor in de natuur. We kunnen zelfs
stellen dat mutualismen het leven op aarde zoals we dat kennen over miljoenen jaren
hebben beïnvloed en ook nu nog steeds beïnvloeden. Zo wordt bijvoorbeeld de energie-
voorziening in de cellen van de meeste organismen verzorgd door mitochondriën die lang
geleden nog onafhankelijke, mutualistische bacteriën waren. Mutualismen in allerlei
vormen en maten zijn ook belangrijk voor de stabiliteit van ecosystemen in onze verande-
rende wereld; denk aan planten en hun bestuivende insecten en de verspreiding van zaden
door vogels en knaagdieren. Andere mutualismen die iedere dag weer van invloed zijn op
ons leven zijn de interacties tussen ons en ons vee en onze gewassen, maar ook bijvoor-
beeld onze ‘samenwerking’ met de bacteriën in onze darmen: zij helpen de vertering van
ons voedsel in ruil voor veilige ‘woonruimte’ en continue aanvoer van hun eigen nutriën-
ten. 
Ondanks het overduidelijke belang van mutualisme voor het leven op onze planeet is
dit proces historisch onderbelicht gebleven in de evolutiebiologie; traditioneel kregen pro-
cessen als competitie en gastheer-parasiet-interacties meer aandacht. Pas sinds de laatste
twee decennia beseffen evolutiebiologen dat het ontstaan van mutualismen en hun stabi-
liteit over evolutionaire tijd niet vanzelfsprekend zijn en tot op heden onbegrepen zijn
gebleven.
Het doel van dit proefschrift was om meer inzicht te krijgen in de evolutie en ecologie
van mutualismen. Om deze inzichten te krijgen maakte ik gebruik van twee complemen-
taire invalshoeken. Allereerst deed ik empirisch, (moleculair) kecologisch onderzoe
aan één specifiek mutualisme, dat tussen de Gele weidemier en de wortelbladluizen in
haar nest. Ten tweede combineerde ik dit met theoretisch onderzoek in de vorm van
simulatiemodellen die de evolutie van samenwerking binnen en tussen soorten nabootsen. 
DE PUZZEL DIE DE EVOLUTIE VAN SAMENWERKING HEET
De evolutie van samenwerking is één van de grootste vraagstukken binnen de evolutiethe-
orie. Natuurlijke selectie is immers gebaseerd op competitie om voortplanting en overle-
ving. Hoe hebben deze concurrerende organismen dan toch het vermogen ontwikkeld
elkaar te helpen, terwijl ze vaak meer voordeel zouden kunnen behalen wanneer ze alleen
van anderen zouden profiteren zonder zelf te investeren?
Samenwerking binnen soorten
Dit probleem is zeer uitgebreid onderzocht voor het geval van samenwerking tussen soort-
genoten (‘binnen soorten’). De belangrijkste mechanismen die tot de evolutie van samen-
werking kunnen leiden kunnen worden onderverdeeld in twee categorieën: 
(1) De eerste categorie bestaat uit mechanismen die ervoor zorgen dat potentiële samen-
kwerkingspartners niet willekeurig bij elkaar komen. Een voorbeeld van een dergelij
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als bijkomend voordeel heeft dat gemeenschappelijke genen worden doorgegeven. Een
ander voorbeeld is samenwerking die kan ontstaan wanneer individuele organismen,
die de neiging hebben tot helpen, bij elkaar in de buurt blijven, bijvoorbeeld omdat ze
zich zelden verspreiden. 
(2) De tweede categorie bevat mechanismen die de investering in samenwerking af laten
hangen van de acties van anderen of van omgevingskenmerken. Een voorbeeld hiervan
is Tit-for-Tat:‘voor wat, hoort wat’.
Samenwerking tussen soorten
Kin selection bleek één van de beste verklaringen te zijn voor samenwerking tussen soort-
genoten. Voor mutualisme, de samenwerking tussen organismen van verschillende soorten
(‘tussen soorten’), kan kin selection echter geen rol spelen: verschillende soorten delen hun
genen per definitie niet. Het bestaan van mutualisme is daarom tot nu toe onverklaard
gebleven en wordt gezien als één van de grote onopgeloste vraagstukken binnen de evolu-
tiebiologie. Dit vraagstuk is tweeledig: (1) Ten eerste is het onduidelijk hoe mutualismen
kunnen ontstaan. (2) Ten tweede is het onduidelijk hoe mutualismen als zodanig in stand
blijven. Dit laatste kan namelijk problematisch zijn omdat natuurlijke selectie altijd op
beide partners apart van toepassing zal zijn en niet op de interactie als geheel. Dat bete-
k kent dat partners door natuurlijke selectie zullen worden geselecteerd om zoveel mogelij
van de interactie te profiteren en er zelf zo weinig mogelijk in te investeren. Met andere
woorden: theoretisch zouden mutualisten door natuurlijke selectie moeten worden gedre-
ven tot het parasiteren van hun partner. Toch wijst het wijdverbreid voorkomen van mutu-
alisme erop dat een mutualistische interactie niet zomaar een parasitaire interactie wordt.
Welke mechanismen zorgen ervoor dat dit niet gebeurt? En welke mechanismen zorgen er
eigenlijk voor dat die mutualismen überhaupt vanuit het niets kunnen ontstaan? Hieronder
zal ik de voornaamste theoretische ideeën over het ontstaan en in stand blijven van mutu-
alismen behandelen.
(1) Dit eerste idee betreft voornamelijk het ontstaan van mutualismen. Veel mutualismen
komen waarschijnlijk voort uit bijproduct-interacties. Dit zijn interacties waarbij er bij
een handeling van de ene soort een bijproduct ontstaat dat van waarde is voor een
andere soort. Belangrijke voorbeelden hiervan zijn honingdauwmutualismen. Hierbij
scheiden insecten die leven op plantensappen (bijvoorbeeld bladluizen) een sui-
kerachtig goedje uit (honingdauw) als uitwerpselen. Deze honingdauw wordt dan
weer opgegeten door bijvoorbeeld mieren, die in ruil daarvoor goed voor de bladlui-
zen zorgen. In zulke gevallen is de verhouding tussen kosten en baten van de interac-
tie voor de producent van het bijproduct laag: de luizen maken de honingdauw vrijwel
gratis en krijgen er waardevolle bescherming voor terug. 
(2) Het tweede idee heeft voornamelijk betrekking op het in stand blijven van mutualis-
men. Dit betreft twee mechanismen die te maken hebben met wederkerigheid van
gedrag tussen de partners. Deze mechanismen zijn de betrouwbaarheid van een
partner over tijd en partnerkeuze en sancties tegen partners die niet samenwerken. Met
betrouwbaarheid wordt bedoeld dat de ene partner er voldoende op kan rekenen dat
de andere partner bij de volgende gelegenheid tot interactie ook weer beschikbaar is.
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goede basis voor mutualistische samenwerking in de toekomst. In de natuur komt een
dergelijk hoge betrouwbaarheid voor wanneer twee samenwerkende soorten zich na
voorplanting samen verspreiden, zoals bijvoorbeeld bacteriën die in het lichaam van
insecten leven en zich tegelijkertijd voortplanten met deze insecten. Partnerkeuze en
sancties zorgen ervoor dat partners actief kunnen kiezen samen te werken met ‘goede’
partners en ‘slechte’ partners kunnen vermijden. Ook op deze manier ontstaat er een
goede basis voor samenwerking. Een voorbeeld van partnerkeuze en sancties in de
fnatuur kan gevonden worden in de interactie tussen planten en bacteriën die stiksto
voor hen fixeren in ruil voor voedingsstoffen: deze planten geven alleen voedingsstof-
fen aan de bacteriën die het best presteren.
HET ‘KWEEKMUTUALISME’ TUSSEN DE GELE WEIDEMIER EN
WORTELBLADLUIZEN
Kweekmutualismen
Het empirische deel van dit proefschrift staat in het teken van één specifieke mutualisti-
sche interactie: die tussen de Gele weidemier Lasius flavus en meerdere soorten wortel-
bladluizen die door deze mier in haar nest worden gehouden. Deze interactie
vertegenwoordigt een bepaalde groep van mutualismen: de zogeheten ‘kweekmutualis-
men’. In dergelijke interacties bevordert de ene soort, de ‘kweker’, de groei van de andere
soort, de ‘symbiont’, van wie de kweker afhankelijk is voor de voedselvoorziening.
Kweekmutualismen komen in allerlei vormen en maten voor: Er zijn mieren en termieten
die schimmels kweken in hun nest, in de zee houden bepaalde vissen keurige algentuintjes
bij en er zijn zelfs ééncellige amoeben bekend die bacteriën kweken. 
De Gele weidemier en haar wortelbladluizen
Het systeem dat ik hier bestudeerde is een voorbeeld van veehouderij in de natuur: de
Gele weidemier bouwt in haar ondergrondse nesten kleine kamertjes die een beschermde
omgeving vormen waar de wortelbladluizen rustig van plantenwortels kunnen drinken. De
Gele weidemier is afhankelijk van de luizen voor zowel suiker als eiwit: de mieren ‘melken’
de luizen voor het suikerachtige goedje honingdauw en ‘slachten’ hun vee ook af en toe
voor hun stikstofvoorziening. Andersom zijn ook de luizen afhankelijk geworden van deze
interactie: de lichaamsbouw van de luizen is volledig aangepast aan het leven bij de
mieren, waardoor ze niet meer onafhankelijk kunnen overleven. Er kunnen meer dan
dertien verschillende soorten luizen in de mierennesten voorkomen. De Gele weidemieren
en hun wortelbladluizen zijn op meerdere plekken in noordwest Europa te vinden. Slechts
onder zeer specifieke ecologische omstandigheden maken ze hun grote karakteristieke
mierenbulten. De kwelder van Schiermonnikoog is een dergelijke locatie en het meeste
veldwerk voor dit proefschrift heeft dan ook daar plaatsgevonden.
Mogelijke conflicten tussen de partners
De insteek van dit gedetailleerde onderzoek naar de evolutionaire ecologie van de Gele
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gegevens van andere dergelijke interacties om op deze manier nieuwe algemene inzichten
over de ecologie en evolutie van kweekmutualismen te krijgen. De achtergrondgedachte
hierbij is dat in dergelijke interacties beide partners er altijd een eigen agenda op zullen
nahouden. Voor de kweker is het bijvoorbeeld van belang dat hij erop kan rekenen dat de
symbiont zoveel mogelijk in de buurt blijft en zoveel mogelijk energie investeert in het
produceren van voedsel, terwijl de symbiont misschien ook energie wil investeren in onaf-
hankelijke verspreiding of seksuele voortplanting (in plaats van bijvoorbeeld klonale voort-
planting). Deze eigen agenda’s zouden mogelijk tot evolutionaire conflicten kunnen leiden
tussen de beide parters. In het onderzoek van dit proefschrift stonden drie mogelijke con-
flicten tussen kweker en symbiont centraal: de potentiële conflicten over (1) de voortplan-
tingswijze van de symbiont (sexueel of asexueel/klonaal), (2) de mate van verspreiding
van de symbiont (veel of weinig) en (3) de (genetische) diversiteit van de symbiontenpo-
pulatie (mengcultuur of monocultuur). 
RESULTATEN VAN DE EMPIRISCHE STUDIES
Hoofdstuk 2 richtte zich op de wijze van voortplanting en mate van verspreiding van de
vier meest voorkomende wortelbladluissoorten in de nesten van Lasius flavus. In deze
studie verzamelde ik wortelbladluizen uit mierenbulten op de kwelder van Schiermonnik-
oog. Door middel van een populatiegenetische analyse, die ik verder toelicht in hoofd-
stuk 3, toonde ik aan dat alle vier de luizensoorten zich voornamelijk (en mogelijk alleen
maar) klonaal voortplanten in deze eilandpopulatie. Luizenmoeders produceren dus enkel
dochters die exacte kopieën zijn van zichzelf. Ook toonde ik aan dat de luizen zich maar
zelden verspreiden vanuit de mierennesten: over het algemeen komen specifieke klonen
slechts zeer lokaal voor. Deze bevinding werd verder ondersteund door de waarneming dat
gevleugelde luizen zeer zeldzaam zijn. Interessant genoeg is deze combinatie van klonale
voortplanting en weinig verspreiding ook veelvoorkomend in andere kweekmutualismen.
Ook de schimmel van schimmelkwekende mieren plant zich enkel klonaal voort en ver-
spreiding die onafhankelijk van de verspreiding van mieren is, komt maar zelden voor. 
In hoofdstuk 4 bracht ik de diversiteit aan luizensoorten en luizenklonen in de mie-
renbulten verder in kaart. Deze studie laat zien dat in de meerderheid van de mierenbulten
slechts één luizensoort voorkomt en dat er binnen die soort vaak maar één enkele kloon
per mierennest voorkomt. Wanneer er meerdere soorten en/of klonen in een nest voorko-
men, leven deze vaak gescheiden in aparte luizenkamers. Op bult-niveau is er dus soms
sprake van mengculturen, maar op luizenkamer-niveau komen er bijna uitsluitend mono-
culturen voor. Deze vinding van monoculturen is in lijn met andere kweekmutualismen,
zoals bijvoorbeeld de vissen met hun algentuinen die vaak slechts één soort alg kweken.
Hoofdstuk 4 toont verder aan dat het aannemelijk is dat de mieren voornamelijk jonge
luizen opeten voor hun eiwitvoorziening en een beperkter aantal van luizen (ongeveer 70)
per bult bewaren voor de honingdauwvoorziening. De pilot-studie van Box A laat zien dat
mieren in keuzeexperimenten geen voorkeur laten zien voor luizen van verschillende soort
of herkomst. Deze resultaten suggereren dat er wellicht geen actieve partnerkeuze door
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siteit verklaard worden uit de klonale voortplanting van de luizen en beperkte verspreiding
die daarop volgt.
Tot slot wordt de ontwikkeling van de genetische markers die gebruikt werden voor de
studies van hoofdstukken 2 en 4 verder toegelicht in hoofdstuk 5. Tevens wordt in Box
B de ontwikkeling van de software die gebruikt is voor deze genetische analyse toegelicht. 
RESULTATEN VAN DE THEORETISCHE MODELLEN
In hoofdstukken 6 en 7 bestudeerde ik de evolutie van samenwerking binnen soorten
en tussen soorten met behulp van computersimulaties. In hoofdstuk 6 ontwierp ik een
model voor samenwerking binnen één soort, waarbij ik als voorbeeld bacteriën in gedach-
ten hield. In het model vormen deze bacteriën één enkele populatie, die is onderverdeeld
in subpopulaties. De bacteriën kunnen een stofje uitscheiden dat voor hen kostbaar is om
te maken, maar waar zijzelf en hun soortgenoten van kunnen groeien. De totale hoeveel-
heid van het stofje wordt binnen de subpopulatie gedeeld. In het model liet ik de neiging
tot investeren in het stofje samen evolueren met de neiging om de thuisbasis te verruilen
voor een andere subpopulatie op basis van de hoeveelheid van het stofje die beschikbaar
was. Hierbij verwachtte ik dat individuen beter zouden samenwerken (lees: meer van het
stofje zouden maken) als iedereen de neiging had weg te gaan uit ‘slechte’ subpopulaties.
Het tegendeel bleek waar: in dit model bleek samenwerking juist te ontstaan wanneer de
bacteriën ‘goede’ subpopulaties verruilden voor ‘slechte’. Deze uitkomst is demografisch
goed te verklaren: bacteriën die zijn opgegroeid in een goede subpopulatie verkeren in een
kdusdanig goede gezondheid dat ze de bacteriën in een slechte subpopulatie gemakkelij
k kunnen wegconcurreren als ze daarheen verhuizen. Kortom, zulke modellen die gebrui
maken van de evolutie van gedrag dat afhankelijk is van de acties van anderen kunnen
vaak tot verrassende nieuwe inzichten leiden.
Dit gold ook voor de resultaten van het model uit hoofdstuk 7. De basis van dit
model was dezelfde als die van hoofdstuk 6, maar in deze simulaties modelleerde ik popu-
laties van twee verschillende soorten bacteriën die met elkaar samenwerken, een voor-
beeld van mutualisme dus. Beide soorten scheidden nu een stofje uit dat als voedsel
diende voor de andere soort, maar niet voor henzelf. Iedere subpopulatie bestond uit bac-
teriën van beide soorten en de keuze om te blijven of te vertrekken was gebaseerd op
hoeveel de bacteriën van de andere soort van het stofje produceerden. Ook konden bacte-
riën op basis hiervan kiezen naar welke nieuwe subpopulatie ze wilden gaan. Ook in dit
model bleek samenwerking te evolueren wanneer bacteriën besloten weg te gaan uit goede
subpopulaties. Dit model bevestigde ook het belang van relatief lage kosten ten opzichte
van baten: wanneer de kosten in verhouding hoog werden, evolueerde samenwerking niet
meer. Interessant genoeg bleken de mutualistische interacties die evolueerden vaak asym-
metrisch te zijn: de ene bacteriesoort investeerde vaak meer dan de ander. Deze asymme-
trie is een bekend fenomeen uit de natuur en is ook terug te zien in de verschillen tussen
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CONCLUSIE
De empirische resultaten geven aan dat het voor de evolutie van mutualisme van belang is
dat (generaties van) partners gedurende langere tijdsspannes op elkaar kunnen rekenen
(betrouwbaarheid). In de interactie van de Gele weidemier met haar wortelbladluizen komt
dit sterk naar voren in de vorm van weinig verspreiding en weinig genetische diversiteit:
de mieren kunnen dus min of meer rekenen op constante aanwezigheid van min of meer
dezelfde luizen. Anderzijds geven aanpassingen in lichaamsbouw van de luizen en het
opgeven van sexuele reproductie aan dat ook de luizen in de loop van de tijd zijn gaan
‘rekenen’ op de aanwezigheid van de mieren. 
De theoretische resultaten wijzen er echter op dat deze dynamiek van op elkaar kunnen
rekenen alleen van toepassing is onder specifieke populatiekenmerken: als partners zich
pas verspreiden na de vruchten te hebben geplukt van de samenwerking kan het evolutio-
nair ook voordelig zijn juist bij goede partners weg te gaan.
Zowel de empirische als de theoretische resultaten wijzen erop dat het aannemelijk is
dat relatief lage kosten ten op zichte van de baten ten grondslag liggen aan de evolutie van
mutualismen (zogeheten bijproduct-mutualismen). Het is aannemelijk dat het honingdauw-
mutualisme tussen de mieren en de luizen ooit ontstaan is vanuit mieren die de uitwerpse-
len van luizen als voedingsbron ging benutten. Vanuit deze – voor de luizen- gratis
interactie kon het systeem zich verder ontwikkelen tot de huidige vorm van onderlinge
afhankelijkheid van de mieren en de luizen. Deze bevinding wordt onderschreven door de
resulaten van de simulatiemodellen: samenwerking in de natuur kan enkel van de grond
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